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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines the role Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy 
played in national security policy during the Kennedy administration, drawing on 
significant new archival sources made available only in recent years.  For decades 
Robert Kennedy’s involvement in national security affairs from 1961 to 1963 has 
gone largely unexamined, in part because of a lack of declassified archival evidence 
documenting his activities as the overseer of covert operations against Cuba.  The 
writing and research presented here offers the only sustained examination of this 
aspect of RFK’s political life to date, filling a major gap in the historiography.  
What emerges is a refined understanding of RFK as a major 20th century 
historical figure challenging conventional narratives characterizing him as an icon of 
liberalism and a new lens for studying the foreign policy process of the Kennedy 
administration as a whole. The dissertation shows that RFK was extremely hawkish 
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during his time as attorney general, a sharp contrast to his later reputation.  At the 
president’s behest, the attorney general involved himself in a wide range of national 
security issues.   RFK’s actual influence varied depending on the issue.  In some 
cases he was the driving force behind U.S. policy.  In others, he was simply one voice 
among many in the White House inner circle.  In others still, he served as a conduit 
for sensitive communications to and from the president.   
Beyond describing RFK’s personal role, the dissertation challenges 
longstanding notions of the foreign policy process in the Kennedy administration by 
showing how RFK, the consummate White House insider, often struggled to exercise 
influence as a policymaker.  Most scholarship examining the Kennedy administration 
argues that President Kennedy crafted foreign policy and national security decisions 
with a small group of advisers who held enormous influence. But, as RFK’s 
experiences in this realm demonstrate, structural forces larger than the influence 
wielded by individual policymakers appears to have played a greater role in the 
Kennedy administration than the scholarship to date has recognized. 
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1 
Introduction 
 
Fidel Castro found himself in a thoughtful mood in 2013, when, during an 
interview with the Atlantic, he discussed a few notable American presidents.  The 
semi-retired Cuban leader had just read a biography of Abraham Lincoln, a president 
he found to be much more intriguing than George Washington.  President Kennedy, 
Castro said, was “young and dramatic,” which led him to make many mistakes.  
Castro’s comments to the interviewer suggested almost an air of detachment toward 
President Kennedy, a marked shift from the wrathful feelings Castro held as the two 
leaders clashed in the early 1960s.  But one name brought back some of the old anger: 
Robert F. Kennedy, who served as attorney general during his brother’s presidency.  
In Castro’s eyes, President Kennedy made some grave errors as a leader during one of 
the most intense periods of the Cold War.  But RFK, Castro remains convinced, was 
the one who was actually out to kill him.1    
Castro had good reason for his feelings.  During the Kennedy administration 
RFK did indeed take a leading role in launching covert operations aimed at toppling 
the Cuban leader, one of the many areas in foreign policy where the attorney general 
displayed a Cold War hawkishness that stands in contrast to his prevailing historical 
image as a dovish liberal.  This dissertation fundamentally reshapes our 
understanding of RFK as a historical figure by closely examining his activities in the 
national security realm during the Kennedy administration.  Present historical 
                                                        
1 Jeffrey Goldberg, The Atlantic, Nov. 20, 2013.   
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writings about RFK tend to focus on his domestic political life and portray him as 
undergoing a personal transformation in a heroic arc, moving steadily from a 
reluctant McCarthyite of the 1950s to the embodiment of dovish liberalism in the late 
1960s.  Evidence marshaled in this dissertation clearly shows that RFK could not be 
considered even remotely dovish in any defensible sense of the term on foreign policy 
matters during the entirety of the Kennedy administration, however. The dissertation 
demonstrates clearly that Attorney General Kennedy was quite the opposite, an 
unwavering Cold War hawk whose aggressiveness had long, deep roots going back at 
least to the earliest days of 1961.  This dimension to RFK has hitherto gone 
unrecognized in the historiography, creating a significant distortion in perceptions 
about RFK.  The misrepresentation becomes especially evident in the voluminous 
writings examining the Cuban Missile Crisis, where RFK’s own purposeful 
deceptions cloud the record.  Understanding Attorney General Kennedy in this new 
way then suggests that RFK’s reputation as a liberal in the latter years of his life was 
an external image constructed by him and his political followers rather than a genuine 
transformation.    
At present no single work offers a sustained examination of Attorney General 
Kennedy’s role in foreign affairs during the Kennedy administration, despite a vast 
number of books dedicated to the Kennedy brothers and their exploits.  The two 
leading biographies of RFK tend to minimize this aspect of his political life and focus 
on broader questions about his character and legacy.  The 1978 biography by Arthur 
M. Schlesinger, Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times, devotes very little attention to 
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RFK’s activities on foreign affairs.  Schlesinger’s narrative places RFK squarely in a 
domestic political context.  So does the narrative advanced by Evan Thomas in his 
2000 biography Robert Kennedy: His Life.  In essence, these and other historical 
writings about RFK tend to look backward on his life from 1968, when RFK emerged 
as a leading critic of the U.S. intervention in Vietnam during his own White House 
campaign.  RFK’s tragic death amid the campaign helped make that year a watershed 
moment on the postwar political and cultural timeline.  Historians and the reading 
pubic alike largely see RFK through the lens of the late 1960s, thereby freezing his 
image in the moments immediately preceding his death.  The 1969 book 85 Days: 
The Last Campaign of Robert Kennedy by Jules Witcover helped launch 
interpretations adhering to this approach, which has continued through recent times 
with the 2002 book by Joseph Palermo In His Own Right: The Political Odyssey of 
Senator Robert F. Kennedy.  As these works suggest, the historiography on RFK 
largely ignores one of the most fateful parts of his political life, the time he spent at 
work on national security issues alongside President Kennedy. 
In fact, RFK immersed himself in foreign affairs following the Bay of Pigs 
and remained an important voice on major national security decisions up to President 
Kennedy’s death in 1963.  The president urged RFK to become involved in national 
security issues, and the attorney general responded with alacrity.  Cuba stood as the 
highest priority for RFK from the start, and the attorney general devoted most of the 
time he spent on national security to that issue.  But his involvement in Cuba quickly 
led him to become active on foreign policy issues ranging from development projects 
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in Africa to coup plotting in Latin America and Southeast Asia.  Existing 
historiography offers only glimpses of this activity.  The most authoritative scholarly 
account of the Kennedy administration to date is Robert Dallek’s 2004 JFK biography 
An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy 1917 – 1963.  Dallek devotes little attention to 
RFK’s role on national security policy.  President Kennedy’s war cabinet, which 
came to include RFK, falls under close scrutiny by Lawrence Freedman in his 2000 
book Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam.  Freedman dissects national 
security policymaking, and RFK does indeed emerge as a player.  But Freedman’s 
narrative puts RFK at the edge of an inner circle dominated by figures such as 
McGeorge Bundy, Robert McNamara and Maxwell Taylor. 
RFK was very much a part of that inner circle, however.  He was at the center 
of decision making on key issues and pursued his own foreign policy agenda at times.  
Yet none of the existing literature fully reckons with this aspect of RFK’s tenure as 
attorney general.  The closest thing to an exception we have to this general rule is 
David Kaiser’s 2009 book The Road to Dallas: The Assassination of John F. 
Kennedy.  Kaiser, a respected historian, mined the vast collection of documents 
compiled for the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection by the National 
Archives.  RFK’s heavy involvement in Cuban affairs comes to light here in 
significant detail, but Kaiser does not examine RFK’s role in other foreign policy 
matters.    
Other works where RFK’s participation in foreign policy is a topic of 
somewhat sustained examination exist primarily outside the realm of academic study, 
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further underscoring the historiographical importance of this dissertation.  Journalistic 
books such as David Halberstam’s 1969 The Best and the Brightest and Gus Russo’s 
2008 book Brothers in Arms: The Kennedys, Castro and the Politics of Murder 
foreground RFK’s involvement in Vietnam and Cuba, respectively.  They do so, 
however, without relying on archival evidence.  In sum, only fragments of RFK’s 
extensive activities in the realm of foreign policy appear throughout works covering 
the Kennedys, the Kennedy administration and the Cold War in the early 1960s.  But 
as yet no historian has drawn these narratives together in a holistic way.  This 
dissertation, with relevant new archival material on the topic at its core, fills a major 
gap in the current scholarship.   
The impetus for the project and a core element of the source material used 
came to light only recently at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.  In an 
unusual arrangement, the Kennedy family had for years withheld 62 boxes of 
materials from RFK's attorney general files, apparently because they contained 
potentially embarrassing evidence of RFK’s role in covert operations against Castro.  
Eventually, however, the Kennedy family agreed to hand these papers over to the 
JFKL, which processed them for release in accordance with standing declassification 
practices.  Archivists deemed four boxes personal, and those remain sealed.  The 
closed boxes apparently relate to family matters involving various members of the 
Kennedy clan still alive.    
The other 58 boxes now newly available all came from either the Classified 
Files series or the Confidential Files series within the Attorney General papers, and 
  
 
6 
they opened in three installments:  October 2012, July 2013, and December 2013. The 
appearance of the December 2013 files marked the final release and completed the 
processing of the Attorney General papers.  Virtually all of the newly available 
documents stem from RFK’s work on foreign affairs, and taken together they 
represents a sizable haul of material not yet integrated into the literature on RFK or 
the Kennedy administration generally.  The two most prominent biographers of RFK 
to date, Thomas and Schlesinger, did not have full access to these papers.  The 
Kennedy family gave them each some limited access, but both complained about the 
lacuna even so.2   
Beginning in January of 2014, I undertook a comprehensive review of all the 
newly available materials, digitizing thousands of pages of important documents in 
the collection.  Elements of the collection are truly revelatory.  For example, the 
hundreds of documents relating to the Central Intelligence Agency in the collection 
offer fresh glimpses into how deeply enmeshed RFK became in the agency’s 
activities.  But the collection poses significant challenges as well.  Roughly a third of 
the contents of any given box remain classified, with documents removed and 
replaced by withdrawal slips offering little information.  These lacunae, spread 
throughout the newly released attorney general files, create difficulties in sustaining a 
narrow focus on RFK’s dealings in foreign affairs.  Given the amount of material 
remaining classified we simply do not have enough documents to form an unbroken 
                                                        
2 Bryan Bender, “Kennedys Keep Vice-Grip on RFK Papers,” Boston Globe, Aug. 5, 2012.  Bender’s 
article highlights the limits placed on Schlesinger.  Thomas discusses limited access in the 
acknowledgments of his 2000 biography Robert Kennedy: His Life. 
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narrative covering RFK’s activities on this score with a strict focus on RFK’s 
activities.  Furthermore, the documents available for examination in the new materials 
mostly offer a one-sided view of what information RFK received.  For example, there 
are many reports from the CIA and the State Department in the new materials 
covering a wide array of subjects.  But often there is little or no evidence indicating 
RFK’s thoughts and reactions to the contents of these documents.  Still, the new 
documents allow us to render a much more complete picture than currently exists, 
especially if we widen the lens and situate RFK within the context of events involving 
him even when his exact role remains somewhat murky.  To that end this dissertation 
utilizes additional archival materials such as the JFK Assassination Records and the 
document sets covering the Kennedy administration in volumes of the State 
Department’s Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS).      
At times in the pages ahead RFK necessarily moves to the edge of the frame 
as the document base falls short in offering enough material to maintain a narrow 
focus on his specific actions.  But the document record we have puts RFK 
nonetheless in the picture of all events discussed here, and what follows is the fullest 
possible account of RFK’s involvement with the evidence currently available.  
Formal declassification reviews requested by researchers offer hope of prying loose 
more documents in the near future that can help expand this picture.  In fact, some of 
the requests I have submitted on roughly 160 items have already produced results.  
The National Archives has declassified more than two dozen documents from this 
collection per my requests, and a number factor into the research appearing in the 
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following pages with significant insights.  Further declassification will undoubtedly 
add to this new narrative, but for the moment this is the most comprehensive account.   
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I.  RFK and the Bay of Pigs 
 
A View from the Sidelines 
In the early months of the Kennedy administration RFK absorbed himself in domestic 
issues as the newly appointed attorney general, but the looming conflagration in Cuba 
drew his attention nonetheless.  Initially Cuba emerged as a small, if ominous, 
distraction for RFK, a foreign policy matter the president addressed mainly with his 
formal national security team.  Very soon, however, Cuba became the attorney 
general’s most pressing foreign policy concern.  The president drew RFK into Cuban 
affairs increasingly as the Bay of Pigs neared, and RFK moved to insert himself into 
matters too as the issue took on the dimensions of a major political crisis.  The 
ensuing debacle transformed RFK and his role within the White House.  For the rest 
of the Kennedy administration RFK fixated on Cuba with an intensity matched by no 
other official.  His early dealings on Cuba heavily shaped the approach he adopted in 
handling the issue later, coloring his perceptions and driving his actions and thinking.  
President Kennedy inherited from his predecessor a plan to topple Fidel Castro; 
neither the president nor the attorney general ever seriously questioned the need to do 
that.  Moreover, the general plans for removing Castro crafted by the Eisenhower 
administration formed the basis of the future measures RFK would oversee as the 
administration’s de facto Cuba tsar, a template he and others would utilize again and 
again in launching their own efforts.  Importantly, the Bay of Pigs and its aftermath 
drove RFK to form connections with a host of desperate actors, American and Cuban 
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alike.  Those connections became some of the most important relationships RFK 
forged while attorney general.  RFK’s unexpected immersion in Cuba during the 
opening months of 1961 ultimately propelled the attorney general into the upper 
rungs of the national security establishment, where he would remain a fixture until 
President Kennedy’s death. 
The Bay of Pigs plan was in fact already unraveling by the time RFK first 
heard about it in detail shortly after Inauguration Day in 1961.  The rebel force of 
Cuban exiles created by the Central Intelligence Agency to confront Castro was 
wasting away, despite months of training at their secret base in the mountainous 
jungles of Guatemala.  Fighters of Brigade 2506, as they called themselves, were 
becoming a deadly force to be sure.  They had the ability and the will to inflict 
significant bloodshed and destruction, as they would soon show.  But Castro was 
growing stronger too, and his forces would ultimately outmatch the invaders.  The 
Cuban leader had sensed the threat and armed and prepared with help from Moscow, 
turning his island into a virtual garrison state. 3  Matters only worsened as time 
passed.  The odds of the rebels striking a decisive blow dwindled day by day in the 
early weeks of 1961 given Castro’s moves to protect himself.  If something were to 
be done, if the rebels were to launch a plausible attempt to overthrow the regime in 
Havana, then the incoming Kennedy administration had to act soon. 4  This was the 
scenario the new administration confronted.   
                                                        
3 Memorandum of Conversation, Jan. 22, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. X, 24. 
4 Ibid. 
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RFK took in this grim picture while sitting among more than a dozen of the 
most senior national security officials in Washington.  The group met at the State 
Department on a weekend just days after the inauguration since the matter was so 
urgent.  CIA chief Allen Dulles, his protégée Richard Bissell and Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer led a group of holdovers from the 
Eisenhower administration.  Unquestioned doyens of the national security 
establishment under President Eisenhower, Dulles and Bissell in particular embodied 
the old guard of the cold war, a conflict they waged in full regardless of elections.  
The young Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk 
represented the new president’s national security team at the meeting, with RFK close 
at their side.  The group listened as Dulles, Lemnitzer and other officials described 
the ongoing covert operations at the heart of the so-called Cuba Project. 5 
At a remote location in Guatemala, some 600 Cubans were undergoing 
paramilitary training, the group was told.  They stood as the armed wing of a political 
front also organized and funded by the CIA, which had provided the Cuban rebels 
with a small air force consisting of about two dozen World War II planes.  The 
project sought nothing less than to foment a counterrevolution against Castro and 
install a pro-American junta.  The plot had begun in the early months of 1960, and 
initially the idea had been to have the paramilitary fighters infiltrate Cuba in small 
bands to sow a rebellion that would sweep Castro from power.  But now, inside Cuba, 
tens of thousands of national police officers and militiamen hunted dissenters all over 
                                                        
5 Memorandum of Conversation, Jan. 22, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. X, 24. 
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the island.  Any subversives lived deep underground or had left the island.  Sparking 
an insurgency amid such internal security seemed unlikely.  A more overt campaign, 
an outright attack by the rebel force, emerged as a risky but necessary option.  The 
CIA wanted guidance from the new administration on how to proceed. 
 Hearing all this, McNamara asked Dulles how big the exile force needed to be 
in order to overthrow Castro.  Once the Cuban brigade reached full strength, Dulles 
said, they could perhaps attack Cuba openly with an amphibious landing, seize a 
beachhead and consolidate enough territory to stand up a government in arms, which 
could then conceivably attract supporters from across the island.  But success was 
uncertain at best.  At the same time the Cubans in Guatemala had to go somewhere 
and soon.  Keeping them in Guatemala was untenable.  The exiles were growing 
impatient, and their presence posed political problems for the Guatemalan leadership.  
Returning them to the United States, where many had been recruited by the CIA from 
the Cuban exile community, posed major problems too.  A disbanded guerrilla force 
privy to CIA secret war plans was unlikely to keep quiet.6  Also, as RFK recalled later 
in an oral history interview, disbanding rebels posed a political problem for President 
Kennedy: “If he hadn’t gone ahead with it everybody would have said it showed that 
he had no courage because Eisenhower trained these people. It was Eisenhower’s 
plan.”7    
                                                        
6 Memorandum of Conversation, Jan. 22, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. X, 24. 
7 Robert Kennedy, in recorded interview by John Bartlow Martin, March 1, 1964, p. 51, John F. 
Kennedy Oral History Program of the John F. Kennedy Library. 
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At one point in the meeting RFK spoke up to say that five days prior an 
attorney who had formerly worked for Castro reached out to him suggesting that Raul 
Castro, Fidel’s brother, closest confidant and ultimate successor, was considering 
defecting.  The scenario seemed unlikely, and the group turned its attention to what 
was becoming a key question:  Where should the Cuban brigade land?  The Isle of 
Pines off the southern coast of Cuba offered a possibility.  But wouldn’t a mainland 
attack stand a better chance of triggering action among rebels still inside Cuba?  The 
whole affair, Secretary of State Rusk stated, carried extraordinary dangers.  U.S. 
adventurism against Cuba risked sparking deadly confrontations in regions much 
farther away, Rusk said.  Money for the project was discussed.  Further meetings 
were planned.  Nothing concrete was decided.8  But every person at the meeting came 
away aware that serious and likely bloody events were taking shape on the horizon 
with regard to Cuba. 
RFK was not entirely sure why he had been invited to that briefing.9   True, he 
was no stranger to the Cuba issue, which was increasingly entangled with domestic 
matters.  Around the time RFK attended the meeting at the State Department, the 
attorney general heard from the Federal Bureau of Investigation that casino moguls 
with ties to organized crime had approached the Democratic Revolutionary Front, 
known by its Spanish acronym FRD, then the main Cuban rebel group in Miami 
supported by the CIA.  The gambling barons offered $2 million in financial support 
                                                        
8 Memorandum of Conversation, Jan. 22, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. X, 24. 
9 Robert Kennedy, in recorded interview by John Bartlow Martin, March 1, 1964, pp. 41-42, John 
F. Kennedy Oral History Program of the John F. Kennedy Library.  
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of their own to the group.10  Castro’s revolution had been very bad for a host of 
casino owners who flourished under the old regime.  Castro’s rebel movement had 
long condemned Cuba’s lavish casinos, casting them as symbols of the Batista 
regime’s links to organized crime.  When the revolution came, looters swarmed the 
casinos, and the new regime shuttered the gambling industry.11  Castro ordered casino 
operators out of Cuba and promised to execute any he found.12  The casino owners 
badly wanted back into Cuba and believed a successful overthrow of Castro would 
open the way.  The fact that mobsters and shady casino owners were lurking around 
Cuban rebels tied to the CIA was certainly cause for concern for the new attorney 
general.  Also, Cuba had been a major topic of debate during the 1960 White House 
campaign, which RFK had managed for his brother. Senator John F. Kennedy struck 
a hawkish stance on the Cuban question in his run against Vice President Richard 
Nixon, arguing essentially that the Eisenhower administration had not been tough 
enough with Castro. The Kennedy administration would be stronger, or so the 
campaign rhetoric went.13  Now the new administration had a chance to demonstrate 
its resolve.  And Robert Kennedy, one of the president’s most trusted advisers, would 
be likely to play a role in any major decisions on Cuba, a reality evident to all 
involved.  Probably for this reason RFK began receiving daily intelligence summaries 
of happenings in Cuba along with the rest of the paper flow that streamed to his office 
                                                        
10 Memo from FBI Director to the Attorney General, Jan. 23, 1961.  JFK Assassination Records, 
FBI files, Record Number 124-90055-10140. 
11 Associated Press, New York Times, Jan. 4, 1959.  
12 Frank Ragano, Mob Lawyer, pp. 49-50.  
13 Robert Dallek, An Unfinished Life, p. 290.  
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at the Justice Department.14  RFK might have been confused about the reason why he 
was invited to attend a major national security meeting, but others there and 
elsewhere in the administration evidently were not. Still, Cuba as a policy matter 
stood well outside RFK’s portfolio as attorney general.   
In those early days of the administration RFK attended a couple of cabinet 
meetings where foreign policy was the main topic, but he had little reason to take an 
active role in such discussions.  Running the Justice Department was after all chiefly 
a domestic job.  When the lawyer with supposed connections to Raul Castro 
contacted RFK again February, the attorney general referred him to the State 
Department.15   The attorney general of course was the brother of the president, which 
allowed him some purview on any range of matters.  Everyone in the White House 
seemed recognize this even before the Bay of Pigs.  But in the opening months of the 
administration RFK was very much the younger brother and a conspicuously junior 
member of the White House Cabinet.  Most of the men close to President Kennedy 
were much older with credentials that far outclassed the young attorney general, 
whose inexperience drew criticism in the press and public ribbing from his older 
brother.  RFK took it all in stride but remained conscious of his limited gravitas 
within the administration.  He was there because he was the president’s brother, not 
because he was an ace lawyer, brilliant mind or political heavyweight, qualities 
virtually all senior members of the administration shared except RFK.   
                                                        
14 See box 201, Attorney General Papers, Classified File, JOHN F. KENNEDY LIBRARY.  The 
dozens of intelligence briefs here offer a mix of news summaries and intelligence snippets.   
15 Memorandum of Conversation, Feb. 4, 1961, FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. X, 36. 
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For a time in the early part of 1961, RFK spent much of his days just meeting 
with reporters.  The new administration in Washington prompted a crush of news 
coverage.  RFK knew many journalists from the campaign trail, and he served as a 
kind of second press secretary for the president.16  When not mingling with 
journalists, Kennedy worked at crafting an agenda for the Justice Department.  Right 
away he focused on stepping up efforts against organized crime, a longtime political 
cause of his.  Within weeks of being on the job RFK overhauled the department’s 
special organized crime unit, changing the leadership and increasing the size until it 
numbered more than sixty attorneys.  Kennedy envisioned a coordinated drive against 
organized crime, a campaign that would bring all relevant arms of the government 
into the fight.  He called for a meeting with Federal Bureau of Investigation Director 
J. Edgar Hoover, Internal Revenue Service Commissioner Mortimer Caplin and 
Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon to hammer out the plan.  Then he summoned all 
the investigative agencies of government departments and urged them to share 
information with one another, especially in coming up with a list of major underworld 
figures to target.  RFK also set up a special unit devoted to pursuing the Teamsters, 
led by his nemesis James Hoffa.  Walter Sheridan, one of RFK’s closest aides, took 
charge of the initiative.17  And so things might have continued, with Kennedy 
increasingly consumed by the everyday tasks of running a massive government 
agency.  In many ways Kennedy looked set to stay in his departmental lane like any 
                                                        
16 Robert Kennedy, in recorded interview by John Bartlow Martin, February 29, 1964, pp. 30-31, 
John F. Kennedy Oral History Program of the John F. Kennedy Library. 
17 Robert Kennedy, in recorded interview by John Bartlow Martin, February 29, 1964 p. 39, John 
F. Kennedy Oral History Program of the John F. Kennedy Library.   
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cabinet member in any given administration.  Like other senior officials in 
government, he might have spent his days wrestling with bureaucracy, fighting to 
implement his own programs and playing obligatory Washington politics.  But Cuba 
would change everything.  
 
The Plot and the Players 
The Cuba Project began officially in March 1960, when President Eisenhower 
approved a CIA covert campaign to bring down Castro.  At its heart, the original plan 
amounted to classic guerrilla strategy as advocated by the likes of Mao Zedong, 
Ernesto “Che” Guevara and indeed Castro himself.  Small bands of commando 
subversives operating mainly in rural areas would recruit followers and stoke 
rebellion.  The CIA would hide its backing of the rebels by having agents pose as 
American businessmen supporting the opposition.  Castro’s revolution had indeed left 
a great many American business interests deeply unhappy.18  But the cover story 
never mounted to anything more than a thin veil to Castro and the Cuban exiles who 
began working with the CIA, which assigned hundreds of agents to the project.19  The 
agency established a sprawling base of operations in Coral Gables near Miami during 
the summer of 1960.  The project headquarters office was a converted office building 
disguised as an electronics firm, a cover the CIA hoped would dispel suspicions about 
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the place’s massive amounts of security and communications equipment.20  The 
agency also acquired a number of safe houses in the area and took over an old World 
War II airbase just outside the city.  Thus Miami became the center of activity.21  But 
the project expanded widely as the months passed in 1960, with bases, safe houses 
and various facilities of one kind or another appearing in New Orleans plus Florida 
locales such as Key West, Useppa Island and Opa-locka.  Puerto Rico, Guatemala and 
Panama hosted sites related to the operation, too.   
Troubling questions without easy answers weighed increasingly heavily on 
the minds of CIA planners and Cuban exiles involved in the operation during the 
early days of 1961.  Was the Cuba project even feasible in light of Castro’s 
strengthened hand?  Could the operation remain covert given its size?  What would 
the new president do?  Once in office JFK quickly authorized further work on the 
plan and had the CIA submit its latest version to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which 
okayed the operation.22  But the plan the new White House initially sanctioned in 
January needed modification within weeks.  On February 17 the CIA told President 
Kennedy that the original idea of inserting small bands of guerrillas was no longer 
feasible.  Castro’s forces would likely just hunt down the infiltrators.  Only an 
invasion force capable of seizing and holding territory stood a chance, but the 
window for launching such an attack was closing rapidly because of Castro’s newly 
established weapons pipeline with the Soviet bloc.  The CIA estimated that in no 
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more than six months Castro would be strong enough to fend off anything except a 
full-scale military assault.23  The administration’s window for action grew ever more 
narrow.   
Reports on attack plans by Cuban exiles based in Miami and Guatemala 
appeared regularly in the news in the weeks before assault.  Hardly a day passed 
without a major newspaper somewhere around the country carrying an item about the 
Cuban exile force gathering for a strike against Castro.  For example, on April 10, 
1961, the Boston Globe carried an Associated Press story reporting that Cuban exile 
pilots were leaving the Miami area for a secret base somewhere in Central America.  
The story, originally appearing in the Miami Herald, stated that the pilots “were 
rounded up shortly before last midnight and taken to an embarkation depot by Cuban 
revolutionary leaders.  The men will be spirited out of the country to join others who 
have gone into Cuba to fight Castro or to training bases reportedly operating in 
Central American countries.”24  Such stories had been seeping into the press steadily 
for months, despite all the CIA’s efforts at secrecy.25  As the day of the attack 
approached the news seemed full of open talk about war, while the visible buzz of 
activity and anticipation among the Cuban exiles themselves rose and rose.26  Jose 
Miro Cardona, the president of the Revolutionary Council in Exile, appeared in 
Washington for meetings at the State Department, leaving little question over U.S. 
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collusion despite unflinching American denials.27  Senior Cuban officials, who had 
their own effective intelligence network in addition to the news reports, angrily 
pointed fingers at Washington.  According to the FBI, Castro had more than two 
hundred intelligence agents at work among the exiles in the Miami area as the 
operation took root there.28  G-2, the Cuban military intelligence service, knew many 
details about the CIA camps as of January.29  Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa even 
publically accused the United States of training and equipping a rebel force 
numbering up to 5,000 fighters based in Florida and Guatemala just days before the 
attack.30  Guatemalan President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, meanwhile, openly 
acknowledged the presence of Cuban guerrilla fighters in his country and admitted 
that U.S. military trainers were among them.  But he denied any invasion plan was 
afoot.  The guerrilla fighters were there for defensive purposes, he said during an 
interview with the New York Times.31  The Kennedy administration’s longstanding 
disavowals of involvement with plots against Castro were sounding just as farfetched 
as virtually everyone watching the situation waited for what seemed an inevitable 
battle.  The exiles, supported by the Americans, would attack.  Castro was ready, but 
Cuba might plunge into civil war nonetheless.  No intelligent observer could doubt 
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any of this in the latter part of spring that year.  The only question was when.  What 
day would the attack come? 
The president called RFK about a week before the invasion.  JFK wanted the 
attorney general briefed on what was developing.  Someone from the Central 
Intelligence Agency would be coming to the Justice Department, the president told 
RFK.  The man who appeared shortly thereafter in the attorney general’s office was 
not your average CIA briefer.  It was Bissell, whose official CIA title was deputy 
director for plans, a position that made him essentially the operational head of covert 
activities.32  The Cuba Project was Bissell’s baby, and he was feeling very good about 
it as he sat down alone with the attorney general.  Like Dulles, Bissell evinced all the 
airs of a gentleman spy.  Tall, urbane and handsome, he had an Ivy League pedigree 
and held a Ph.D. in economics.  At the CIA Bissell became a star during the 
Eisenhower administration for his work developing the U-2 spy plane, a 
transformative piece of technology that gave America a decisive edge at a critical 
moment in the cold war.  In 1961 Bissell could reasonably hold out hope for leading 
the CIA one day.  Until then, he stood at the shoulder of Dulles, whose status as a 
Washington untouchable could be matched only by FBI Director Hoover.33 
Bissell explained the updated plan to overthrow Castro to the attorney general.  
Things had changed significantly since the meeting both had attended in January.  
The CIA had been refining the operation for months.  Indeed, Bissell and Dulles 
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personally had been working closely with President Kennedy on finalizing it.  As of 
April 12, the CIA planners envisioned an operation that would look like an internal 
revolt sparked by the arrival of small bands of guerrilla infiltrators under the 
leadership of Cardona and the Revolutionary Council, an umbrella group comprising 
a range of Cuban dissidents.  The operation was not supposed to look like an 
invasion, nor was it to appear to be supported by the United States.  In the hopes of 
clouding the reality many already perceived, Cardona had joined the chorus of denials 
about U.S. involvement in the days leading up to the attack, stressing that Cuban 
counterrevolution was the responsibility of the Cuban people. 34   
Cardona’s fighters needed air support, but the rebels must appear as though 
they had come into the possession of warplanes without American help.  An elaborate 
ruse would accomplish this.  Initial airstrikes by the Cuban brigade’s warplanes 
would knock out Castro’s planes.  Immediately after that the CIA would have a 
Cuban B-26 land in Miami.  A Cuban pilot would emerge saying that he and two 
other B-26 pilots had defected, stolen planes and strafed their Cuban airport before 
flying to Florida.  Meanwhile, an invasion force of more than 1,000 guerrillas would 
be wading ashore from a flotilla escorted at a distance by the U.S. Navy.  The main 
force of raiders would hit beaches in southeastern Cuba in three groups.  A week after 
those men were safely operating ashore another invasion force would land on the 
western end of the island.  The rebel bands would join forces with an estimated 7,000 
insurgents in waiting.  A new revolution would erupt, sweeping the island and 
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toppling the Castro regime in short order.  That was the idea.  There were other 
details such as a diversionary pre-invasion force and airdrops of supplies to be made 
in the days after the landings.35  But the essence of the plan was simple enough: 
knock out Castro’s planes, land the rebels and watch an unstoppable uprising unfold.     
Bissell was upbeat about the prospects.  The fighters were well trained and 
almost feverish with an eagerness to attack.  The target beach was a fine place to land, 
Bissell told the attorney general.  Sure, there was chance Castro’s forces would 
confront the rebels as they hit the shore and prevent them from capturing any territory 
in the first go.  But the terrain around the landing area was good guerrilla country.  If 
Castro’s forces immediately descended on the rebels then they would simply melt 
into the mountains and regroup.  An insurgency against Castro would arise either way 
once the fighters from Brigade 2506 were on the ground in Cuba, Bissell argued.  
RFK asked only a few questions of Bissell, who sensed a bit of apprehension in 
RFK’s quietness.  At bottom the whole plan hinged on the rebels’ ability to seize and 
hold a beachhead, a feat Bissell assured the attorney general was doable.  “I hope 
you’re right,” RFK said.36  Bissell and others at the CIA indeed felt certain, however.  
Efforts on the Cuba project had been slow going with more than a few false starts and 
wrong turns.  But things were now coming together, Bissell and other CIA planners 
believed.  The agency had set in motion an operation that would take Castro from 
power much as CIA plots had undone the leaders of Iran, Guatemala and the 
Dominican Republic during recent years.  
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Much more contentious discussion about the plan erupted at the White House 
in the days leading up to the invasion, and now RFK joined the talks.  Both JFK and 
RFK clearly had reasons for doubting the plan, and neither of the Kennedys ever 
seemed to fully embrace the CIA assumptions about a Cuban uprising materializing 
upon the invasion.  But the president had allowed the plan to proceed nonetheless.  In 
RFK’s mind, one of the main reasons the president did so was because of the political 
difficulty of turning back.  Abandoning the plan would likely open the door for 
political opponents to label JFK soft on communism, a president who stood in the 
way of freedom fighters whom Eisenhower had supported. 37  But the problems with 
the plan became more evident as the day of the attack neared, and JFK clearly grew 
increasingly less comfortable with the idea.  The president was going over and over 
the details before giving his final assent.  He insisted on the ability to call the whole 
operation off up to twenty-four hours before its launch.38  And the more the president 
probed the plan, the more skeptical he became.39  Castro, having readied the island 
for battle, would likely field more than 20,000 troops to meet the guerrillas once they 
landed.  How long could less than 2,000 insurgents hold out against such a force on a 
beachhead or retreating into the hills?  The presence of the invaders was supposed to 
spark a general uprising, but how a revolt could take shape in Castro’s police state 
remained unclear. 
                                                        
37 Robert Kennedy, in recorded interview with John Bartlow Martin, March 1, 1964, p. 51, John F. 
Kennedy Oral History Program of the John F. Kennedy Library. 
38 Robert Dallek, An Unfinished Life, p. 360. 
39 Arthur Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 249. 
  
 
25
Also, Kennedy had said repeatedly that U.S. forces would not intervene if the 
invaders got into trouble.  He stressed this again and again to the CIA, to the 
Pentagon and to the rebels themselves through a special envoy.  But the president 
nonetheless got the sense, rightly, that many involved believed American military 
backing was assured. 40   How could the president allow the campaign to fail once it 
began?  He would not let the exiles die on the beaches.  He could not pass up the best 
chance to overthrow Castro anyone was likely to see for some time to come.  But JFK 
meant what he said, in part because he saw Cuba as integrally connected to other 
potential Cold War flashpoints.  Overt U.S. aggression against Cuba could prompt a 
Soviet countermove in Laos or Germany or Vietnam.  Washington had already tipped 
its hand far too much in allowing the supposedly secret operation to appear so visibly 
in the press.  Some plausible claim of deniability must remain, however thin.  Direct 
use of U.S. military forces to back the rebels would rip the veil from this needed 
political fiction.  RFK had no significant involvement in talks surrounding the Bay of 
Pig planning and did not have a chance to express feelings about whether U.S. troops 
should become directly involved in support of the rebel landing.  If he had, however, 
RFK would almost certainly have advocated for the use of U.S. troops as a last resort.  
As we will see, RFK consistently favored direct U.S. military intervention in Cuba as 
well as other extreme measures.    
The president’s most trusted advisers, almost to a one, sought to reassure JFK 
on the eve of the invasion.  Dulles, who had orchestrated the overthrow of the 
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Guatemalan government in 1954, told the president that odds of success looked better 
for Cuba than they had in Guatemala.41  McNamara was in favor of going forward, as 
was Rusk.  The Joint Chiefs all voiced their support.  The unanimity of the war 
council carried special weight with the Kennedy brothers, who felt they had an 
excellent national security team in place.  The Kennedy brothers wanted to believe 
the men they had entrusted with guiding the White House on such matters would not 
allow them to go astray.  Indeed they were counting on it.42   
One of the few voices of dissent in the White House came from Arthur M. 
Schlesinger, Jr., a normally deferential professor who had joined the administration as 
a special advisor to the president.  Schlesinger by his own account was too 
intimidated to challenge the wisdom of the war council in cabinet meetings.  He was a 
mouse in a bowtie facing hardened warriors with chests full of medals.43  But the 
Kennedy brothers trusted Schlesinger’s advice, which he gave quietly to both.  In 
private conversations and in memos he wrote in the weeks and days leading up to the 
invasion, Schlesinger urged the president to abandon the scheme.  “No matter how 
‘Cuban’ the equipment and personnel, the U.S. will be held accountable for the 
operation, and our prestige will be committed to its success,” Schlesinger wrote in 
one of his warning memos to the president.44  Schlesinger tried with the attorney 
general too.  Just days before the invaders were set to storm the beach RFK and his 
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wife Ethel were hosting one of the many lively parties they held at Hickory Hill, their 
expansive home in McLean, Virginia.  It was Ethel’s birthday celebration.  
Schlesinger was among the guests and had a private aside with the attorney general 
about the plan for Cuba.  “I hear you don’t think much of this business,” Kennedy 
said, asking why.  Schlesinger explained his concerns, many of which the president 
openly shared.  Robert listened without expression.  “You may be right or you may be 
wrong,” he said, closing the talk.  “But the president has made his mind up.  Don’t 
push it any further.  Now is the time for everyone to help him all we can.”45  Clearly 
doubts about the plan stayed with JFK and RFK as it began to unfold.  Neither of the 
Kennedys seemed to ever fully embrace the most optimistic CIA assumptions of 
success.  But they saw no options for turning back without extreme political costs, 
and the advisers they had so carefully selected to offer wisdom on such matters only 
urged them forward.  
 
Managing Disaster 
In the darkness of the hours before their dawn attack, the roughly 1,400 fighters of 
Brigade 2506 moved through the warm waters of the Caribbean Sea sailing aboard 
seven rusting transport ships crammed with weapons and supplies, all under the 
watch of a U.S. Navy escort.  The men who had come together to form the brigade 
represented many segments of Cuban society.  Two hundred and forty of them were 
students.  One hundred and thirty-five were former military men.  The rest had done a 
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variety of jobs before joining the cause.  There were ministers, geologists, engineers, 
teachers, truck drivers and clerks among them.46 At sunrise they would storm a beach 
in their homeland and sound what all hoped would be a death knell for Castro and his 
hated regime.  The opening blows of the battle had already come even as they moved.  
The exiles’ warplanes had attacked their targets in Cuba in the hope of crippling 
Castro’s air force and thus clearing the skies for the invaders.  Reports suggesting 
success for the airstrikes reached the flotilla, and as they neared the beachhead the 
men sang and cheered at speeches by their officers.47  They sensed a victory at hand, 
one that would fulfill dreams of triumphal homecomings nurtured through many dark 
days in months past. 
 Jose Perez San Roman and Manuel Francisco Artime led the brigade.  A 
former Cuban army officer, San Roman had initially welcomed Castro’s revolution in 
1959 but quickly became disillusioned with the new regime, which jailed him for 
dissent.  Pepe, as he was widely known, managed to escape and fled to Miami, where 
he immediately began plotting against Castro with other exiles gathering there in 
1960.  In May of that year Pepe met Artime, who had a similar story.  Artime had 
connections to the CIA, which helped smuggle him out of Cuba late in 1959.  In the 
following months, as the agency developed its plan to oust Castro, Artime emerged as 
a possible rebel leader in the minds of CIA officers.  He was young (not yet thirty 
years old) pliable, eager and naïve.  And he owed a lot to the CIA agents he had come 
to know.  The agency had plenty of resources to offer Artime, but he needed allies.  
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So Artime reached out to San Roman and many others, recruiting volunteers among 
the Miami Cubans.48  Many were eager to join, and soon the exiles backed by the CIA 
formed a center of gravity in the Miami community.  
 Relations between the exiles and the CIA proved difficult from the beginning. 
Initially the prominent Cuban leaders, including Artime, demanded a huge budget 
from the CIA and a free hand to spend it.  Many had helped Castro in his revolution 
against Fulgencio Batista.  We staged one successful revolution in Cuba, they told 
their CIA liaisons and paymasters, and we could do it again.  Just give us the money 
and get out of the way.49  The CIA disagreed.  The agency insisted on close control of 
the Cuba Project and displayed an undisguised paternalism in dealing with the exiles, 
whom were often made to feel beholden to their U.S. handlers.  Few of the hundreds 
of CIA personnel at work on the Cuba project in fact even spoke Spanish.50  They 
tended to view the exiles as pawns and sometimes treated them like children.  Still, 
many Cubans who got involved felt cause for hope, especially after the 1960 election.  
The incoming president was young, Catholic and outspoken in his support of Cuban 
exiles.  Perhaps their war could be won.   
By the fall of 1960 the rebel force was training in earnest at their crude camp 
in the highlands of Guatemala.  There the brigade effectively came into being under 
the tutelage of paramilitary experts furnished by the CIA and the Pentagon.  
Surrounded by acres of coffee bushes, the place consisted of little more than an 
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airstrip, a few unpaved roads, a mess hall and barracks for the trainees.  One of the 
brigade members, a fighter named Carlos Rafael Santana, died early on, perishing in a 
climbing accident.  Santana was the first causality for the group, which honored his 
memory by naming the brigade after his trainee number, 2506.51  The camp had 
problems beyond rugged terrain, though, and many times spirits flagged in the 
barracks.  Conditions generally were poor.  Equipment of all kinds was in short 
supply.  The sequestered men felt lonely, homesick and sometimes doubtful about 
U.S. will to see the plan through to its end, despite all the promises.  But finally in the 
spring of 1961 a day for battle was set.  The time had come.  
In the days before the assault the brigade left their base in Guatemala and 
gathered at a staging ground in Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, where they found ships 
waiting for them.  By April 12 the entire force, including the warplanes, stood poised 
for attack from Nicaragua.52  Meanwhile in Washington Kennedy declared publically 
that the United States would not stage an intervention in Cuba when questioned by 
journalists about rumors of U.S action against Castro.  Planners of the invasion at the 
CIA did not believe the president.  They thought Kennedy was offering up a brilliant 
smokescreen for the unfolding plan, which deliberately held open the possibility of 
U.S. armed forces becoming involved.53  In Puerto Cabezas, fighters of Brigade 2506 
readied for battle trusting that U.S. military support was assured. They believed the 
plan was to establish a beachhead and await the arrival of a government in arms led 
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by Cardona, who would immediately draw full support from the United States.  The 
brigade would land and fight to hold territory until help came, they believed.54  There 
was no talk among the rebels of going into the hills as the flotilla came quietly to a 
halt off the beaches of the inlet on April 17 shortly after midnight.  The men lowered 
landing crafts from the ships and began slipping as stealthily as they could toward the 
shore.     
Long before the brigade set sail the CIA estimated that Castro had a 
uniformed army of 32,000 plus another 200,000 loyal militia fighters equipped with 
up to 40 thousand tons of arms supplied by the Soviet Union.55  This was in addition 
of course to Castro’s small but effective air force, which the initial rebel airstrikes 
failed to destroy.  Any real hope the brigade had for victory rested mainly on two 
things, a lack of will among Castro’s forces and a genuine popular uprising thrown 
into motion by the arrival of the rebels.  Scant evidence existed suggesting either 
scenario was likely, much less both at once.  No insurgent cells operated inside Cuba, 
at least as far as the CIA knew.  No intelligence in CIA possession supported the 
claim that ordinary Cubans would flock to the invaders once they arrived.56  On the 
contrary, Castro’s security forces appeared to have become as effective as the most 
oppressive regimes in Eastern Europe in stifling dissent and rounding up agitators.  
Few Cubans in Cuba seemed ready stage open defiance, for if they sided with the 
invading rebels and lost life would most certainly become much worse.  And 
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whatever expectations the CIA and the rebels fostered about weak resolve among 
Castro’s forces disappeared completely in their first steps on Cuban soil.  Militia 
forces immediately spotted the invaders, opened fire and radioed word to the military.  
The bloody battle flashing to life in the darkness of April 17 would last three days.   
Castro lashed out swiftly once the invaders hit the beach, pummeling them 
with airstrikes at dawn and hurling a column of troops toward rebel positions.  
Castro’s warplanes had knocked out a key rebel supply ship, and the brigade fighters 
quickly ran low on ammunition as Cuban forces, led by Castro himself, swarmed 
them.  Meanwhile, as the battle on the beach unfolded, Castro’s internal security 
forces arrested more than two hundred thousand suspected insurrectionists elsewhere 
around the country.  Police herded Cubans into theaters, ballparks, auditoriums and 
other gathering places, keeping them there until Castro was sure he had the island 
under control.57  The operation appeared entirely doomed before the first full day 
closed. 
The president and the attorney general both had left Washington for nearby 
points in Virginia as the invasion got underway.  The president and the first lady 
retreated to their rented estate called Glen Ora, nestled in horse country just outside 
the capital.  RFK traveled to Williamsburg for a speaking engagement.  He got a call 
from JFK just before the president gave his final okay.  Did RFK have any 
reservations, the president wanted to know?  No, the attorney general said.  The two 
hung up, and the president gave the order to go.  The next call RFK got from the 
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president came about thirty-six hours later.  The rebels had landed, JFK said.  Things 
looked bad.  Come back to Washington.58  The attorney general quickly returned and 
went to the White House, where three days of crisis meetings drew senior 
administration officials gloomily together.   
Admiral Arleigh Burke, the longtime chief of naval operations, rushed with 
other Pentagon officials April 18 to the White House, where President Kennedy 
huddled in the Cabinet Room with officials from the CIA and the State Department, 
trying to figure out what was happening.  No one seemed to know much beyond the 
reports that the operation was quickly becoming a bloody loss.  A brusque old 
military man, Burke listened at the edge of the group around the president, 
occasionally muttering “balls” as the few available details came into view.  No one 
seemed sure what to advise the president to do.  If there were anything to do, some 
action for the president to order, the Navy would have to respond.  Thus Burke 
became for a moment a central player in the crisis management.  The president pulled 
Burke, McNamara, Rusk, Dulles and Lemnitzer into the Oval Office.  What could be 
done, the president wanted to know?  Rusk cautioned against doing much, and 
President Kennedy ordered Burke to arrange aerial reconnaissance of the bay so they 
could have more information.  Burke did so, and moments later Robert Kennedy rang 
him on the phone.  The president is going to rely on you to advise him in this 
situation, the attorney general told Burke.  The rest of the advisers were not being 
helpful.  Burke told the attorney general that would be bypassing McNamara and 
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Lemnitzer.  RFK said he knew.59  The president’s august war council was standing 
around him helplessly in the first real crisis they faced together.  Suddenly the 
president’s inner circle of trusted advisers effectively collapsed to two people, JFK 
and his brother.  RFK set to forming a crisis team that could actually help the 
situation and reached out to the aged admiral. 
Burke ultimately had no answers.  No one did.  The besieged rebels needed 
help.  Only U.S. airstrikes and probably fire from U.S. navy ships lurking near the 
Cuban coast offered a chance to save them.  But such a rescue would amount to direct 
military involvement and risk reprisal by the Soviet Union.  The president would not 
do it.  He remained true to his word much to the dismay of the CIA planners and the 
Cubans on the beach, where they begged for help.  Pepe sent frantic pleas that made 
their way back to the White House.  “Do you people realize how desperate the 
situation is?” one of his messages read.  “Do you back us or quit?  All we want is low 
jet cover.  Enemy has this.  I need it badly or cannot survive.  Pepe.”  Another one 
sent only hours later said:  “Can you throw something into this vital point in the 
battle.  Anything.  Just let jet pilots loose.  Pepe.”60  RFK saw one final report from 
Pepe:  “We fired our last shell – we’re all taking to the swamp.”61  It was over.  The 
rebels left more than a hundred fallen comrades behind them as they fled, scattered 
and scrambling through the countryside.  A small number of fighters managed to 
retreat into the sea and make their way to U.S. navy ships undertaking cautious rescue 
                                                        
59 Memoranda of Conversation, April 19, 1961, FRUS, 1961-63, Vol. X, 121. 
60 Haynes Johnson, Bay of Pigs, p. 155. 
61 Robert Kennedy, in recorded interview by John Bartlow Martin, February 29, 1964 p. 50, John 
F. Kennedy Oral History Program of the John F. Kennedy Library. 
  
 
35
missions.  But in the end most of those who survived wound up captured and thrown 
into Castro’s jails, where they would serve as a trophies and bargaining chips for the 
newly empowered Cuban leader. 
The attorney general was a novice cold warrior at best before the Bay of Pigs.  
His political life before revolved mostly around domestic issues.  But RFK easily 
stepped into the role of Cold War hawk once the Bay of Pigs crisis took shape.  In 
years past RFK had generally held a Manichean worldview, a mindset that dovetailed 
with his self-image as an anticommunist crusader on the domestic front in the 1950s.  
These traits and a family connection led RFK in 1953 to work briefly as a staffer for 
the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, chaired then Senator Joseph 
McCarthy.62  RFK quickly distanced himself from McCarthy as the senator’s fortunes 
fell, but the underlying sentiments that drew RFK to McCarthy in the first place 
seemed to endure and stay with him throughout the Kennedy administration.  RFK 
clearly considered himself an unflinching anticommunist at home and abroad, a 
fighter always alert for enemy scheming and aggression.  His views and actions 
consistently aligned with the most hawkish elements of the national security 
establishment, and at no point did RFK exhibit any inclination toward questioning or 
reflection on the underlying assumptions of such an approach to the Cold War.  
RFK’s instincts in this vein allowed him formulate a prescient analysis he offered to 
the president just 48 hours into the Bay of Pigs crisis.  In fact, the attorney general 
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immediately grasped the darkest ramifications of the Bay of Pigs disaster and outlined 
them in a memo he wrote to JFK. 
Castro would become more bombastic, more closely tied to the Soviet Union 
and more heavily armed than if the Bay of Pigs never happened, RFK told the 
president.  In short, Castro was much more dangerous after the Bay of Pigs than 
before, when Washington and the American public generally considered the regime in 
Havana a serious threat.  Something forceful and determined must be done, RFK told 
the president.  Perhaps an incident could be staged whereby Cuba appeared to launch 
attacks at U.S. forces in Guantanamo Bay with Russian MIG fighters, RFK 
suggested.  Then the administration would have cause for a more direct military 
confrontation with Castro.  Whatever was to be done, the attorney general argued, it 
had to be done soon.  The status quo could not be allowed to resume once the crisis 
faded.  Castro could not be left alone.  “The time has come for a showdown,” RFK 
wrote to the president.  “For in a year or two years the situation will be vastly worse.  
If we don’t want Russia to set up missile bases in Cuba, we had better decide now 
what we are willing to do to stop it.”63 
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II.  The Makings of a Wider Role 
 
Confronting the CIA 
The Bay of Pigs left President Kennedy regretting RFK’s appointment as head of the 
Justice Department.  “He is wasted there,” JFK told Schlesinger. “Bobby should be in 
CIA…  It’s a hell of a way to learn things, but I have learned one thing from this 
business – that is, that we will have to deal with CIA.  McNamara has dealt with 
Defense; Rusk had done a lot with State; but no one has dealt with CIA.”64  JFK aired 
the thought in conversation amid the crisis, voicing frustration in a moment when the 
worst of the bad news flooded him.  However, the president took the idea of RFK as 
head of the CIA seriously nonetheless.  They talked about it.  RFK opposed the idea.  
Having the president’s brother at the head of the agency would look bad, RFK felt.  
Also, RFK said, the job was no good for a Democrat generally.65  Still, the CIA was 
too important for RFK to ignore.  The attorney general had to get involved in covert 
operations if he wanted to serve his brother effectively in the administration.  The 
Bay of Pigs debacle had proven this much to both of them. 
 In this way RFK began what would become an ever-deepening involvement 
with the CIA, where he eventually asserted himself as a kind of shadow director for 
Cuban affairs after the Bay of Pigs.  RFK, like the president, had long been an 
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enthusiast of espionage tales written by the likes of John Buchan and Ian Fleming.66  
The attorney general showed no reverence or romanticism in dealing with the U.S. 
spy agency in real life, however.  From the start RFK approached the CIA with a 
sense of hostility and suspicion, seeing most of the rank and file essentially as 
incompetent bureaucrats who had misled the president in a key moment.  RFK’s 
dealings with the CIA posed bigger problems than personnel frustrations, however.  
The CIA’s ongoing activities in support of Cuban exiles in the United States 
amounted in many cases to illegal activity, especially in instances when the spy 
agency enlisted the help of organized crime figures.  The Cuba Project, which paused 
only for a moment after the Bay of Pigs, remained a hive of militant activity in the 
United States that clearly contravened U.S. law as governed by treaty obligations 
under the U.N. Charter as well as the U.S. Neutrality Act.67  RFK publicly disparaged 
such legal obligations in the wake of the Bay of Pigs: 
 
First…  the neutrality laws are among the oldest laws in our statue 
books…  Clearly they were not designed for the kind of situation 
which exists in the world today.  Second, the neutrality laws were 
never designed to prevent individuals from leaving the United States to 
fight for a cause in which they believed.  There is nothing in the 
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neutrality laws which prevents refugees from Cuba from returning to 
that country to engage in the fight for freedom.68 
 
A further legal dilemma for the attorney general arose from the fact that the 
administration’s secret war against Castro entailed the cooperation of Mafiosi, spies 
and Cuban rebels.  Government collusion with the underworld flew in the face of 
RFK’s adamant vow to crack down on organized crime.  The conflicts of interest 
presented themselves early and very clearly, but RFK never appeared troubled by 
them.  The imperative to move against Castro seemed to override all other concerns 
for RFK, and he showed no hesitation in pressing a covert action campaign in Cuba 
despite the fact that doing so involved considerable illegal activity by the 
administration.  Indeed, the attorney general threw himself into the CIA campaign 
against Cuba, a move that landed him squarely in the center of the administration’s 
most contentious debates about the threat of communism across the whole of Latin 
America.        
The attorney general got his first real look at the inner workings of the CIA 
during hearings of the Cuba Study Group, the board of inquiry President Kennedy 
established to investigate the Bay of Pigs debacle.  Retired Gen. Maxwell Taylor 
headed the commission at the president’s personal request.  Taylor was supposed to 
help guide the group toward consensus in a final report.  Dulles and Burke took seats 
on the board as well.  The president put them on the commission essentially to 
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prevent persecution of the CIA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  But really the attorney 
general and Taylor drove the probe.  Taylor oversaw the inquiry as a venerable 
former military man, a soldier-scholar who drew respect from the national security 
establishment and the New Frontier alike.  RFK served essentially as chief 
interrogator and presidential proxy.69 
CIA men packed the room for the commission’s first meeting April 22, when 
U.S. operations aimed at helping the surviving rebels were still underway off the 
coast of Cuba.  Emotions were raw, and tensions ran high as the board gathered its 
first witnesses.  Many at the CIA and the Pentagon felt that President Kennedy 
botched the Bay of Pigs.  CIA men like Jacob Esterline, the head of the anti-Castro 
taskforce, believed that relatively unimportant politics kept JFK from ordering vital 
airstrikes that would have saved the invasion.  “We cannot conduct an operation 
where political decision is going to interfere with military judgment,” Esterline said 
flatly to the board.  “My friend,” RFK quickly shot back, “you sound like military 
men have been shouting down the hall.”70  In Esterline’s view key men who planned 
the operation were not heard by the president, pushed from the room as the inner 
circle of the White House focused on the politics of the situation.  As far as RFK was 
concerned the president had heard the military advice on offer and followed it, which 
was the problem. 
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The subject changed quickly after the sharp exchange between RFK and 
Esterline.  Yet the sentiments behind it colored all of the proceedings, which lasted 
for roughly six weeks.  RFK showed little patience for witnesses who felt the same as 
Esterline.  The only mistake the president made was allowing a stupid CIA plan to go 
forward in the first place, in RFK’s view.  The brigade’s invasion was doomed, 
because ultimately the CIA plan hinged on a popular uprising that never had a chance 
of forming.  If Castro’s planes were immobilized, so what?  The brigade could not 
hold out indefinitely against Castro’s overwhelming ground force.  They simply did 
not have the numbers.  And Castro proved ruthlessly effective at squelching any 
internal dissent that might have arisen to embrace the rebels.  The CIA men had based 
their plan on a dream scenario and pressed ahead in an almost delusional fashion in 
the face of easily visible realities.  They believed their plot could be kept secret even 
after the cover was blown.  They believed a resistance force inside Cuba would arise 
even though none existed.  It was fantasy.  Why anyone at the Pentagon or the White 
House believed them was the real question.  “How could I have been so stupid?” JFK 
said again and again in the days afterward.71  Outwardly the president took full 
responsibility, but RFK and others in the White House ultimately blamed the CIA.  
The commission’s proceedings, and RFK’s role in them, essentially put the CIA on 
notice.  The president was going to deal with the CIA, as he believed he must.  JFK’s 
method of dealing with the CIA was to give the attorney general full license to 
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examine its activities as a presidential proxy and control them when necessary.  This 
was the implicit mandate RFK carried after the commission came to a close.      
The agency’s failings in Cuba went beyond the bloody disaster on the beach 
in Cuba, RFK learned.  Early in the proceedings the attorney general heard probably 
for the first time that the CIA had hired mobsters to assassinate Castro.  Bissell told 
RFK some of the details and mentioned a name familiar to the attorney general, Sam 
Giancana, a notorious Chicago Mafioso. 72  RFK and Giancana had faced off during 
congressional hearings in June of 1959 probing connections between organized labor 
and the Mafia.  Giancana appeared as a witness on Capitol Hill, snickering and 
sneering as RFK questioned him as a Senate counsel.  RFK got nothing from 
Giancana, who gleefully pled the Fifth Amendment over and over again.  “Would you 
tell us anything about your operations or will you just giggle every time I ask you a 
question,” Kennedy asked Giancana.  “I decline to answer because I honestly believe 
my answer might tend to incriminate me,” Giancana said.  “I thought only little girls 
giggled, Mr. Giancana,” RFK growled.73  The bit of melodrama was little more than a 
footnote to RFK’s time as a Senate counsel, coming shortly before he left to run his 
brother’s White House campaign.  But Giancana and RFK would remain connected in 
ways that surprised both in following years.    
Giancana got involved with the CIA in the fall of 1960, when he met private 
detective Robert Maheu.   A former FBI agent, Maheu regularly worked for the CIA, 
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doing various spook jobs deemed too risky for formal agency employees in the 
United States.74  Maheu had also developed friendly contacts within the criminal 
underworld through his detective work.  Now the CIA wanted introductions from 
Maheu.  The idea came from Bissell and CIA Director of Security Sheffield Edwards.  
They figured that mobsters with gambling interests chased from Cuba by Castro 
might harbor the motivation for action against the revolutionary leader and possibly 
hold some useful connections on the island.75  They were right.  Many organized 
crime figures craved revenge against Castro.  With Castro gone things might again 
look like the good old days of Havana in the 1950s, when gambling syndicates and 
their attendant mobsters based in the United States used Cuba as a libidinous carnival.  
Also, working with the U.S. government against Castro allowed the Mafia to hold out 
hope for an easing of the pressure they had felt in recent years from federal 
authorities.  Hoover’s FBI had in the late 1950s, slowly and grudgingly, begun to 
focus on the neglected issue of organized crime.  Crusaders like RFK had helped stir 
FBI action, much to the Mafia’s frustration.   
Bissell shared few specifics with RFK about Giancana’s connections to the 
CIA when the matter first surfaced in the Cuba Study Group.  The attorney general 
learned more from Hoover around the same time, however, because one of 
Giancana’s associates, Arthur Balletti, got arrested while trying to install a tap on a 
phone in Las Vegas.  Maheu and Edwards scrambled to bail out Balletti, who was 
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doing a chore for Giancana when he got caught.  Edwards was forced to explain to 
the FBI that Giancana was on a mission for the CIA.  Edwards told FBI officials that 
Giancana had launched several plots to eliminate Castro before the Bay of Pigs, but 
none of them had worked out.  Giancana had several more schemes in the works as of 
late May 1961, Edwards said, and those could eventually pay off.76  The details were 
still somewhat hazy when Hoover shared them with the attorney general, but RFK 
understood enough for the important facts to be clear.  The CIA was using 
underworld figures to assassinate Castro, and the mobsters involved in the effort were 
not to be touched by the FBI.  
Passes from U.S. law enforcement had become routine for the Cuban exiles 
and their supporters plotting against Castro before the Bay of Pigs.  Those working 
inside the United States to bring down Castro had been involved in a variety of illegal 
activities -- buying and stashing weapons, recruiting and fundraising for their shadow 
army, entering the country illegally and so on.  Troubles arose as the exiles and their 
American allies inevitably encountered the Coast Guard, local police, the FBI and the 
Immigration and Nationalization Service.  The CIA eased their way, quietly 
explaining whenever necessary how the exiles were essential to national security and 
could not be hindered. 77  Hoover, who considered himself a ferocious anti-
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communist, was the last to object to a covert operation targeting Castro.  He gladly 
played along, content to be included in the secret. 
RFK offered no objection to the CIA’s work with the Mafia.  As ever, the 
imperative to act against Castro clearly overrode all other considerations, including 
matters of legality.  But RFK ordered the chief of his organized crime task force to 
look into the Balletti case nonetheless.  Who was Balletti?  What exactly was his 
connection to Giancana?  And why was he tapping a phone in Las Vegas, where the 
intended target seemed to be comedian Dan Rowan, one of the guys who would later 
star in the goofball television show Laugh-In?  It made little sense.  Even Edwards 
claimed not to know.  Giancana’s work against Castro did not involve phone taps, 
Edwards said.78  Ultimately, though, the matter was unimportant to RFK when 
compared to threat posed by Castro.  Did it really matter why the Mafia was secretly 
listening to whatever banalities and unpolished jokes Dan Rowan likely shared over 
the telephone if nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union appeared in Cuba?   
 
Working with the Mafia 
Giancana was not the only mobster working with the CIA.  In fact he had become 
involved incidentally.  The first mobster Maheu and the CIA approached was John 
Rosselli, the Chicago Mafia’s overseer of operations in Los Angeles since the mid 
1930s.79  Maheu was supposed to adopt the standard CIA cover in reaching out to 
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Rosselli, posing as a representative of businessmen out for Castro’s blood over losses 
dealt to them in the wake of the Cuban revolution.  Maheu abandoned the charade 
when he met Rosselli face to face at the Brown Derby in Beverly Hills in early 
September 1960.  Maheu simply told Rosselli that the U.S. government wanted 
Castro dead and hoped he could help by recruiting Cubans willing to do the job.  
Rosselli hesitated.  He insisted on talking directly to someone in the government.  
Maheu then arranged a meeting between Rosselli and a CIA case officer at the Plaza 
Hotel in New York in mid September, when Castro was in the city for a visit to the 
United Nations.  From then on Rosselli understood the CIA’s involvement and agreed 
to cooperate.  Soon Rosselli was in Miami searching for murderous Cubans with help 
from Giancana and a senior Florida Mafioso also brought into the plot, Santo 
Trafficante.80  The three mobsters met regularly with Maheu, who kept the CIA up to 
date on what Rosselli, Giancana and Trafficante said they were doing.  Whether the 
three mobsters actually did anything at all remains unclear.        
Trafficante for one thought the idea of the three of them orchestrating Castro’s 
assassination was ludicrous.  He knew how formidable Castro was from firsthand 
experience.  When Castro took power Trafficante was running several lavish Havana 
casinos, whose coffers directly supported the despised Batista regime.  Castro marked 
Trafficante and other casino operators for death, and Trafficante barely escaped a 
firing squad before fleeing to his home in Florida.81  Trafficante understood well that 
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three Mafia toughs were no match for Castro and his legions of bearded 
revolutionaries.  “I looked at Johnny and I thought he must be some kind of idiot to 
believe that somebody could just go down there and kill Castro,” Trafficante told his 
longtime lawyer, Frank Ragano.82  But Rosselli was eager to try anyway.  The CIA 
had offered Rosselli money, about $150,000, a fair sum in those days.83  But it was 
not really about the money.  U.S. authorities had been trying to deport Rosselli for 
years.  That would go away if he helped kill Castro, Rosselli told Trafficante.  Not 
only that, but the Justice Department would get off their backs if they did the CIA this 
favor. 84 
A typical mob assassin used a gun at close range or even a knife.  Anyone 
attempting that against Castro might beat the odds and succeed in killing him, but he 
would never leave alive.  Whoever the mobsters sent would be on a suicide mission.  
“You have anybody like that?” Trafficante asked Giancana and Rosselli. 85  They did 
not, but the CIA had another option for them.  The idea of poisoning Castro had been 
around the CIA for a while.  The agency got a box of Castro’s favorite cigars in 
August of 1960 and laced them with a poison potent enough to kill anyone who 
simply put one in their mouth.  The CIA gave the cigars to someone they hoped 
would pass them to Castro in February of 1961, but nothing came of it.86  Now with 
their three Mafiosi the CIA proposed using poison pills.  CIA technicians developed 
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pills that could be slipped into food.  CIA lab hands tested the pills on monkeys 
successfully and passed a batch to mobsters in Miami around February of 1961.  
Where the pills went after that is a mystery.  The mobsters told the CIA that they had 
given the pills to a Cuban government official, a defector in Castro’s midst who 
agreed to poison his food.  But the Cuban official got cold feet and backed out of the 
plot.  The Mafiosi trio promised the CIA that they would try again.  This time the 
poison pills were given to a Cuban exile supposedly able to access the kitchen of a 
restaurant frequented by Castro.  Again, nothing came of it, and the CIA was left 
unclear why the plot had failed.87  Did this Cuban get cold feet too?  Had Castro 
stopped going to the restaurant?  Was there some sort of mix-up in the secret signals 
sent to green light the attempt?  They did not know.  The CIA men only knew what 
the mobsters told them.  That was part of the idea behind having mobsters do the dirty 
work.  In any event, Castro clearly lived. 
Anyone wanting to kill Castro in early 1961 had to get in line.  Those with 
cause to seek Castro’s death included the CIA, casino magnates with Mafia ties, 
Batista regime remnants, disenchanted Cuban revolutionaries and Latin American 
leaders fearful of Castro’s designs for the region.  Castro understood this better than 
anyone and vigilantly oversaw internal security matters, especially his own personal 
safety.  He surrounded himself with loyalists wholly dedicated to keeping him alive, 
knowing that his list of enemies grew more numerous and determined as he 
consolidated power after the revolution.  Castro early on proved himself to be 
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cunning and ruthless in ensuring his own survival.  He never lost his edge in that 
regard, and he instilled the same flintiness among his many security forces.  Would-
be assassins after Castro had to evade scores of spies, secret police and bodyguards.88  
Three Mafia goons in Miami were no match against Castro in his Havana citadel, not 
even with CIA poison pills.  
The three mobsters probably made little or no effort to kill Castro.  Trafficante 
claimed to have swindled the agency in the affair.  “The CIA had all this foolish talk 
about poisoning Castro,” Trafficante said some years afterward.  “Those crazy 
people.  They gave me some pills to kill Castro.  I just flushed them down the toilet.  
Nothing ever came of it.  We didn’t expect to make any money but we had a windfall.  
They paid us a lot of money and nobody intended to do a damn thing.”89  Trafficante 
was right about Castro even if Rosselli wanted to believe otherwise.  The Cuban 
leader was without question a fearsome man with a talent for destroying his many 
enemies, and his reach only grew longer after the revolution.  Attempting to kill 
Castro was at best foolish, and Trafficante was no fool.  He was the only one among 
the three plotters to live out his days.  Giancana and Rosselli were both brutally 
murdered in the 1970s. 
The scheme seemed shockingly sinister when revealed years later through 
congressional inquiries into CIA activities, but at the time it was a small affair 
compared to everything else the CIA hurled at Castro.  While the 2506 Brigade 
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trained in Guatemala, the agency waged what can only be described as a terrorism 
campaign inside Cuba.  From October of 1960 to April of 1961 CIA saboteurs 
torched 300,000 tons of sugar cane in some 800 fires they set targeting an economic 
resource that provided a livelihood for thousands of Cuban civilians.  Arsonists sent 
by the CIA also burned 42 tobacco warehouses, two paper plants, one sugar refinery, 
two dairies, four stores and 21 homes of communists.  A bombing campaign spread 
further destruction and fear in the same months.  More than a hundred explosions 
ripped through communist party offices, railroad stations, bus terminals and militia 
barracks, among other targets.  Additionally about 200 so-called nuisance bombs 
rattled the Havana area.  Guerrillas derailed half a dozen trains and plunged 
neighborhoods into darkness by bringing down multiple power transformers.  At one 
point the CIA brazenly sent commandos ashore in an amphibious raid aimed at 
destroying an oil refinery.90  The CIA’s paramilitary machinery ran at full tilt against 
Castro when the mobsters started their desultory plotting in Miami.  Trafficante, 
Rosselli and Giancana were little more than a few crooked arrows in the vast arsenal 
the CIA wielded against Castro.  Sending underworld figures after the Cuban leader 
ultimately represented a small bet for the CIA in the overall scheme of things.  Maybe 
they would beat the odds and succeed.  If they got and killed by Castro, who cared?  
Yet the fact that the CIA utilized the Mafia meant that RFK necessarily stepped into 
the intrigue as he forcefully asserted himself on Cuba within the CIA.  A lack archival 
evidence due to classifications prevents a full understanding of RFK’s awareness of 
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or possible involvement in the CIA’s dealings with mobsters.  RFK may or may not 
have known about the extent of the CIA’s connections to organized crime while he 
was attorney general.  What archival evidence does show, however, is that RFK 
personally sought to use the CIA to make connections with organized crime, which is 
discussed later. 91  Thus if RFK did know about the CIA’s relationship with the Mafia, 
he likely condoned or tacitly accepted it.  In any case, publically the three Mafiosi 
remained priority targets for the Justice Department in RFK’s vow to pursue 
organized crime, while secretly the trio mingled with the administration’s allies 
against Castro.  
 
New Powers for the Attorney General 
President Kennedy wasted no time in showing that RFK held broadened authority on 
Cuba policy within the White House.  JFK gathered senior officials in the Cabinet 
Room April 22 to discuss what actions should be taken on Cuba going forward from 
the Bay of Pigs.  Normally such a meeting would involve only officials dealing 
directly with foreign policy, but RFK joined nonetheless.  The president opened by 
saying the time had come to move past the Bay of Pigs and focus on work ahead.  
Cuban rebels in touch with the United States should be advised to lie low for the time 
being, the president said, but that could change as conditions permitted.  Looking at 
the bigger picture, Castro appeared stronger than ever in the afterglow of his victory.  
The president and all others around the table at the White House feared an 
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emboldened Castro would be tempted to launch subversive activities against Latin 
American countries and perhaps even within the United States.  JFK ordered the 
attorney general to work closely with the CIA director to more effectively root out 
any Castro operatives in the United States.92  The president’s directives were quite 
vague, and he did not spell out specific new powers for RFK in that meeting beyond 
saying RFK should work with the CIA more closely against Castro on the domestic 
front.  But JFK’s inclusion of the attorney general in high-level talks about Cuba 
served as another implicit message to the most senior administration officials, i.e. 
RFK henceforth would play a central, if undefined, role on Cuba policy.   
No attorney general had played such a role before, but then no attorney 
general had been brother to the president.  Yet for RFK, being involved in a major 
foreign policy issue seemed natural.  Being involved in any important issue JFK faced 
seemed natural.  At difficult moments, JFK reached out to RFK for advice and 
support.  JFK had done so for many years, and the brothers had faced a great number 
of travails together in this way.93  Moreover, once in the White House, JFK highly 
valued RFK’s ability to accomplish tasks effectively.  “He has this terrific executive 
energy,” JFK said of RFK during a discussion in 1963 with Ben Bradlee.  “We’ve got 
more guys around here with ideas.  The problem is to get things done.  Bobby’s the 
best organizer I’ve ever seen.”94  JFK used RFK as more than a taskmaster handling 
high priority projects such as Cuba, however.  The president relied on the attorney to 
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give blunt counseling on a range of issues, trusting always that RFK held the 
president’s interests foremost in mind when other administration officials perhaps 
would not.  JFK also used RFK as a kind of militant alter ego, especially at the CIA.  
RFK eagerly embraced these roles throughout his time in the Kennedy administration 
handling matters ranging from cabinet selection to civil rights.95  Working on Cuba 
combined them all. 
Both the president and the attorney general mulled ideas about reform for the 
CIA as the Cuba Study Group wound down its hearings.  The board had focused 
almost exclusively on the operational failures of the Bay of Pigs, but the president felt 
the organization as a whole needed changes.  JFK asked Schlesinger for policy 
suggestions along these lines.  Schlesinger said that covert operations needed tighter 
controls.  Every planning team for future such missions, Schlesinger argued, probably 
ought to have “an official son-of-a-bitch – a man charged with raising every question, 
forcing every objection, and picking every hole before a decision is finally made.”96  
Schlesinger outlined a number of other ideas on how to integrate CIA plans and 
operations more seamlessly with the rest of the national security bureaucracy.  But his 
notion about an overseer for covert operations meshed with the emerging sentiments 
of the president and the attorney general, who also contemplated Schlesinger’s policy 
guidance.  The attorney general might not be able to lead the CIA, but he could 
certainly be the official son-of-a-bitch for covert operations. 
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Cuba remained the administration’s top target for covert operations.  President 
Kennedy and the attorney general stayed committed to overthrowing Castro, despite 
all the fallout from the Bay of Pigs.  National security imperatives as perceived by the 
president and RFK drove the administration’s thinking and actions.  Castro had to go, 
because Cuba might become a Soviet missile base, a hub for communist subversion in 
Latin America, a launching pad for cover communist activities within the United 
States or all three.  At various points both RFK and JFK stressed the threat of all three 
of these potential scenarios, which in their minds was sufficient reason for immediate 
aggressions against Castro.  How Castro might be brought down remained unclear in 
the summer of 1961, but RFK and others at the White House grew increasingly 
determined to find a way.  By early May the White House national security team all 
agreed that the administration must act against Castro.97  However, the general 
strategic calculation about Cuba was the same after the Bay of Pigs as it was before, 
i.e. Castro could not be attacked directly without grave risk of war with the Soviet 
Union.  That left covert operations as the instrument for overthrow, but prospects 
along those lines were bleaker than ever.  Castro’s internal security forces had 
thoroughly swept the island in the wake of the invasion, arresting thousands.  The 
crackdown left the CIA with only about a dozen active agents in Cuba.  The Cuban 
opposition on the island had scattered as well.  Only one group numbering about 100 
fighters in the Escambray Mountains was thought to be active as a guerrilla force.  All 
other rebels escaping arrest were back in their homes biding time, and their numbers 
                                                        
97 Record of Actions at the 483rd Meeting of the National Security Council, May 5, 1961, FRUS, 
1961-1963, Vol. X, 205. 
  
 
55
were small.  Dormant insurgents connected to exile outfits totaled less than 700.98  
Still, the CIA had Cuban exiles leaders in the United States willing to try, notably 
Manuel Ray Rivero, head of a rebel group called the Revolutionary Movement of the 
People, or MRP.  Ray had already asked the CIA for five boats, money and 
miscellaneous other materials so that MRP operatives could take up intelligence and 
sabotage operations inside Cuba.99  Ray wanted to keep up the fight against Castro 
and get started right away. 
At best Ray and other Cuban exiles willing to throw themselves at Castro 
could hope to mount only dozens of sabotage missions with no real prospect of 
shaking Castro’s hold on power.  The Cuban exiles could be a nuisance to Castro but 
nothing more.  There seemed to be little point in spending time, money and blood on 
risky missions certain to leave Castro unbowed.  But the president and the attorney 
general pressed for action nonetheless.  In National Security Council meetings RFK 
led the call and flashed anger toward anyone who seemed hesitant.  Under Secretary 
of State Chester Bowles, a frequent participant in national security meetings on Cuba, 
took minutes at a meeting with RFK and JFK shortly after the Bay of Pigs and 
described it this way:   
 
There were some thirty-five people at the NSC meeting on Cuba.  
Again Bob Kennedy was present, and took the lead as at the previous 
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meeting, slamming into anyone who suggested that we go slowly and 
try to move calmly and not repeat previous mistakes.  The atmosphere 
was almost as emotional as the Cabinet meeting two days earlier, the 
difference being that on this occasion the emphasis was on specific 
proposals to harass Castro…  The president limited himself largely to 
asking questions—questions, however, which led in one direction.100   
 
Such scenes became familiar to the White House hands dealing with Cuba.  
The president would coolly preside over a meeting with the formal National Security 
Council or one of the many other administration teams working on Cuba while the 
attorney general unleashed his temper and demanded action.  RFK called for nothing 
short of a relentless campaign against Castro, and anyone who sat through a meeting 
with him and the president understood that the two brothers spoke with one mind on 
the issue.  RFK embodied a wrathful urgency the president and the attorney general 
both felt toward Castro. 
By mid May, responding to pressure from the White House, the CIA 
developed a plan for renewed covert operations in Cuba.  The Cuban Revolutionary 
Council, acting as an umbrella organization for various rebel groups, would be the 
main organization receiving U.S. backing.  At the same time the agency would work 
with other Cuban exile groups like Ray’s, regardless of their relationship with the 
council.  The CIA would, in short, start spreading its bets against Castro.  The targets 
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for exile sabotage operations would be the same as before the Bay of Pigs – 
refineries, power plants, bridges, radio and television stations, sugar production 
facilities and the like.101  The basic idea was to keep chipping away at Castro’s 
powerbase with rebel attacks until something bigger could happen.  Perhaps, under 
pressure, Castro would blunder and launch an outright attack on a Latin American 
country or even the United States, inviting a U.S. invasion.  Maybe the appearance of 
internal dissent created by covert operations would lead to mass defections, hollowing 
out Castro’s regime.  The sabotage campaign in effect hinged on an unknowable 
future event or circumstances taking shape, some scenario in which Castro’s hold on 
power suddenly slipped.  The covert operations proposed by the CIA were supposed 
to instill a sense of mayhem that would help in some murky way bring about such a 
moment.  And if that moment never came?  Then there was just senseless mayhem in 
Cuba, a prospect that appeared to raise little concern in the White House.  At least 
mayhem was action, and it cost the United States little so long as Cuban exiles were 
willing to hurl themselves into the fray. 
As before, the CIA kept RFK apprised of happenings in Cuba with daily 
intelligence briefs, which swelled files in the attorney general’s office.  News of the 
blasts and the blazes unleashed by the CIA had filled the intelligence summaries in 
the weeks ahead of the April invasion.  In the months afterward the CIA briefs 
reaching the attorney general painted an increasingly dark picture on the island.  
Castro indeed felt emboldened – and enraged. Weapons from the communist bloc 
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poured into Cuba while Castro tightened his grip on the country, rounding up and 
executing suspected subversives with firing squads.  In public Castro thundered 
against the United States in speech after speech, denouncing and hectoring 
Washington.  Other leading Cuban figures such as Guevara and Raul Castro voiced 
up too, echoing their leader.  Taken together political rhetoric coming from Havana 
seemed all about revolution in the region, austerity in Cuba, strengthened ties with the 
Soviet Union and unbridled hatred for America.102  How much RFK absorbed from 
the copious intelligence materials sent to him by CIA is unclear.  The reports show no 
signs of notations from the attorney general.  But the bleak picture they presented of 
Cuba meshed generally with perceptions of Cuba RFK voiced repeatedly in meetings 
and memos.  RFK’s sense of the threat Castro’s Cuba posed on the whole aligned 
with the intelligence assessments generated repeatedly by the CIA during the 
Kennedy administration, which tended to take an alarmist view. 
The fears RFK and the White House generally felt regarding Castro’s reach 
within Latin America were well founded and had arisen even before the Bay of Pigs.  
The CIA had watched with alarm as Castro made his opening moves in the region 
once in power.  In June of 1959, more than 200 guerrillas trained and backed by 
Castro landed in the Dominican Republic hoping to launch a revolution there.  The 
fighters came from Cuba via two boats and a transport plane and included a number 
of Cuban officers as well as Dominican exiles opposed to right-wing dictator General 
                                                        
102 See box 201, Attorney General Papers, Classified File, John F. Kennedy Library.  The dozens of 
intelligence briefs here offer a mix of news summaries and intelligence snippets.   
  
 
59
Rafael Trujillo.103  The insurrection failed.  Trujillo’s forces wiped out the rebels in 
just a few days, but the operation revealed the depth of Castro’s audaciousness and 
ambition.  As far as the CIA was concerned, Castro had a vision for revolution across 
Latin America and was committed to pursuing it. 
Castro’s revolution had been only the most vivid manifestation of political 
currents that ran deeply throughout Latin America.  A genuine grassroots reform 
crusade had taken root in the region during the postwar period.  A great many people 
wanted to see an old political order swept away.  For generations politics throughout 
Latin America tended to pit military and political elites against a largely agrarian 
underclass in a competition for economic privilege.  Backed by Washington and 
American businesses, the elites won more often than not.  In 1959, Castro showed 
people how that could change in a stroke.104  Revolution could be had if only people 
were bold enough.  Latin America was ripe for change.  This was what Castro and his 
revolutionaries preached, and few doubted their resolve to wage a campaign beyond 
Cuba.  The CIA estimated that only eight sitting governments in Latin America were 
solidly against Castro and Castroism as of 1961.  In most countries across the region 
leading officials felt wary or outright fearful of leftist blocs in their countries and 
hesitated to speak or act against them.105  Castro, his backers and his enemies all 
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sensed violent upheaval in the middle distance, and after the Bay of Pigs the odds 
seemed to favor Castro in many people’s eyes. 
RFK worried especially about Castro’s revolution spreading beyond Cuba.  
The attorney general wanted to find out from American embassies and military 
missions throughout Latin America how strong the military and police forces were in 
countries susceptible to revolutionary politics, and he urged the president to order a 
study of the matter in a memo dated May 22, 1961.  “It would be helpful, I think, to 
find out from our Embassy and Military Personnel in all these countries the 
capabilities of the police and of the Army to determine: 1.) Violence, insurrection and 
guerrillas. 2.) How much training has taken place in the field of special forces.”106  If 
bands of guerrillas backed by Castro appeared in Bolivia, Venezuela or some other 
country, who would put them down?  RFK wanted to know.  Thus contemplating the 
threat of Castro had led RFK to grow increasingly concerned about the security of 
Latin America as a whole, taking the attorney general ever deeper into the Cold War.  
To be sure, a basic, if dubious, assumption that Castro was indeed a threat to the 
security of Latin America underpinned the thinking of RFK and JFK.  Neither of the 
Kennedy brothers showed any willingness to challenge that assumption, even though 
Castro’s ambitions and rhetoric clearly went beyond his actual abilities to bring about 
revolutionary change in the region.  Events helped reinforce the sense of menace the 
Kennedy brothers adopted toward Castro, however.    
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The first crisis in Latin America after the Bay of Pigs materialized swiftly, in 
the same place Castro had struck in 1959.  Trujillo, the ruler of the Dominican 
Republic for three decades, was losing his grip on power by 1961.  Trujillo’s long, 
brutal reign had given rise to many enemies inside the Dominican Republic and 
throughout Latin America.  The dictator had been a reliable U.S. ally in the region in 
times past, and Washington had long been happy to look the other way when it came 
to his regime’s abuses.  But Trujillo’s oppression and malfeasance had grown so 
egregious by the late 1950s that even the Eisenhower administration felt that dictator 
should go.  The sentiment passed to the new administration, and in mid May 1961 
Dominican dissidents reached out to U.S. officials saying a plot to kill Trujillo was 
afoot.  They wanted arms, recognition and general U.S. support.107  Consul General 
Henry Dearborn was serving as CIA station chief at the time in Ciudad Trujillo, the 
Dominican capital.  In response to the request the CIA gave the oppositionists three 
pistols, four machine guns and some ammunition to further their plot.108  Trujillo’s 
enemies did not really need the weapons; many were military men with easy access to 
arms.  The covert aid from the United States was little more than a gesture to the 
opposition, a signal that Washington welcomed the demise of its onetime ally and 
would not stand in their way.  
RFK got involved with the issue when he heard rumors about the intrigue in 
Ciudad Trujillo.  In late May of 1961, Attorney General Kennedy discussed the 
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matter in person with Dulles.  Then he called the president, who said he knew nothing 
about a coming assassination attempt.  Nonetheless the brothers agreed that a task 
force should be formed to figure out what the U.S. response would be if Trujillo 
suddenly fell.  RFK, the president and other White House officials monitoring the 
situation generally were ambivalent about whether Trujillo should stay or go.  The 
foremost concern for RFK was what should be done if Trujillo fell.109  And soon the 
dictator indeed did.  On the evening of May 30, shortly before midnight, Trujillo was 
driving in his limousine just outside the capital when his assassins struck.  Eight 
gunmen traveling in three cars forced Trujillo off the road and opened fire, killing 
him.  Dulles called RFK as news reports about the assassination began to circulate 
and kept him abreast of what little the CIA knew in the immediate hours after the 
killing.  Despite the CIA contact with dissidents, the intelligence agency could shed 
no light on whether Trujillo’s killers held popular support or even who in fact they 
were.  RFK seemed largely indifferent to Trujillo’s bloody demise but annoyed that 
the CIA had so little information about a potential crisis as it unfolded.  In notes made 
at the time RFK wrote: 
 
We still don’t know how much popular support this anti-Trujillo group 
has.  We don’t know who is involved in it; we have at the present time 
no contact of any kind with them; we haven’t received a report from 
the consul indicating that he has any contact with them…  The great 
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problem now is that we don’t know what to do because we don’t know 
what the situation is.110 
 
President Kennedy was in Paris preparing for a Vienna summit with 
Khrushchev when news of Trujillo’s assassination arrived.  RFK was back in 
Washington, and the Kennedy brothers discussed the situation by phone.  No archival 
evidence reveals the details of their conversation, but in any case RFK ended the call 
with the president understanding that he had the responsibility of ensuring that the 
administration took the necessary action to prevent the Dominican Republic from 
falling to communists.  And in RFK’s view no one in the administration was moving 
aggressively enough.111  The contingency planning done to date aimed to craft a plan 
of action meant to prevent communist takeover of the country if Trujillo’s removal 
produced a power vacuum.  Remembering the episode years later during an interview, 
RFK said:  “And the big question was, when Trujillo was assassinated, who was 
going to take over the country.  And that was my concern.”112  Even before the Bay of 
Pigs the CIA had warned that the Dominican Republic could fall into turmoil at 
almost any moment because the Trujillo regime had grown so intolerable, creating an 
opportunity for Castro.  According to CIA estimates, the oppositionists were mostly 
upper class and thus unlikely to join forces with communists in effort to bring down 
Trujillo.  But at the same time Castro had cards to play if he wanted.  The CIA 
                                                        
110 Arthur Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His Times, pp. 491-492. 
111 Robert Kennedy, in recorded interview by John Bartlow Martin, April 13, 1964, p. 178, John F. 
Kennedy Oral History Program, John F. Kennedy Library. 
112 Ibid. 
  
 
64
figured Castro could in short order dispatch several hundred revolutionaries to the 
Dominican Republic, in effect repeating the move Cuban revolutionaries made on the 
country in 1959.  That was about all Castro could hope to do, according to the CIA.113  
The timing of Trujillo’s death so soon after the Bay of Pigs made the situation seem 
more dangerous to the Kennedy brothers, however. 
Castro loomed in the minds of the president and the attorney general as they 
contemplated how to respond to the situation in the Dominican Republic.  Cuba was 
such a small country – yet caused such large problems.  The Dominican Republic 
threatened to do the same if communists seized it, RFK felt.  Communist control of 
the Dominican Republic could prompt a domino fall in the Caribbean.   Neighboring 
Haiti would likely be the next nation to swing into alignment with Castro in RFK’s 
mind.  From there the specter of Castro’s revolutionary politics sweeping the region 
grew ever more ominous.  Reflecting on the issue during an interview, RFK said: 
“You see a little country like Cuba, the problems and the trouble it caused, and if he 
[Castro] had the Dominican Republic…  And then it meant really the whole part of 
the Caribbean would be hard to hold, and so that was the major concern.”114   
The administration’s Dominican Republic crisis team assembled at the State 
Department, and RFK joined in an unofficial capacity but believing he served as the 
president’s proxy nonetheless.  The meetings made for high drama.  Calls flew back 
and forth between the group at State Department and the president’s entourage in 
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Paris.  Intelligence cables flashed to Washington from Ciudad Trujillo as the 
policymakers tried to figure out what was happening on the ground in the Dominican 
Republic and what they ought to do.  Richard Goodwin, a presidential confidant and 
key advisor on Latin America, joined RFK along with Schlesinger.  Vice President 
Johnson took part in the talks, as did Rusk, McNamara and Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Lemnitzer.  The questions on the table before them all were weighty 
indeed.  Was a bloodbath about to erupt in Ciudad Trujillo?  Would the communists 
swoop in and take the place amid the turmoil?  Should the administration land 
American forces in the Dominican Republic? 
RFK and the White House contingent wanted quick action to ensure that the 
upheaval offered no opportunity for a communist takeover.115  The attorney general 
wanted U.S. Navy ships to be positioned off the coast of the Dominican Republic in 
preparation for sending troops ashore.  Bowles, the most senior State Department 
official at the meeting and ostensibly the chairman of the meeting, expressed some 
hesitation along with others from the department.  RFK berated him, calling Bowles a 
gutless bastard.116  To Bowles, RFK seemed to be looking for an excuse to storm the 
place with American troops.  At one point in the talks RFK suggested blowing up the 
American consulate in the Dominican Republic as a way to give U.S. forces a reason 
to intervene, an early display of his consistent willingness to contemplate extreme, 
even outlandish, covert actions.  Another idea discussed by RFK and others eager for 
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military action was to encourage Dominican dissidents to issue an appeal for U.S. 
intervention, giving diplomatic cover for the landing of U.S. forces.  RFK was hardly 
alone in his zealotry.  Goodwin argued in the same vein.  McNamara and Schlesinger 
also agreed with the attorney general and Goodwin to the dismay of Bowles, who 
along with other State Department officials that felt a drastic U.S. military move on 
the Dominican Republic was reckless. 117  The White House seemed to want action 
for action’s sake. And RFK led the call, clearly seeing himself as a kind of White 
House whip to the broader administration. 
In the end the immediate imbroglio actually passed quickly, and the White 
House stayed its hand.  Trujillo’s son Ramfis assumed political control in Ciudad 
Trujillo alongside the regime’s figurehead president, Joaquin Balaguer.  By June 2, 
the CIA was reporting that the elder Trujillo’s death had in fact not altered the near-
term political picture all that much.  The regime seemed able to carry on fine without 
the old man.  No organized opposition came forth.  Trujillo’s assassins looked to be 
simply killers, not usurpers.  For the time being things appeared relatively stable in 
the eyes of the CIA.  But agency analysts felt certain that trouble would come 
eventually.  Major upheaval would grip the Dominican Republic sooner or later, 
analysts said.  The regime’s continued reliance on a police state to maintain power 
would stoke an already smoldering opposition movement within the country, and a 
power struggle would likely ensue.  Castro would almost certainly try to shape events 
to his advantage, the CIA believed.  Outright attack with the Cuban military or a 
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revolutionary guerrilla force would likely be too bold a move given the risk of 
reprisal from the United States or other Latin American countries.  But Castro could 
stir up communist subversives in the country in the future.118  The crisis had passed, 
but the threat remained.  For RFK, one of the immediate takeaways from the episode 
was a further sense of frustration and disappointment with the CIA.  The attorney 
general felt the CIA should have had more information and done a better job of 
getting it to Washington.  And RFK found that acting himself in the face of what 
looked to him like CIA incompetence produced results.  In an oral history interview, 
RFK said: 
 
You couldn’t tell what was going on in the country.  And the CIA had 
some people there, but they couldn’t get any information out.  Then I 
finally found out a newspaperman had gone in and landed and was 
reporting out, so I suggested, why didn’t they telephone?  And they… 
put a dime in the telephone and they called down there and got right 
through.  We had all kinds of things like that.119 
 
The president returned to Washington after his Vienna summit and met with 
the members of the Dominican Republic crisis team, including Attorney General 
Kennedy.  They debated what the policy going forward should be.  RFK said the new 
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leadership ought to have a chance to prove itself.120  As far as RFK understood, 
Trujillo’s son Ramfis offered assurances that he would undertake internal reforms, 
eliminate domestic threats to the regime and then fade from the scene to make way 
for elections.  RFK felt the administration had to play along with these promises, 
however dubious, because few viable alternatives existed.121  And that is essentially 
what the policy became, waiting and seeing.  The attorney general from then on made 
it his business to be among the most careful watchers of events in the tiny country.  A 
steady stream of intelligence reports, diplomatic cables and memoranda related to the 
Dominican Republic began flowing his way at the Justice Department, deepening his 
activities in foreign affairs and thickening his confidential and classified files.  Albeit 
brief, the crisis did two important things for RFK.  It showed the national security 
establishment that the attorney general could insert himself into any situation 
whenever he deemed it necessary to act as a presidential proxy.  And seeing the CIA 
fumbling in its efforts to handle the Dominican Republic seemed to further cement a 
feeling in RFK that he needed to be personally involved in agency activities in order 
to ensure their effectiveness.  That meant keeping abreast of national security 
hotspots like Cuba, the Dominican Republic and a lengthening list of other places in 
addition to his domestic responsibilities in the administration.     
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III.  The Soviets and the Global Cold War 
 
The Struggle for Berlin 
Cuba and Latin America dominated the attorney general’s national security portfolio, 
but other pressing foreign policy matters drew RFK’s attention as well.  Even amid 
the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy and the White House sought to maneuverer for 
advantage in the wider Cold War on a number of fronts, and RFK thrust himself into 
the action with the president’s approval.  The attorney general began doubling as a 
kind of unofficial national security advisor and high-level envoy on basically any 
national security matter weighty enough to merit sustained attention from the 
president and his senior foreign policy team.  Throughout the remainder of 1961 RFK 
took part in policy discussion and decisions on matters ranging from European 
summitry to military intervention in Southeast Asia.  Even without an explicit 
mandate, the attorney general put himself at the center of national security 
policymaking.  RFK’s authority as a senior advisor on all matters simply went 
unquestioned by the national security team, whose members in fact actively sought 
RFK’s participation in their work.  They wanted RFK involved, because the president 
clearly wished it.  And there was plenty of work for any senior official handling 
foreign policy to do.  The Bay of Pigs, for all its drama and intensity, remained but 
one of multiple national security crises the administration faced in 1961 as the Cold 
War intensified, especially in Berlin.       
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Virtually all hope of peacefully resolving the longstanding dispute over Berlin 
seemed lost after the June 1961 Vienna summit between Khrushchev and President 
Kennedy.  At the summit and afterward Khrushchev made plain his intentions to 
force a new security arrangement for Berlin.  The Soviet premier above all wanted to 
halt what was becoming an exodus of Germans fleeing from east to west through the 
city.  Khrushchev and his advisors in the Kremlin assumed the allies did not want to 
go to war over Berlin.  After meeting JFK in Vienna, moreover, Khrushchev sensed 
that the new American president in particular was eager to avoid a clash.122  The 
Kremlin was miscalculating, however.  President Kennedy and the administration 
were ready for a confrontation in Berlin and began making plans for one as tensions 
rose.  For RFK, the state of affairs over Berlin in the summer of 1961 represented a 
failure on his part as an envoy and advisor to the president.  The Vienna summit was 
supposed to ease tensions, not heighten them.  The attorney general had been working 
quietly for months to orchestrate a successful summit along those lines.   
Shortly after the Bay of Pigs, with tensions between Washington and Moscow 
intensifying, RFK helped open a diplomatic backchannel with the Soviets.  The 
attorney general began holding informal meetings about twice a month with Georgi 
Bolshakov, a press attaché for the Soviet embassy in Washington who served as an 
unofficial Washington messenger for Khrushchev.  Often RFK and Bolshakov met in 
the attorney general’s office at the Justice Department but sometimes they stepped out 
to a doughnut shop near the Mayflower Hotel or took walks together along 
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Constitution Avenue.  Bolshakov’s job at the Soviet embassy was a cover.  In reality 
he was a colonel in the GRU, Soviet military intelligence.123   The attorney general 
met Bolshakov through a mutual friend, New York Times reporter Frank Holeman, 
who usually helped arrange the meetings.  The talks between RFK and Bolshakov 
covered all manner of issues concerning relations between the United States and the 
Soviet Union.  But the idea of a summit and its would-be agenda quickly became a 
key topic for them.  Often RFK would write nothing down about his talks with 
Bolshakov.  He would simply brief the president verbally on the exchanges when he 
felt they were important.  Sometimes the State Department was made aware of the 
communication, sometimes not.  Using Bolshakov as a backchannel for diplomacy 
was a Kremlin idea.124  RFK got the impression that the informal diplomacy, initiated 
by Bolshakov, served a need for Khrushchev as much as President Kennedy.  
Khrushchev evidently felt that the regular diplomatic communications had left him 
unclear about American intentions in Cuba, or so it seemed to RFK.125  In any case, 
both sides certainly wanted to dispel murkiness about will and intentions over 
potential flashpoints like Berlin, and RFK showed no hesitation in serving as a 
discreet messenger to his brother, a role he played many times over the years. 
RFK sensed that Khrushchev was misreading the situation and failing to 
recognize the depth of resolve in the Kennedy White House over Berlin.  The 
attorney general told Bolshakov repeatedly that the administration would go to war 
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over Berlin.  The Kennedys wanted that made clear to Khrushchev, and Bolshakov 
assured the attorney general that the message was getting through to the Kremlin.126  
Yet tension escalated nonetheless, with Khrushchev seemingly confident that he 
could move unilaterally in Berlin.  RFK came to think that the Russians felt as though 
they could kick the president around.  War seemed close, very close, as both sides 
hardened their positions over Berlin.127  Within the administration a sense of 
uncertainty prevailed over the question of whether or not the United States was even 
ready for a war with the Soviets.  RFK, McNamara and other senior officials handling 
national security set themselves to finding out.  A crash study revealed alarmingly 
low levels of battle readiness across the armed forces.  RFK learned that roughly half 
the torpedoes in U.S. submarines lacked batteries.  Around a third of the soldiers in 
Europe had no ammunition for their guns, he was told.  Something like a fifth of the 
anti-aircraft guns did not work at all. 128  The general lack of readiness for U.S. 
conventional forces stemmed from the Eisenhower administration’s deterrence 
strategy, which relied on nuclear arms rather than ground troops to check the Soviet 
Union.  That plus years of demobilization following World War II and the Korean 
War had left U.S. conventional forces greatly thinned.  Soviet forces lacked readiness 
too.  Like the United States, the Soviet Union had steadily reduced the size of its 
military through the 1950s and increasingly looked toward nuclear weaponry as a 
means of security.  By 1961, Soviet troops tasked with defending Berlin were not 
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combat ready, and many would try to defect as the crisis intensified.129  U.S. military 
planners nonetheless believed that Soviet forces had enough strength to overrun 
Berlin, an assumption RFK and the White House adopted.   
The senior White House officials were unified in their determination to make 
a stand in Berlin, despite what they believed were low odds of holding the city in the 
event of an all-out Soviet attack.130  The president wanted a stronger U.S. troop 
presence in the city.  If the Soviets made a move on Berlin, President Kennedy 
wanted to fight there with conventional forces rather than resorting immediately to 
nuclear weapons.  He and RFK imagined a scenario where fighting erupted in Berlin 
and went on for some time without either side considering the use of nuclear 
weapons.131  During the Eisenhower years, American defense strategy in Europe 
revolved around the doctrine of massive retaliation, which boiled down to a standing 
U.S. threat of nuclear strikes against Moscow for any aggression by Soviet ground 
forces.  But President Kennedy wanted, with RFK concurring, more room to 
maneuver if a conflagration erupted.  If the Soviets sent a platoon into the Allied area 
of Berlin, why drop a nuclear bomb on Moscow instead of just sending two platoons 
against the Soviet forces?  This is what RFK and the president wondered.  The 
Kennedys at bottom wanted the ability to engage in an escalating ground fight for a 
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matter of some days in the hope that a nuclear exchange could be avoided.  Defenses 
in Berlin had to strengthen in order for that to be feasible.132   
The crisis committee formed to handle the situation, the Berlin Steering 
Group, met two or three times a week during this period.  Along with the president 
members of the group included the attorney general, Rusk, McNamara, Lenmitzer, 
Dulles, Taylor and Bundy.  One of the main points RFK argued in these meetings was 
the need to raise taxes by as much as 1.5 percentage points in order to fund the 
military increases needed to defend Berlin.  “I was the one who fought for that policy 
and was supported by all of the Cabinet with the possible exception of Dillon, plus 
[U.S. Information Agency Director] Edward R. Murrow,” RFK said in a dictated 
memo at the time.133  For RFK it was not really about the money.  In his mind, a tax 
increase represented a way to gird the country for all-out war.  He wanted all 
Americans to feel they had a personal stake in the fight for Berlin against the Soviets.  
The president shunned a tax increase for a variety of reasons.  But RFK’s idea of 
making average Americans feel they had a role to play in what seemed to be an 
inevitable conflict held appeal for JFK, who addressed the nation about the crisis in 
Berlin July 25 via television from the Oval Office.134  RFK helped compose the 
president’s speech with Ted Sorenson, the president’s main speechwriter.  The 
attorney general told Sorenson that the president should emphasize the legal basis 
underpinning the American military presence in Berlin and stress that Soviet 
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domination of the city would not go unchallenged by the United States.135  When 
RFK got his hands on a draft of the speech, he made extensive notes for revision, 
including a line at the top stressing the need for sacrifice on the part of Americans for 
the sake of the struggle in Berlin.136  On air the president voiced the call for sacrifice 
in a grim speech.  What exactly Americans were supposed to sacrifice was left vague, 
but the inescapable implication was that a costly war involving all was likely 
approaching. 
On August 13, East German forces backed by the Soviets troops began 
stringing barbed wire barriers in border areas of Berlin, marking the beginnings of the 
Berlin Wall.  In Washington, RFK and the president huddled with the rest of the 
Berlin Steering Group, contemplating how to respond.  As a first move President 
Kennedy finalized his decision to send a battle group numbering roughly 1,800 
soldiers to Berlin.  The steering group also agreed to send Vice President Johnson and 
General Lucius Clay, hero of the Berlin Airlift, to Berlin in a show of support for 
West Germany.  The attorney general asked if more could be done to incite 
worldwide protest over East Germany’s actions.  A breakout group consisting of 
RFK, Dulles, Taylor and some others set to work, though the initiative fell by the 
wayside as more pressing matters drew the group’s attention.137  Specifically, the 
group discussed how the administration would deal with an eruption of violence in 
Berlin.  RFK and the others in the steering group debated how the administration 
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should respond to various incidents should they occur.  What should the U.S. 
response be if a surface-to-air missile brought down a U.S. plane?  What would the 
response be if a Soviet fighter jet downed an American plane?  And so on.  The hopes 
the Kennedy brothers had for managing a phased escalation created problems with 
France, West Germany and the United Kingdom.  The U.S. allies had for years 
operated on the assumption that the United States would quickly resort to nuclear 
weapons if the Soviets made a serious move on Berlin.  The French in particular were 
reluctant to step forward with resources for a ground fight in Berlin, RFK recalled:  
“They thought is would just eventually evolve into atomic warfare.  The president 
always thought this was rather, not only dangerous, but a weak position because it 
didn’t give us any flexibility.”138  In short, the U.S. allies in Berlin, whose support 
would be crucial on the ground in the event of an outbreak of violence, did not appear 
ready to join the administration’s plan for incrementally responding to a provocative 
incident.  And an incident of one kind or another seemed perhaps only moments 
away. 
Events only looked more ominous as the following weeks unfolded.  On 
August 30, the Kremlin resumed nuclear testing, adding to the sense of menace 
hanging over Berlin and darkening RFK’s own view of the situation in particular.  
RFK recorded:   
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I had talked to Jack previously and he was at a loss to explain 
Khrushchev’s decision to resume testing.  It was obviously done to try 
to intimidate the West and the neutrals…  I offered the explanation 
that we were as puzzled about this as Khrushchev must have been 
puzzled about our invasion of Cuba.  As we discussed at the time, he 
must have thought there was something sinister and complicated 
behind it all or otherwise, we would not have done anything quite as 
stupid.139  
 
Months earlier, before the Vienna summit, RFK nurtured hopes of a mutual ban on 
nuclear testing by the United States and the Soviet Union.  Bolshakov suggested such 
a deal could be worked out during their initial backchannel talks.140  Now that seemed 
irretrievably lost as American and Soviet forces in Berlin braced for an outbreak of 
fighting.  In Moscow, meanwhile, Khrushchev correctly perceived that President 
Kennedy’s reinforcement of the American garrison in Berlin along with the 
reappearance of Clay in the city signified a resolve he had perhaps underestimated.  
But Khrushchev did not back off.  The Soviet premier added forces to Berlin in 
response to the White House’s move.  “We had picked up the gauntlet and were ready 
for the duel,” Khrushchev said.141  RFK put the odds of war at about one in five.142   
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On October 28, American and Soviet tanks faced off during a dramatic 
confrontation at Checkpoint Charlie, a key crossing between East and West Berlin.  A 
crisis that had escalated agonizingly and terrifyingly for months had finally come to a 
head.  At the White House, the Kennedy brothers were looking for a way out before 
the shooting started.  In a show of disgust, RFK had broken off his visits with 
Bolshakov when the Berlin barriers first appeared.143  Now he got back in touch with 
a message from the president to Khrushchev.  JFK asked if the tanks could be taken 
out within twenty-four hours in order to deescalate the situation.  Bolshakov delivered 
the message to Khrushchev.144  Soon Soviet and American tanks virtually locking 
horns at Checkpoint Charlie were backing away from each other.  In the weeks and 
months that followed anxieties over Berlin gave way to grim resignation.  The Berlin 
Wall was up.  The allies were not going to knock it down.  Khrushchev had won a 
crucial round of the Cold War in Europe, even if the White House was loathe to admit 
it.  For RFK, though, the standoff reinforced his importance to the president as a key 
player in foreign policy crises.  The attorney general had new confidence placed in 
him by the president and a proven backchannel to the Kremlin.  RFK would draw on 
both as the foreign policy issues he faced multiplied. 
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Approaching Southeast Asia 
Laos troubled the Kennedy administration from its first days to its last, and in 1961 
the fate of the remote country seemed all-important for a time.  The previous 
administration had tried for years to harden Laos into a bulwark against communist 
advances in Southeast Asia.  During the latter part of his presidency Eisenhower 
established a clandestine military advisory mission in Laos known as the Program 
Evaluation Office, and in 1959 Eisenhower added more than 100 Special Forces 
troops whose teams went by the code name “White Star.”145  The American troops 
were there to aid Laotian government forces in their efforts to fend off multiple 
factions feuding for power in the capital, Vientiane.  A series of coups allowed the 
rise of Nosavan Phoumi, who led the regime in Vientiane as of 1961 with U.S. 
backing.  Phoumi’s Royal Laotian Army did not control the country, however, and 
the government’s hold on power appeared shaky.  The most serious threat to Phoumi 
came from communist guerrillas known as the Pathet Lao, who drew backing from 
North Vietnam.  Virtually everything Hanoi used in waging its war against South 
Vietnam moved along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which cut through Laos and Cambodia.  
North Vietnam’s leaders viewed control of Laotian territory incorporating the Ho Chi 
Minh trail as vital to their war aims and committed significant numbers of North 
Vietnamese forces in that effort.  The Eisenhower administration in turn increasingly 
considered Laos a linchpin for the region, a teetering domino that could not be 
allowed to fall.  
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Once in office the Kennedy administration adopted the same mindset and 
moved to deepen U.S. involvement in Laos with an eye toward military intervention 
if necessary.  In addition to providing advisers to Phoumi, Washington had the CIA 
create a so-called third force, a paramilitary outfit nominally aligned with the Laotian 
government but really serving as an agent of U.S. force in the region.  In January of 
1961, the CIA began delivering weapons and other supplies to the Hmong, a Laotian 
tribal militia force fiercely opposed to communists.  At that time, the Hmong’s secret 
army numbered around 2,500 fighters.146  After Kennedy took office that number rose 
nearly fourfold.  By mid 1961 a force of nearly 10,000 Hmong fighters was at work in 
the jungles of Laos against communist guerrillas traveling the Ho Chi Minh trail.147  
Yet still the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces made gains, dealing blows to 
Royal Laotian Army and taking swaths of territory.  On March 23 the president spoke 
extensively about the situation in Laos during a press conference, essentially warning 
the public about the prospects of a U.S. intervention there.  But events surrounding 
the Bay of Pigs largely eclipsed the Laos crisis, at least for a time.  
RFK got involved with high-level talks about Laos shortly after the Bay of 
Pigs, joining regular meetings with senior national security officials to discuss the 
matter even though it had absolutely nothing to do with his role as attorney general.  
As of early August, RFK and the senior national security team at the White House 
were generally in agreement that an outright military intervention in Laos would 
come only in the event of an overt invasion by communist forces from North 
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Vietnam.  If that happened, the administration planned to orchestrate a military 
campaign ostensibly under the banner of Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.148  
Member nations of the treaty organization appeared unlikely to offer meaningful help 
militarily, though, and the administration addressed the reality that any intervention 
would at bottom be a U.S. effort.  So how many U.S. troops were needed to shore up 
the Royal Laotian Army?  RFK wanted to know.  Phoumi needed perhaps as many as 
2,000 U.S. military advisers, according to one estimate that reached the attorney 
general.149   
As of April 29th, the president was contemplating whether to send U.S. forces 
to Laos, Thailand or possibly other neighboring countries and ordered the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff to begin preliminary planning for such moves.150  RFK felt wary about 
another military intervention so soon after the Bay of Pigs, and he sensed deep 
skepticism in the president toward the idea as well.  To RFK, all the talk from the 
military brass about sending troops to Laos sounded eerily similar to discussions on 
the eve of the Cuba fiasco.  Indeed, RFK believed that if the Bay of Pigs had not 
happened, then the president would likely have sent large numbers of troops to Laos, 
since so many of his military advisers seemed for it.  “I think we would have sent 
troops into Laos, and large numbers of American troops into Laos, if it hadn’t been 
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for Cuba, because everybody was in favor of it at the time.”151  RFK’s judgment was 
probably correct given President Kennedy’s publically expressed concerns about 
Laos and the sentiments in favor of an intervention generally within the 
administration.  But in light of the Bay of Pigs the Kennedy brothers grew more 
willing to challenge military advice.  Together in multiple meetings with Pentagon 
brass the president and the attorney general probed the emerging U.S. intervention 
plan at its fundamentals, which involved airlifting thousands of American troops into 
landlocked Laos if North Vietnamese forces began moving en masse into the country.  
Pentagon leaders estimated that they could get 1,000 U.S. troops a day into Laos 
using two airports provided weather conditions were ideal.  RFK understood there to 
be at least 3,000 communist forces in the area where U.S. troops would land, and that 
number could quickly double depending on how fast Hanoi acted in the face of a U.S. 
military buildup.  What happens if the communists bomb the airports and make them 
unusable on, say, day three?  The Kennedy brothers wanted to know and asked for 
answers from military planners.  RFK at least heard no answers that satisfied him.  
The only recourse the Pentagon brass seemed to have in mind was bombing Hanoi.152 
The attorney general voiced skepticism about intervention planning in a 
meeting August 29 with McNamara, Bundy, Air Force General Curtis LeMay and 
other senior officials.  RFK wondered aloud to the group whether Laos was the best 
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place to make a stand against what many in the administration saw as an overarching 
communist threat to Southeast Asia.  Perhaps the battle line should be drawn 
elsewhere in the region, he suggested.  The attorney general’s question went 
unaddressed by the rest of the group as the conversation continued, covering issues 
ranging from the wisdom of seeking UN involvement to the possibility of Chinese 
intervention.  RFK spoke up again to say that sending U.S. troops only to withdraw 
them would make the administration look silly.  He did not want to see the president 
commit troops unless they were going to stay for the long term.  RFK then asked 
whether U.S. airstrikes could effectively knock the rebels back.  LeMay said he 
thought so by destroying large amounts of supplies.  The attorney general asked what 
the next step after that would be.  Rusk said the administration should get the United 
Nations involved immediately after U.S. airstrikes.  LeMay said the worst outcome 
from unilateral U.S. airstrikes would be military involvement by China in Laos.  RFK 
asked if all blows could be dealt by air.  Yes, LeMay said, they could.  McNamarra 
spoke up to say that nuclear weapons would have to be used, a suggestion no one 
challenged.  If Laos fell, the attorney general asked, could South Vietnam and 
Thailand be held in a military intervention by the United States?  Admiral Burke and 
others agreed that holding other countries in Southeast Asia would be difficult if Laos 
fell under communist control.153  The meeting yielded no major decisions, but RFK 
had successfully inserted himself again into national security policymaking 
nonetheless. 
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On May 1 Rusk wrote a memorandum to the president about Laos that RFK 
also received.  Rusk felt that the for the time being the best outcome in Laos would be 
to see Laos remain in a state of de facto partition.  “The more we can fracture it the 
better,” he wrote.  A centralized coalition government would likely fall under the 
sway of communist influence, Rusk argued.154  But the prospects for a carefully 
balanced political solution seemed to be fading quickly as Rusk aired his ideas with 
the president and the attorney general.  Most of the administration thinking about 
Laos continued to revolve around the possibility of a military intervention.  And the 
more they thought and debated the higher the number of troops likely needed tended 
to get.   
During another policy meeting attended by the president, Lemnitzer, 
addressing a question from RFK, said 13,000 U.S. troops would likely be required as 
a start if the administration decided to make a serious play to hold Laos.  RFK, openly 
challenging the analysis by military brass, asked what that number of troops be 
expected to accomplish.  Lemnitzer said that level of U.S. forces would be used to 
hold key territory currently under government control, allowing local forces to fight 
in contested areas.  And what if it did not, the attorney general asked?  What if the 
communists kept up a campaign to capture Laos?   How many more U.S. troops 
would be needed?  Lemnitzer said that would depend on the strength of the 
communist forces invading.  RFK noted that three months prior it had been proposed 
that the administration take military action in southern Laos.  The problem then was 
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that North Vietnamese forces were supposedly so strong in the area that they could 
wipe out intervention forces before they got a foothold.  Why, RFK wondered, were 
the military men more optimistic about the prospects for intervention now?  
Lemnitzer said the original plan for intervention was flexible, meaning easily scaled 
up to include large numbers of U.S. forces.  If the United States kept adding troops, 
the communist would likely do the same, RFK said.  And would that not just lead to a 
direct confrontation with Hanoi, perhaps one even involving American airstrikes 
there?  Lemnitzer acknowledged the risk of an escalation that would quickly require 
massive amounts of U.S. troops.155  With the president’s tacit support RFK had 
challenged the Pentagon brain trust, displaying open skepticism over their ability to 
formulate a successful strategy for Laos.  The aim of RFK’s approach was clear: 
protect the president from bad advice on national security policy. 
Hearing all this, the president called for redoubled efforts at a diplomatic 
solution.  He did not want to be dragged into a war in Laos, especially without 
backing from the British or the French, who were reluctant to throw support behind 
Phoumi.  Moreover, U.S. public interest in the region had waned, the president noted.  
Laos was not the place to fight, JFK felt.  He made clear that he agreed with 
suggestions by some that if the communists advanced in Laos, the United States 
would fall back and hit the communists from the sea and elsewhere outside Laos.156  
But at the same time he ordered an immediate increase of military advisers, who 
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would now number 500 in Laos.  He also wanted Thailand to contribute the same 
number for the same purpose.  Additionally JFK ordered an immediate increase of 
2,000 in the number of Meos being supported to bring the total to a level of 11,000.  
And he authorized stepped up surveillance of the country.157  The president was 
looking for a way out of military involvement in Laos but appeared to see a need to 
keep that option open for the time being nonetheless.  RFK’s exact feelings on the 
president’s chosen approach remain unclear.  The attorney general made no effort to 
assert his own views about what U.S. policy toward Laos should be.  He seemed 
content to support whatever options the president pursued.  But RFK had reason to be 
pleased in the sense that the skepticism he voiced in policy deliberations seemed to 
help deflate support for the aggressive military move advocated by Pentagon brass.  
RFK had hoped to keep the president from making a rash move in Laos, and JFK had 
indeed adopted a sense of caution toward the situation.   
A number of factors worked to ease the sense of crisis surrounding Laos in the 
White House as the summer of 1961 drew to a close.  Seasonal rains slowed fighting 
on the ground, opening the way for a ceasefire.  Diplomatic efforts aimed at forming 
a neutralist government in Vientiane, President Kennedy’s preferred outcome, 
seemed to be making some progress.  Khrushchev appeared to remain sincerely 
committed to pledges he made in Vienna to work towards a neutral Laos, despite 
increased tensions between Washington and Moscow on other disputes.  The larger 
issue of preparing for direct war with the Soviet Union drew the attention of the 
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White House and the American public away from Southeast Asia, too.  But RFK 
remained watchful, taking on Laos as yet another issue in his foreign policy portfolio.  
CIA reports made available to the attorney general showed North Vietnamese combat 
units active in Laos as early as March 1961, and their numbers seemed to be only 
increasing.  Initially scattered reports suggested dozens or perhaps hundreds of North 
Vietnamese fighters, but by the summer of 1962 the CIA would put the number at 
more than 5,000.158  More North Vietnamese fighters appearing in Laos meant more 
cause for reconsidering U.S. military intervention there, and RFK would keep himself 
at the center of those policy deliberations as they arose.  For RFK the crisis in Laos 
never really passed.  It simply simmered and occasionally threatened to boil over, 
pulling him in again and again.     
 
Focusing on Vietnam 
Laos and Vietnam were, of course, interwoven conflicts.  The main factor 
destabilizing Laos was infiltration by fighters from North Vietnam, and so RFK 
naturally took part in the administration’s increasing discussions about Vietnam as a 
crisis built there throughout 1961.  A White House task force dedicated itself to 
formulating a plan to prevent a communist takeover of South Vietnam, and RFK 
involved himself in the various policy proposals that began taking shape.  Reports and 
memoranda from the highest rungs of the national security establishment began 
flowing his way.  The outlook in Vietnam as of 1961 was much bleaker than Laos, 
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RFK learned.  Communists had steadily pressed a guerrilla campaign against South 
Vietnam since 1959.  U.S. intelligence estimates put the number of communist 
fighters in South Vietnam at 12,000 as of April 1961, up from 4,400 in early 1960.  
Nearly 60 percent of the country fell under some form of communist control ranging 
from harassment and night raids to administrative jurisdiction in so-called communist 
secure areas. 159  Every month brought more 600 bloody incidents of one kind or 
another, and casualties on both sides passed 4,500 in the first three months of 1961.160  
The country appeared to be teetering on the brink of an open civil war, a conflict the 
communists looked likely to win.  
The Pentagon was calling for quick action on a counterinsurgency campaign 
meant to deal some blows against the Viet Cong and instill some staying power in 
South Vietnam’s ruling regime, led by Ngo Dinh Diem.  A key aspect of that plan fell 
under RFK’s emerging responsibility as unofficial overseer of covert operations, the 
president’s son of bitch on such issues.  The Pentagon and the CIA were proposing a 
significant escalation of covert operations against North Vietnamese forces.  And by 
at least May of 1961 the attorney general became privy to such plans.161  RFK’s 
views on the specific counterinsurgency initiatives he saw early on remain unclear, 
but he wholeheartedly embraced the idea that Vietnam was a vital struggle for the 
United States in the Cold War.  Allowing a communist takeover of Vietnam, RFK 
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felt, would be a disaster for the United States in Southeast Asia and other regions of 
the world where America hoped to prevail against global communism.  In an 
interview RFK said: 
  
It would just have profound effects on our position throughout the 
world and our position in a rather vital part of the world.  It would 
affect what happened in India, of course, which in turn has an effect on 
the Middle East.  It would have, everybody felt, a very adverse effect.  
It would have an effect on Indonesia, with a hundred million 
population.  All these countries would be affected by the fall of 
Vietnam to the Communists, particularly as we had made such a fuss 
in the United States both under President Eisenhower and President 
Kennedy about the preservation of the integrity of Vietnam.162 
 
The administration’s early covert operations program in Vietnam called for 
small teams of U.S. paramilitaries drawn from the ranks of CIA operatives and Army 
Special Forces.  They would step up sabotage actions against communist forces in 
Laos and North Vietnam, with support from friendly forces.  The approach amounted 
to escalation, especially considering that the Pentagon advocated increased covert 
operations in Laos regardless of the ceasefire. 
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Bundy, Taylor and other key players on Vietnam policy kept RFK abreast of 
discussions on the issue as a matter of course in the latter half 1961.  White House 
advisers evidently understood that RFK’s thoughts would likely form part of the 
president’s decisions at key moments on major issue like Vietnam, Berlin, Cuba and 
Soviet relations.  On Cuba, the president was explicit regarding RFK’s leading role.  
On other matters such as Vietnam and Laos, RFK’s role went less well defined.  But 
since the Bay of Pigs the president most certainly made clear that RFK would 
henceforth be a part of national security decisions, and the attorney general appeared 
to have no hesitation in fulfilling that task.  Bundy and Taylor in particular ensured 
RFK was informed about the action plan for Vietnam.  Documents written for the 
president on Vietnam by his senior advisers also went to RFK regularly at the Justice 
Department.  RFK did not become heavily involved with policy discussions on 
Vietnam at White House meetings in that first year the way he did for Berlin, Laos 
and Cuba.  But he absorbed the details of the policy program the national security 
team was crafting for Vietnam nonetheless and actively tracked the progress of its 
various elements.163 
In the earliest months of the administration, before the Bay of Pigs, the 
president had already taken some action on Vietnam.  Within days of his inauguration 
President Kennedy sat in the Oval Office with Dulles and Rusk listening to a briefing 
by Edward Lansdale about the increasingly worrisome situation.  Communist forces 
in the north were making alarming gains even then.  Lansdale, a former military 
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officer who worked on counterinsurgency for the CIA, warned that Diem was 
struggling to hold out against communist aggression.  Lansdale advised swift action 
to save the Diem regime from downfall.  President Kennedy grew convinced of the 
need for action in Vietnam but remained wary of direct military intervention.  So he 
called for covert operations, which were undertaken before in Vietnam 
unsuccessfully.  During the Eisenhower administration the CIA had stood up several 
small commando squads to serve as counterinsurgency teams meant to operate in 
North Vietnam.  Yet they had never mounted any missions across the frontline, 
because Diem had for years proven squeamish about fielding forces in communist 
territory.164  Dulles explained the past CIA efforts at covert operations to President 
Kennedy, who said repeatedly in the Oval Office meeting in January of 1961 that 
covert operations should be active in northern areas nonetheless.165  The response 
from the Pentagon and the CIA to the president’s order for covert action during his 
first days in office was taking shape in the form of the policy proposals circulating to 
RFK by mid 1961.  The president had more or less set a course for American 
intervention before RFK got involved.  The question going forward would be how far 
the administration was willing to go in its efforts to save Diem. 
Part of President Kennedy’s impulse for U.S. action in Vietnam stemmed 
from what he and others in the White House perceived to be a new and extremely 
dangerous threat arising in the Cold War.  In January of 1961, shortly before 
president-elect Kennedy took the oath of office, Khrushchev publically committed the 
                                                        
164 Richard Shultz, the Secret War against Hanoi, p. 14. 
165 Oval Office meeting on Vietnam, Jan. 28, 1961. DSNA Item No. V100784. 
  
 
92
Soviet Union to supporting “wars of liberation or popular uprisings” in a speech 
widely noted in Washington.  Khrushchev’s vow deeply worried JFK, who pored 
over a text of the remarks during his first weeks in the White House.  Kennedy took 
the speech with him to Cabinet meetings, to dinners with friends and to quiet 
moments alone.  Sometimes he would even quote from the speech aloud and ask his 
advisers to comment.166  JFK believed Khrushchev meant what he said and would 
make good on his promise to foment communist uprising in the developing world.  
Moreover, JFK had become a serious student of revolutionary warfare and understood 
its power and appeal in the Third World.  President Kennedy had read writings about 
communist revolution by twentieth century practitioners such as Ernesto Che Guevara 
and Mao Zedong, and the president pressed his advisers from the start to contemplate 
what he believed was a serious menace.167  The specter of legions of communist 
guerrillas backed by Moscow on the march across Africa, Asia and Latin America 
drove JFK to issue an order on February 1, 1961, calling for the Department of 
Defense to examine ways of developing counterinsurgency forces, consulting with 
other government agencies as needed.168 
Counterinsurgency had a specific meaning to the Kennedy administration 
defined by two closely studied conflicts in Asia during the 1950s.  In the Philippines, 
the Hukbalahap Insurrection pitted communist guerrillas against the government in 
Manila.  The crisis erupted under President Truman, who offered limited yet 
                                                        
166 Robert Dallek, An Unfinished Life, p. 350.  
167 Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. 415. 
168 National Security Action Memorandum No. 2, Feb. 3, 1961, DSNA No. PD00631. 
  
 
93
ultimately decisive military and intelligence support to the government.  By 1955, the 
Philippine government had put down the communist rebellion, and Lansdale had 
earned a reputation as a cunning CIA officer who led the U.S. effort.  The 
fundamental lesson of the so-called Huk rebellion, according to Lansdale and others, 
was that effective counterinsurgency involved lots of politics aimed at capturing 
hearts and minds and relatively little, yet decisively employed, military force.  This 
was a notion of counterinsurgency that sharply contrasted with the U.S. effort against 
Philippine guerrillas at the turn of the 20th century, when brute force against the 
civilian population was seen by U.S. commanders as the best way to sap the strength 
of insurgents. 
Lansdale’s conception of counterinsurgency meshed perfectly with strategy 
developed by Robert Thompson, a British military thinker whose ideas deeply 
influenced the Kennedy administration.  Thompson served in key senior roles with 
the British military in Malaya in the mid 1950s, when U.K. forces battled a 
communist insurrection there.  By 1960, the Malayan communists were in defeat, and 
Thompson arose as a strategist deserving much of the credit.  Thompson then went on 
to advocate novel counterinsurgency strategies in Saigon, where he became head of 
the British Advisory Mission in 1961 and drew notice from Roger Hilsman, the 
director of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research and 
increasingly a correspondent with RFK on Vietnam.  Thompson's approach to 
isolating and eliminating communist guerrillas became known as the inkblot strategy, 
a.k.a. “clear, hold and build.”  Areas that security forces effectively control can be 
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seen as inkblots on a map. To pacify a country gripped by armed rebellion, you 
spread the inkblots outward -- block by block, town by town.  Any area that falls 
under the spreading inkblot must be cleared of insurgents and subsequently policed 
and provided for so that guerrillas cannot find sympathy or safe harbor there in the 
future.  This approach when done successfully, in theory, accomplished two things:  It 
forced insurgents to gather in concentrations elsewhere in the country where they can 
be confronted, and it denied them areas of retreat. 
This core concept of separating guerrillas from the civilian population formed 
the basis of Thompson’s so-called strategic hamlet program, which Hilsman and other 
Kennedy administration thinkers on counterinsurgency liked.  Hilsman felt that 
Thompson’s counterinsurgency strategies “jibed completely with the results of the 
studies we had been conducting in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.”169  Here 
was a forward-leaning plan to confront communist guerrillas in the Third World that 
brought together lessons learned about protecting civilian populations and defined a 
clear offensive role for U.S. forces to play through paramilitary and covert operations.  
This kind of doctrinal thinking about counterinsurgency percolated among the New 
Frontier thinkers throughout 1961, with Hilsman and presidential advisor Walt 
Rostow prominent advocates of an idea already embraced by JFK.  
Counterinsurgency as preached by strategists like Rostow went beyond the tactical 
steps taken by security forces to eliminate insurgents, however.  Successful 
counterinsurgency also required what would in later times be known as nation 
                                                        
169 Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. 433. 
  
 
95
building, i.e. economic and political development.170   The basic idea of a holistic 
approach was to seed economic uplift and political liberalization in troubled countries 
while strengthening their security forces at the same time.  That way the United States 
would build a coalition of strong, loyal nations in the Third World resistant to 
communism. 
RFK became peripherally involved in counterinsurgency policymaking in 
1961, getting looped into a series of memos and discussions originating in the 
National Security Council on the topic.  The president viewed Latin America as the 
priority region for counterinsurgency operations.171  Cuba was at the center of the 
administration’s concerns about security threats to Latin America, and the president 
had made it clear that RFK had a lead role to play there.  It followed, then, that RFK 
would have a part to play in counterinsurgency strategy in the region.  RFK had an 
additional stake in counterinsurgency policy as a law enforcement official.  The 
president wanted stronger security forces overall in Latin America, meaning not just 
military but police also.  President Kennedy moved to launch a program whereby 
police officers from Latin America would come to the United States for training by 
the FBI, which under Hoover of course prided itself on its supposed ability to crush 
alleged communist subversion within the United States.172  President Kennedy 
viewed his attorney general as the policymaker who could help oversee the process of 
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instilling the FBI’s anticommunism prowess in the domestic security forces of nations 
abroad. 
In Vietnam, President Kennedy and his advisers saw the kind of communist 
insurrection Khrushchev threatened to spread worldwide materializing in real time.  
The country became at once a security crisis and a test case for the counterinsurgency 
doctrine of the New Frontier.  By May of 1961 discussions about strategy and 
doctrine were hardening into policy proposals put to the president and contemplated 
by RFK.   The program ultimately endorsed by the White House task force on 
Vietnam was basically a counterinsurgency plan of the kind Thompson and Lansdale 
saw as key to their successes in Malaya and the Philippines.  President Kennedy had 
in fact designated Lansdale as the operations officer for his Vietnam task force, which 
suggested a wide array of diplomatic, economic and propaganda measures to improve 
the situation.  Proposed projects ranged from tax reform to agricultural aid, but the 
core of the intervention strategy was a buildup of conventional U.S. military forces to 
support the South Vietnamese government and an increased tempo of covert 
operations involving joint efforts by the Army and the CIA.  Infiltration teams of 
Vietnamese irregulars posing as civilians were to be sent from Vietnam into Laos, 
where they could attack communist bases and lines of communication.  These U.S.-
trained teams were allowed to be as large as 150 men if needed for assaults.  And the 
plan called for more infiltration of North Vietnam by South Vietnamese operatives 
who could “form networks of resistance, covert bases and teams for sabotage and 
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light harassment.”173  President Kennedy approved the proposed covert operations in 
full without hesitation.174  RFK watched and listened avidly as the policy programs 
for Vietnam and counterinsurgency moved from debate to action.  Like many in the 
administration, RFK was an early enthusiast for counterinsurgency doctrine.175  He 
saw counterinsurgency as a military and political strategy that could help the United 
States win the Cold War in the developing world and continued to believe in it even 
after seeing its failures and shortcomings in Vietnam.  In his 1968 book To Seek a 
Newer World, RFK wrote: 
 
Insurgency aims not at the conquest of territory but at the allegiance of 
men.  In the Latin American countryside as in other threatened parts of 
the world, that allegiance can be won only by positive programs: by 
land reform, by schools, by honest administration, by roads and clinics 
and labor unions and even-handed justice, and a share for all men in 
the decisions that shape their lives.  Counterinsurgency might best be 
described as social reform under pressure.  Any effort that disregards 
the base of social reform, and becomes preoccupied with gadgets and 
techniques and force, is doomed to failure and should not be supported 
by the United States.176 
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IV.  The Rise of Operation Mongoose 
 
A Lead Role at the CIA 
Two significant changes at the CIA empowered RFK in his newfound role as a fighter 
in the Cold War during the fall of 1961.  Longtime director Allen Dulles left the 
agency amid the lingering fallout from the Bay of Pigs.  The departure of Dulles 
marked the end of an era for the agency, which had gained a high level of prestige in 
the national security establishment during his storied tenure.  The CIA under Dulles 
developed a reputation as an agency with solutions to foreign policy problems that 
baffled the Pentagon and the State Department.  But in the fall of 1961 Dulles was 
effectively fired, and the CIA became to the Kennedy White House more or less just 
another troubled government agency needing oversight and direction if it were to be 
an asset in a global struggle against communism.  This loss of stature and leadership 
would help RFK assert himself at the CIA, especially in his new role as overseer of 
efforts to depose Castro.  President’s Kennedy’s explicit intent to have RFK play an 
increasing role on Cuba found concrete expression when RFK assumed the leadership 
of Operation Mongoose.  The attorney general by virtually all accounts grew to 
become his most determined and ruthless self in heading up the secret war against 
Castro in the yearlong period spanning the fall of 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis.  
RFK embodied the president’s will to destroy Castro, an urge the attorney general 
ardently shared.  
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RFK personally interviewed the White House pick for a new head of the CIA, 
industrialist turned public servant John McCone.  RFK felt that the CIA most needed 
an effective administrator, not a policymaker.  Neither of the Kennedys knew 
McCone personally but felt comfortable with his reputation and credentials, even 
though McCone’s profile stood in sharp contrast with most of the senior officials of 
the administration.177  A Republican and Nixon supporter in 1960, McCone was no 
New Frontiersman.  He came from a much different world than the one shared by 
many of the liberal northeasterners in the administration.  During the 1930s and 
1940s, McCone grew wealthy as a California businessman.  An engineer by training, 
he worked at the top levels of steel, construction and shipping companies before 
coming to public service.  McCone’s first major government job was as 
undersecretary of the Air Force for two years starting in 1950, when his chief task 
was to oversee production of aircraft for use in the Korean War.  Later McCone went 
on to further his reputation as an effective administrator by serving as chairman of the 
Atomic Energy Commission during the last three years of the Eisenhower 
administration.  Initially McCone feared that his partisanship would hinder his ability 
to serve in a Democratic administration when the idea of joining first arose.178  The 
Kennedys did not feel that way, however.  They brushed such concerns aside and 
welcomed McCone, who replaced Dulles at the CIA in September of 1961.  During 
his confirmation hearings McCone told lawmakers that he did not consider himself a 
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policymaker, a role the previous director certainly adopted.  McCone instead saw 
himself as basically the manager of the CIA.  As far as McCone was concerned, the 
White House decided what operations the CIA would undertake.  The director just 
oversaw them.  Only the president could decide, for example, whether the leader of a 
foreign country could be deposed by the CIA, McCone said.179  
The attorney general and McCone quickly forged a bond.  Shared feelings on 
Cuba formed a big part of their connection.  McCone had watched events in Cuba 
during the latter part of the Eisenhower administration carefully and felt that for a 
time a diplomatic solution could be had with Castro, some arrangement whereby 
relations between Washington and Havana could normalize enough to keep Cuba out 
of the Soviet sphere.  But after the Bay of Pigs McCone saw no chance of 
rapprochement, and there was no discussion of it in the Kennedy White House.  
Moreover, McCone shared RFK’s perspective on the dangers Castro posed.  Both felt 
the Cuban leader was likely to allow Soviet forces on the island and sow 
revolutionary politics throughout Latin America.  And like RFK, McCone believed 
Castro would allow Soviet missiles in Cuba, a scenario that many in the intelligence 
community doubted would arise.  Such a move was thought by many analysts to be 
too bold, even for Castro.  RFK made certain that McCone understood his zeal for 
Castro’s downfall, but McCone saw no immediate prospects for that.  The new 
director believed the intelligence estimates showing Castro held widespread support 
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and that a general uprising was unlikely.180  If the administration wanted to see Castro 
go, then they would have to do more, much more, than simply encourage Cubans to 
revolt and hope for the best. 
By early November 1961 the president mulled launching a new covert 
program against Castro, but he was unsure what such an operation should entail or 
who should lead it.  By then White House advisorand speechwriter Richard Goodwin, 
a member of the Kennedy inner circle since 1959, had risen to become deputy 
assistant secretary of State for inter-American affairs, a position he used to expand his 
considerable sway over administration policy on Cuba and Latin American generally.  
Goodwin wholly endorsed the idea of a renewed secret campaign against Castro, and 
he urged the president to appoint the attorney general as chief of a revamped anti-
Castro operation.  RFK’s energy and effectiveness were self-evident.  Furthermore, 
the Cuba hands at the CIA remained stuck in the old thinking that led to the Bay of 
Pigs, Goodwin suggested.  At the same time no one at the State Department appeared 
up to the job.  The attorney general seemed to be ideal, Goodwin argued, provided his 
role could remain secret.  Goodwin said RFK should have a deputy connected to the 
upper levels of the CIA, someone to ensure the attorney general’s orders were carried 
out while his hand remained hidden.181  Goodwin evidently took for granted that such 
a role for the attorney general would be appropriate and legally allowable, as did the 
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president.  The impulse to do something about Cuba seemed to override all other 
considerations. 
An intelligence estimate on Cuba prepared at the president’s request offered 
virtually no cause for optimism that a new covert campaign against Cuba would 
succeed, despite all the eagerness within the White House.  Castro’s grip on the 
country was tighter than ever.  He appeared to have significant popular support.  
What remained of an internal opposition were more inclined to flee than rise rebel.  
U.S. efforts to stir internal dissent and subversion seemed doomed to fail.  Not even 
Castro’s untimely death would likely alter the situation.  The regime could endure 
without him.  In fact, Castroism might even thrive all the more with Castro enshrined 
as a martyr.182   In short, another stab at Castro was virtually pointless.  With that 
intelligence estimate in hand, the president and the attorney general huddled with 
McNamara, Goodwin, Bundy, Bissell, Lansdale and several other officials from the 
CIA and the State Department in early November of 1961 for lengthy discussions of 
new plans for Castro nevertheless.  And soon the president authorized a new program, 
code named Operation Mongoose.  RFK assumed overall control, and Lansdale 
became his deputy, serving as chief of operations.  So began a pattern of behavior 
that, when contemplated decades later, seems to make little sense.  After the Bay of 
Pigs U.S. intelligence estimates consistently stated that covert action aimed at 
toppling Castro held low odds of success, but the president and the attorney general 
consistently demanded action in any case.  It is important to remember, however, that 
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while intelligence estimates about the likelihood of Castro’s downfall changed, the 
underlying reason for the U.S. policy of seeking his overthrow had not.  The 
Eisenhower administration had decided that Castro represented too great a threat to 
the hemisphere to be allowed to remain in power.  The Kennedy administration 
adopted that policy and saw no reason to abandon it after the Bay of Pigs.  Indeed, as 
RFK pointed out, the need to act against Castro only grew more urgent in the 
aftermath of the Bay of Pigs.  Chances of success seemed low for U.S. efforts in 
Cuba, but none of the other Cold War struggles the administration contemplated 
seemed especially promising.  Laos, Thailand and Vietnam, for example, held no easy 
solutions either, and yet the Kennedy administration waded into those conflicts too.  
And none of those countries posed a threat as near to the United States as Cuba did.  
The Kennedy administration’s pursuit of Castro in 1961 and much of 1962 was not in 
fact illogical.  The policy remained consistent with national security stratagems 
willingly adopted by the Kennedy administration from the Eisenhower 
administration, and it carried a reasonable sense of urgency given that the grave fears 
RFK expressed over the prospect Soviet missiles in Cuba turned out to be well 
founded.              
Operation Mongoose officially fell under the purview of the Special Group, a 
panel within the National Security Council tasked with overseeing covert operations.  
Established during the Eisenhower administration, the Special Group consisted of top 
officials from the State Department and the Pentagon tasked with oversight of covert 
operations conceived and launched by the CIA.  The Cuba project, as Operation 
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Mongoose was also known, became a kind of subcommittee of the Special Group, 
called the Special Group (Augmented).  Augmented signified the involvement of the 
attorney general, whose regular job as a cabinet member of course normally had 
nothing to do with covert operations.  Political imperatives trumped the 
organizational arrangements, however.  From the start Mongoose was RFK’s 
operation, even if on paper Taylor, McCone and Bundy were supposed to be the real 
overseers.  McCone for one understood that those working on the Cuba project, 
including him, answered directly to the attorney general.183  RFK drove that message 
home by gathering the main players on Operation Mongoose in his office at the 
Justice Department for an early strategy session in January of 1962.  Richard Helms, 
who had then replaced Bissell as CIA deputy director for plans, attended the meeting 
with a number of others and listened as the attorney general forcefully made sure 
everyone understood that getting rid of Castro was the administration’s top foreign 
policy objective.184  “We are in a combat situation,” RFK said during an early 
Mongoose meeting.185  As far as Helms was concerned RFK spoke directly on behalf 
of the president.186  The two Kennedys were one and the same when it came to Cuba.  
Few who worked with either the president or the attorney general in this period failed 
to perceive that reality.   
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Lansdale for his part delighted in the idea of serving as a key lieutenant to the 
Kennedy brothers in formulating a new covert operation.  Lansdale was of course 
already advising the president on Vietnam, but Cuba now took priority.  In both roles 
Lansdale presented himself to the Kennedys as a plucky officer bucking the system, a 
man of action fighting the good fight against both communism and an ossified 
Washington bureaucracy.  He suggested to RFK that a “heavy whip” might instill 
some fighting spirit in bureaucrats seemingly reluctant toward launching another 
campaign against Cuba.187  He pooh-poohed intelligence estimates arguing that an 
uprising had little chance of success.  Determined action, Lansdale argued, would 
bring results.188  The attorney general knew Lansdale by reputation when the 
Mongoose team first came together, calling him the “Ugly American” in handwritten 
notes from an early meeting they had.  Owing to his adventures in Southeast Asia 
during the 1950s, Lansdale reportedly became the basis for the title character of the 
bestselling 1958 novel The Ugly American by Eugene Burdick and William Lederer.   
RFK seemed unimpressed by Lansdale’s notoriety.  The lanky officer now 
worked for him, and RFK ordered Lansdale to survey the situation, outlining the 
problem and what assets the administration held.  The move represented standard 
government task force operating procedure -- formation of a committee, issuance of a 
report and drafting of policy proposals, etc.  RFK might as well have dispensed with 
the pro forma bureaucratic machinations, however.  He already knew what he wanted.  
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At the time he wrote:  “My idea is to stir things up on island with espionage, 
sabotage, general disorder, run & operated by Cubans themselves with every group 
but the Batistaites [sic] & Communists.  Do not know if we will be successful in 
overthrowing Castro but we have nothing to lose in my estimate.”189  
 
Pushing the Bureaucracy of Covert Operations 
Lansdale considered himself the Cuba project’s lead strategist in addition to 
operations chief, and he began developing elaborate policy proposals that went to 
RFK and the others on the Mongoose team.  How much substantive interaction RFK 
and Lansdale shared in shaping a new covert operation strategy is unclear.  Lansdale 
wrote many, many memos to RFK, as the attorney general’s papers reflect.  But 
Lansdale’s papers hold no memos written from RFK.  In fact, Lansdale’s papers, 
housed at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, have no documentation of 
Operation Mongoose at all.  The only trace of Operation Mongoose in the Lansdale 
papers is a handful of press clippings Lansdale collected years later when the 
operation came to light through congressional investigations.  The omission of any 
documents about Operation Mongoose in Lansdale’s papers raises questions.  What 
did RFK write and say to Lansdale when they worked together on Cuba?  Available 
evidence sheds little light.  At present, we have only one side of a conversation 
captured in the memoranda Lansdale wrote to RFK.   
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Lansdale’s voluminous memos to RFK and other members of the Mongoose 
team smacked of Madison Avenue hype, which Lansdale understood well from his 
former days as an advertising executive.  His plans for Cuba were generally long on 
vague promises of success against Castro.  Despite his outward optimism, Lansdale’s 
approach adopted the assumption that a Cuban uprising remained highly unlikely.  
Thus Lansdale’s strategy tended to emphasize the cumulative effects of a long-term 
campaign aimed at undermining, rather than overthrowing, Castro.  Sabotage 
operations in Lansdale’s view were chiefly propaganda exercises, dramatic acts 
intended to alter popular perceptions about Castro’s strength. Over time, the thinking 
went, Castro’s power would erode if Cubans began to see him as weak and 
ineffectual.190  At their best Lansdale’s thoughts as expressed in lengthy memos 
flowing to RFK offered a seemingly highly sophisticated form of clandestine warfare, 
a nuanced strategy combining propaganda and political violence effectively.  At their 
worst they sounded like salesmanship drawing on pseudo science to push dubious 
policy proposals.  
Lansdale initially conceived several phases for Operation Mongoose.  Each 
phase had specific objectives to be accomplished on a set timeline.  Phase one ran 
roughly from the spring of 1962 to about July of that year.  It had the following goals: 
increase intelligence from Cuba, coordinate political, economic and covert activities 
aimed at Cuba, remain consistent with overt U.S. policy and continue military 
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planning to ensure capability for a possible U.S. intervention.191  From the beginning, 
the Mongoose team, including RFK, worked on the assumption that U.S. military 
intervention would ultimately be needed to overthrow Castro and that one of the 
project’s goals was to produce a justification for direct U.S. military action.192  The 
first order of business, however, was to renew U.S. intelligence on Cuba, where the 
CIA had little presence owing to the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs.  Castro’s security 
forces had effectively broken what network the CIA had.  The CIA was struggling to 
maintain contact with the handful of agents it had inside the country, McCone told 
RFK.  On paper the CIA had 27 or 28 agents in Cuba.  But only about a dozen were 
in communication, and contacts were infrequent.  As Operation Mongoose geared, up 
a team of seven agents infiltrated Cuba but were captured, with two giving televised 
confessions.193 
A paucity of intelligence assets in Cuba was one of the project’s thorniest 
problems during its early days but hardly the only one.  As Lansdale found, a lack of 
consensus about the underlying policy made crafting strategy difficult.  The senior 
officials involved in the Cuba project disagreed on both the goals and the approach.  
For example, the central assumption of eventual U.S. military intervention directly in 
Cuba regularly came into question as the Mongoose team pondered various moves 
against Castro.  Lansdale believed that an internal revolt strong enough to topple 
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Castro could take shape in Cuba, but open U.S. support of Cuban rebels was key to 
success in Lansdale’s mind.  He argued that sufficient means and manpower in fact 
already existed within Cuba and among the exile community in the United States to 
overthrow Castro.  The Cubans really only lacked will and organization, which the 
administration could provide if it wanted.194  But the administration needed to act 
quickly, Lansdale argued, or risk losing vital momentum.  The will of the Cuban 
people to resist the Castro regime was fading, Lansdale believed.195  In Lansdale’s 
view, people inside Cuba needed to see a rebellion come to life in order to gather 
enough courage to take to the streets themselves en masse and overthrow Castro.196  
The base of that rebellion would naturally be within the Cuban exile community in 
the United States.  Certainly Cuban exiles in America offered a vital asset for the 
Cuba project.  Their ranks were swelling all the time.  Nearly 7,000 Cubans fled the 
island for the United States in February of 1962 alone, joining a community of some 
100,000 Cuban emigrants who began streaming to America after the revolution in 
1959.197  But open U.S. support for rebel activities by the exile community posed 
legal and political pitfalls the White House was unwilling to risk. 
Meanwhile, the administration’s urge to keep the new Cuba project secret 
hindered efforts to get operations going.  In the end everyone involved understood 
                                                        
194 Review of Operation Mongoose, July 25, 1962, Box 193, Attorney General Papers, Classified 
File, John F. Kennedy Library.   
195 Lansdale, program review of the Cuba Project, March 2, 1962, Box 193, Attorney General 
Papers, Classified File, John F. Kennedy Library. 
196 Lansdale, program review of the Cuba Project, March 2, 1962, Box 193, Attorney General 
Papers, Classified File, John F. Kennedy Library. 
197 National Intelligence Estimate, “The Situation and Prospects in Cuba,” March 21, 1962, pp. 1-
5, Box 193, Attorney General Papers, Classified File, John F. Kennedy Library.  
  
 
110
that Cubans from the exile community would be the main operatives in the campaign 
against Castro.  But they needed training and support, which was difficult to provide 
within the United States without attracting attention.  A U.S. airbase in Florida was 
available for CIA use, but training Cubans there would clearly reveal U.S. backing.  
Lansdale did not know whether that was okay or not and had to seek guidance.  
Throwing off the veil covering secret U.S. involvement with Cuban rebels was a 
policy decision only the White House could make, however thin that veil might have 
been.  The same issue troubled efforts to arm exile groups.  Were they to get U.S. 
weapons even if they were not directly under U.S. supervision?  Rebels undertaking 
independent action with American arms could raise political dilemmas.  Lansdale 
wanted clear guidance on that question as well, likely sensing that he would shoulder 
the blame for any rebel debacles in the absence of explicit orders from higher ups.  
Also, the unfolding plan called for a large measure of direct U.S. military support.  
The Pentagon was supposed to supply cargo planes, amphibious assault crafts and 
submarines to get exiles trained by the CIA in and out of Cuba.  But what were the 
rules of engagement for the U.S. servicemen working to support the Cuban rebels?  
Lansdale was unsure and wanted to know.198  Answers from the White House were 
not forthcoming. 
As of spring of 1962, RFK and the other members of the Mongoose leadership 
team seemed to have little clarity on exactly what the operation was supposed to do.      
Lansdale seemed to see Operation Mongoose as a grand strategy, a long-term 
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campaign involving economic warfare, diplomatic pressure, covert action and 
sophisticated propaganda to undermine Castro to the point where his regime teetered.  
At the same time Lansdale offered contradictory analysis arguing that nothing short 
of a direct U.S. military intervention timed with a Cuban uprising could bring down 
the Castro regime.   For his part, RFK seemed to see Mongoose as a way to deal 
quick blows against Castro and keep up pressure on him, even if the endgame 
remained uncertain.  McCone, meanwhile, appeared to view Mongoose as a way to 
rebuild intelligence capabilities within Cuba, at least initially.  Taylor seemed to think 
Mongoose was a prelude to a direct military intervention, even though the president 
was openly skeptical that overt military action would ever become an option 
politically.  It was even unclear whether or not Lansdale would remain involved.  His 
position as operations chief was tenuous, up for review at regular intervals.199   
Of all the uncertainties the question of whether the White House would ever 
okay an outright invasion remained the most problematic.  The president had clearly 
signaled his intention to refrain from outright war against Cuba.  The political 
calculation vis-à-vis the wider Cold War remained the same as it was during the Bay 
of Pigs.  Moreover, an invasion of Cuba would be extremely costly even if the rest of 
the Cold War conflict regions remained stable.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff produced an 
estimate of what such an operation would involve.  About 261,000 U.S. military 
personnel would be needed in order to seize control of Cuba within ten to fifteen 
days.  In other words the invasion would have to be about twice the size of D-Day.  
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Once on the island U.S. occupation forces would likely find themselves battling a 
determined insurgency of unknowable duration.200  But if the United States was never 
going to invade, what was the point of fomenting a Cuban rebellion that would only 
be crushed?   
Frustration and impatience welled among RFK, McCone, Lansdale and others 
at work on the project as the uncertainty persisted.  Lansdale especially had reason to 
be angry since much of the intense pressure for the project to produce quick results 
fell on him.  Lansdale began to feel that Operation Mongoose in its current form was 
essentially futile so long as the administration remained unwilling to engage in an 
open confrontation with Castro.  In Lansdale’s view, the White House needed to 
expand support of Cuban rebels to the point where Washington’s hand certainly 
would be revealed and seriously contemplate direct military invasion.  Such firm 
action by the United States, Lansdale argued, would solve most of America’s 
problems in Latin America generally.  Inaction only served to strengthen America’s 
enemies in the region and beyond.  Lansdale seemed driven to convince the Kennedys 
to take a much more forceful approach to Cuba, eschewing the caution the president 
himself had preferred.201 
Confusion over the ultimate objectives for Operation Mongoose persisted into 
the summer of 1962, when the senior planners for the project found themselves 
debating four possible courses of action for the future.  They could simply desist with 
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anti-Castro efforts and treat Cuba as a bloc nation, isolating it from the rest of the 
region so much as diplomatic pressure would allow.  They could press ahead with an 
overthrow campaign employing all U.S. means short of direct military intervention.  
This plan would essentially be a Bay of Pigs redo, only this time U.S. forces would 
ride to the rescue of a Cuban uprising.  Lastly, they could stage a provocation leading 
to an outright U.S. attack against Cuba, a notion RFK had suggested before for both 
Cuba and the Dominican Republic.202      
 
A Personal Shadow War  
RFK knew that his brother could not afford another debacle like the Bay of Pigs, and 
yet at the same time RFK remained determined to act against Castro.  The CIA was 
that attorney general’s instrument for doing so, but RFK harbored significant doubts 
about the agency’s abilities.  Operation Mongoose was, after all, a reconstitution of 
much of the CIA’s program leading up to the Bay of Pigs.  Few new ideas were on 
offer from the CIA in the months afterward as RFK sought methods for dealing with 
Castro, and the new players in the picture such as Lansdale failed to instill confidence 
in RFK.  The attorney general had gotten wind of some resistance to the idea of 
Lansdale serving as the operations chief for Mongoose.  Initially RFK stepped in to 
support Lansdale, telling McCone that he hoped the CIA would cooperate fully with 
Lansdale and provide an able agency liaison for him.203  But soon RFK too 
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questioned whether Lansdale was the right coordinator for the Cuba project.  The 
attorney general asked McCone for a frank assessment of both Lansdale and the 
project generally in January of 1962.  McCone was pessimistic about the operation 
and told the attorney general so.  Carrying it out would be difficult because of 
realities in Cuba, McCone said.  Moreover, the CIA and the government generally 
were short on assets usable in a campaign against Castro.  McCone promised the 
attorney general that the CIA was sparing no effort even so.204  The man the agency 
put forward as the liaison for Lansdale, however, failed to inspire RFK.  
William Harvey took the lead on Task Force W, the CIA’s internal unit for the 
Cuba project.  Harvey had made a name for himself as the spy behind the Berlin 
Tunnel, a successful joint effort by the CIA and British intelligence to tap Soviet 
communications cables snaking beneath East Berlin.  In his new job back at 
headquarters Harvey oversaw the CIA’s Miami base, called JMWAVE internally.  He 
also worked closely with Lansdale and the attorney general in Washington, attending 
the many Cuba project meetings, 40 in all from January to October 1962. 205   RFK 
and Harvey came to loath each other and made no secret of their feelings.  As far as 
RFK was concerned Harvey was incapable of getting anything done.  Reflecting on 
Harvey, RFK in an interview said: “We’d been working with him for a year and no 
accomplishment.”206  Harvey returned the contempt, often referring to the attorney 
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general as “that fucker.”207  Harvey considered the Mongoose leadership meetings a 
waste of time, and if they came in the afternoon sometimes he drank at lunch before 
attending.  He despised Lansdale as much as he did the attorney general.  Harvey 
regarded Lansdale as a security threat and he actively resisted cooperating with him 
despite orders from the White House.208  In Harvey’s eyes Lansdale’s hype, swagger 
and ignorance typified the mindset of all the Mongoose higher-ups, including the 
attorney general, McCone and even the president.  They were all reckless amateurs 
playing at espionage in Harvey’s judgment. 209  In Harvey’s view, the Kennedys 
wanted the impossible, i.e. a clandestine overthrow of Castro.  The administration 
would have to move openly against Castro if it truly hoped to bring him down.  
Harvey’s policy views counted for little, though.  His job mostly boiled down to 
presenting options for CIA operations to the Special Group Augmented.  He would 
listen to RFK and the other project leaders debate in detail what operations should be 
undertaken and grew ever more annoyed.  One day the group would be eager for 
action.  The next day they would be reluctant.210  None of them were ever satisfied, 
least of all the attorney general.   
All the dysfunction within Operation Mongoose frustrated RFK, but it also 
empowered him.  A lack of consensus about what Operation Mongoose should do 
allowed RFK to push the program toward his goals, i.e. bleeding Castro with little 
more than a vague hope of ultimately overthrowing the Cuban ruler.  While RFK 
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could steer the policy of Operation Mongoose given his position and the group’s 
inability to form a unified approach, the attorney general could not hope to see his 
policy implemented so long as he relied on the likes of Lansdale and Harvey.  And 
that seems to have driven RFK to take a much more direct role in managing 
Operation Mongoose than he might have if people he regarded as more competent 
and effective were involved.  RFK, like other senior officials working on the Cuba 
Project, was supposed to provide policy guidance, not operational management.211  
But from the beginning RFK and other Mongoose planners conducted detailed 
oversight of CIA activities, receiving weekly progress reports about the number of 
agents infiltrating Cuba, among other things.212  The attorney general took matters 
further, going out of his way to involve himself deeply with a wide array of CIA 
activities related to Cuba.  He would personally call midlevel CIA officers working 
on Mongoose and demand progress reports about infiltration teams and other 
issues.213  RFK requested detailed information on specific operations and went so far 
as to ask if he could meet personally some of the CIA’s operatives involved in covert 
actions he had seen described in various memoranda.214  RFK also demanded daily 
reports from a CIA interrogation center established in Opa-Locka, Florida, just north 
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of downtown Miami.215  The Opa-Locka interrogation facility, formally called the 
Caribbean Admissions Center, came to life in February of 1962 as one of the first 
priorities of Operation Mongoose.  The idea was to have a hub for incoming Cuban 
refugees, who could provide reports from inside Cuba and possible recruits for anti-
Castro activities.  The Opa-Locka center was soon producing about 800 reports a 
month, meaning the attorney general was sifting through huge amounts of raw 
intelligence.216 
At one point RFK joined Harvey for one of his regular visits to the CIA 
Miami station.  Kennedy roamed the halls of the bustling building and heard a telex 
machine clattering.  He walked over, ripped the message out and began reading.  
Harvey erupted, tearing the paper from RFK’s hands as he shouted about the 
impropriety of someone without proper clearance accessing classified materials.217  
Back in Washington, the attorney general asked to have a CIA officer assigned to him 
personally, someone who could make contacts with the Mafia and then answer 
directly back to him.  Sam Halpern, Harvey’s deputy, came to understand that RFK 
was actively pursuing connections to organized crime in the belief that the Mafia 
might have useful information on happenings inside Cuba stemming from the 
remnants of networks they used in the days before the revolution to run gambling, 
prostitution, drug running and the like.  Halpern was told by Harvey that RFK would 
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provide the Mafia contacts and the times and places of meetings in the United States 
and Canada.  The attorney general wanted the CIA to provide a man to go, and 
Harvey told Halpern to find someone. 218  Halpern did not look have to look far. 
The Washington war room for Task Force W was a suite of offices facing an 
open area where secretaries and staff assistants gathered.  Halpern, Harvey and 
another CIA man on the project, Bruce Cheever, each had offices facing the open 
area, which they dubbed the bullpen.  Halpern strode into the bullpen and approached 
Charles Ford, a big, burly officer who Halpern figured could handle himself around 
Mafia toughs.  Halpern and Ford came up with an alias for Ford, Charley Rocky 
Fiscollini.  Ford went to see RFK, and during the spring and summer of 1962 Ford 
made a number of trips on behalf of the attorney general and then reported back to 
him either in person or over the telephone.  Ford did not share the details of his 
reports to the attorney general with Halpern, and Halpern never saw any intelligence 
come of it.  Halpern considered the arrangement a dangerous annoyance in any case.  
He did not like sending an officer blindly into meetings, and nothing useful seemed to 
come of the effort as far as Halpern could tell.219 
All of this attention from the attorney general left many in the agency with the 
clear impression that Operation Mongoose was nothing less than the personal project 
of the president and his brother.  The Kennedys themselves were in charge of the 
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Cuba project, not the Special Group Augmented, not McCone or Lansdale or any of 
the other senior White House officials who were drawn in such as Taylor and Bundy.  
All directives for Operation Mongoose, as far as Sam Halpern understood, came 
directly from the attorney general.  Lansdale, who kept an office at the Pentagon, 
answered to the attorney general as kind of chief of staff.220  At times RFK seemed to 
treat virtually everyone at the CIA as his own personal staffers.  One morning in May 
Helms got an unexpected call from the attorney general.  Was Francis Gary Powers 
writing a book about his captivity in the Soviet Union?  RFK heard that from the 
authors of a forthcoming book about the downing Powers’ U-2 spy plane.  He wanted 
Helms to find out whether it was true.  Helms did. The answer was no.221 
RFK kept up a palpable intensity few failed to recognize during high-level 
meetings of the senior leadership team of Mongoose held in the first half of 1962.  
The attorney general constantly complained about inaction.  In March, RFK ordered 
Lansdale to research the feasibility of sabotaging Soviet ships sent to Cuba as aid 
from Moscow, an operation apparently of his own design.222  Slowdowns on ongoing 
covert action angered him.  A typical hitch stalled progress in March, when the 
Mongoose team struggled to deal with the problem of resupplying infiltration teams 
by air.  The CIA had identified five drop sites and had a number of planes ready for 
use.  But who would fly them, Americans or Cubans?  Cuban pilots were thought to 
be unreliable.  But putting Americans in the cockpit risked an embarrassing 
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disclosure should one of the planes go down in Cuba.  Mongoose planners debated 
and promised risk assessments.  RFK lost patience and ordered them to get on with 
things.  Could they not find some Cuban airlines pilots who had defected?  In almost 
the same breath RFK ordered every effort made to find proof of any Cuban 
subversion activity in Latin America.  The attorney general, Lansdale, Bundy, 
McCone and others agreed that if proof could not be found then the possibility of 
manufacturing such an incident should be examined.  McCone promised to look into 
it.223  Clear evidence of Castro backing communist guerrillas in Latin America could 
provide one pretext for direct military intervention, in this case probably with backing 
from multiple countries in Latin America. 
Fingering Castro for subversion was not the only plan RFK contemplated 
when thinking up excuses for attacking Cuba openly.  In March the attorney general 
asked the Mongoose leadership team whether the United States could make a fake 
Soviet fighter plane or perhaps acquire a real one clandestinely.  The CIA estimated 
that, if given proper funding, multiple bogus MIG 17s and MIG 19s could be 
available in roughly six months to a year, with the Air Force manufacturing the 
aircraft.  The CIA advised making the planes rather than trying to buy them.  If word 
got out the United States had purchased Soviet fighters, then it would make using 
them in clandestine activity impossible.   The obvious use for fake Soviet Fighters 
would have been launching them to attack U.S. targets in a staged provocation, a 
possible plan the Special Group Augmented openly considered as a course of 
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action.224  RFK, of course, had urged the president to consider exactly such a plan 
immediately after the Bay of Pigs. 225  Within just a few months of the launch of 
Operation Mongoose RFK made his presence felt at every level of the project, 
pressing demands for progress with anger again and again.  He became essentially 
what Halpern and other perceived him to be, a relentless incarnation of the president’s 
anger toward Castro. 
 
Castro and the Forces against Him 
Operation Mongoose did make some gains in the early part of 1962, despite the 
frustration and impatience RFK and others involved often felt.  The heart of the effort 
remained getting operatives into Cuba to collect intelligence and begin organizing 
insurgent cells.  The work was dangerous and slow going with low odds of success.  
Just 11 infiltration teams had quietly waded ashore on boats launching from the 
United States by the end of July and slunk into the Cuban countryside, where they 
tried to attract recruits while evading Castro’s security forces.  Nineteen other such 
missions had to be abandoned, making the infiltration success rate quite low.  And of 
the teams inside Cuba only one managed to become an active guerrilla cell.  In Pinar 
del Rio in western Cuba an infiltration team had managed to attract an estimated 250 
supporters and remained active with the help of regular U.S. resupply efforts.  The 
fact that the group was receiving outside support tended to encourage recruitment.  
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But other teams elsewhere were not able to expand, and Lansdale estimated that little 
progress would come before October.  No sabotage actions had been taken as of the 
end of July, but the CIA had selected targets and reported having resources in place 
inside Cuba to undertake such attacks.226  Intelligence collection saw more success.  
The CIA had 477 CIA staff working on Operation Mongoose fulltime, with a large 
contingent working part time on the project additionally.  Harvey reported that the 
CIA had 90 agents inside Cuba, and plans were in motion to add dozens more to the 
network as of mid 1962.227  
None of this fundamentally changed the bleak picture in terms of the project’s 
ultimate goal of bringing down Castro, however.  Castro appeared to be going 
nowhere.  The CIA estimated that at least a quarter of the Cuban population solidly 
supported Castro as of March 1962, despite a growing sense of disillusionment about 
the revolution.  The vast majority of people in Cuba, meanwhile, neither supported 
nor resisted the Castro regime.  Instead most had simply settled into a sense of 
resignation and tried to get on with life while coping with a pervasive economic crisis 
on the island.  The Cuban economy hinged on the island’s sugar crop, which the CIA 
projected to be the smallest in years in 1962.  A small sugar crop meant less cash for 
Castro, who used money earned from sugar sales to purchase the many other goods 
needed on the island.  Cuba was getting significant support from the communist bloc, 
but that would be enough to stave off shortages.  That, the CIA believed, was possible 
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leverage to be used in furthering rebel movements.228  Yet nothing in the CIA’s 
assessment suggested the likelihood of an uprising emerging inside Cuba any time 
soon, with or without U.S. support.  As of July, McCone held out little hope for 
change.  Castro still firmly held Cuba, where the regime’s military and security forces 
were gathering strength.  Castro had problems to be sure.  Some popular support had 
slipped amid economic stagnation.  But no serious divisions appeared within the 
regime, and on the whole Castro looked set to remain.229 
RFK candidly expressed his displeasure to McCone as the project went 
forward.  The attorney general had hoped that months of efforts by the Mongoose 
team would have yielded more action against the Castro regime.  In terms of 
manpower, the U.S. intelligence network inside Cuba was the largest anywhere in the 
communist world as of July 1962 thanks to the added resources marshaled by 
Operation Mongoose.  Yet Castro’s forces still managed to stifle U.S. efforts to 
develop and foster resistance cells.230  No Cuban rebel group operating without U.S. 
support had more than 200 people active on the island, where Castro’s forces hunted 
insurgents mercilessly and kept up a steady pace of political executions.  Still, some 
in the underground managed to stage acts of resistance.  Sugar cane fields in the 
hinterlands would mysteriously catch fire well before the usual harvesting burns, 
ruining the crop.  Guerrillas staged sporadic attacks on bridges, communication 
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facilities and militia outposts, prompting crackdowns by security forces. 231  The rebel 
activity was little more than a nuisance to the regime, however.  A further 
disappointment came in the CIA’s failure to uncover any subversive activity by 
Castro in Latin America.  McCone had looked into a number of such intelligence 
reports and found they had no basis.232 
Meanwhile, the CIA’s efforts to kill Castro also sputtered.  Harvey took on 
oversight of continuing assassination plots against Castro as part of his assignment to 
the Cuba project.  Harvey, and those involved at the CIA generally, considered the 
effort to kill Castro and Operation Mongoose to be on separate but parallel tracks.  
Harvey and Lansdale discussed killing Castro on several occasions.  Lansdale asked 
Harvey whether the CIA had the ability to kill Castro and if Harvey thought doing so 
would be a good idea.  Harvey was deliberately vague in his replies, refusing to 
reveal the plots he knew to be underway.  Harvey similarly refused to openly discuss 
assassination efforts with any other member of the Special Group Augmented despite 
his direct involvement.  In April 1962, Harvey went to Miami, which he visited about 
every two or three weeks during this period.  He gave another batch of poison pills to 
Roselli for a new attempt on Castro.233  As before, Roselli was supposed to give the 
pills to a group of exiles willing to attempt the assassination, but this time the Cuban 
involved wanted a cache of weapons and explosives as a quid pro quo.  So, Harvey 
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arranged to have U-Haul truck full of arms handed over to the exiles.  After the 
exchange Roselli kept Harvey informed and reported that the pills and weapons had 
arrived in Cuba.  Again as before, the plot came to nothing, and Harvey was left 
unclear whether any of Roselli’e contacts had made any real effort to kill Castro.234  
Hopes for a quick end to the affair that way dimmed too. 
What RFK knew about the CIA’s assassination plans during this time remains 
somewhat murky.  The attorney general certainly knew about the CIA’s previous 
effort to poison Castro in 1961.  Bissell gave him the basic details about that shortly 
after the Bay of Pigs.  RFK heard about the plot again in May of 1962, when he 
requested a formal briefing from the CIA about it.  It was a defensive move meant to 
thwart Hoover, who had been steadily unraveling the Ballatti case in a transparent 
effort to blackmail the Kennedys.  Hoover needled RFK with FBI findings showing 
links between the CIA’s anti-Castro program and organized crime, a clear dilemma 
for the attorney general.  Giancana topped the list of Mafiosi RFK vowed to prosecute 
as part of his war on crime.  Hoover had successfully made RFK squirm.  The 
attorney general felt the need to state explicitly to Hoover and the CIA that he did not 
condone collusion with organized crime, not even against Castro.  Kennedy told his 
CIA briefers: “I trust that if you ever try to do business with organized crime again—
with gangsters—you will let the attorney general know.”  In conversations with 
Hoover RFK acknowledged that prosecuting Giancana would be difficult since the 
CIA connection would likely come to light, but he vowed to go forward 
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nonetheless.235  RFK’s ongoing effort to use a CIA agent as his personal liaison to the 
Mafia suggests that the attorney general was of two minds on the matter.  On the one 
hand RFK remained determined to press a campaign against organized crime.  At the 
same time the attorney general displayed showed little hesitation in utilizing 
organized crime to press a campaign against Castro.  Neither the clear conflict of 
interests nor the dubious legality of pursuing both campaigns at once seemed to give 
RFK pause.  He worked on each front assiduously throughout his days as attorney 
general.  In any case the mob was not helping.  Castro clearly held them in check 
along with all his other enemies. 
RFK became personally involved with the Cuban exile community during the 
early part of 1962 as well.  The attorney general met in April with Jose Miro Cardona, 
who remained the president of the Cuban Revolutionary Council.  After talks at the 
Justice Department RFK escorted Cardona to the White House for a secret meeting 
with the president.  JFK told Cardona he looked depressed.  Cardona was.  For one 
thing a number of Cuban fighters taken prisoner during the Bay of Pigs remained in 
Castro’s jails despite ongoing negotiations.  But Cardona said the reason he was 
feeling low was the lack of action.  He wanted to renew the fight against Castro and 
asked President Kennedy bluntly for arms and training camps to raise a new force.  
JFK told Cardona that approach was too conspicuous.  The president said exiles 
would have to be trained on U.S. military bases, and he ordered Goodwin to look into 
ways of doing so quickly.  JFK asked Cardona if his relations with the CIA were all 
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right and wanted to know the name of the officer with whom Cardona dealt.  Cardona 
said he was happy with his arrangements with the CIA.  The real problem, Cardona 
stressed, was inaction.236   
Cardona felt compelled to do something, undertake some act that would 
demonstrate his group still held a leading role in the fight against Castro.  Other rebel 
outfits were raising calls for action, exciting donors in the exile community with 
promises of hitting Castro hard.  Cardona feared the council would collapse from 
defections to such groups unless they got into the fight somehow.  JFK told Cardona 
that Castro could not be brought down by an internal uprising.  Only a massive U.S. 
military attack could topple Castro.  When the U.S. might be able to undertake such 
an intervention was the question then.  The president did not have an answer.  He told 
Cardona he would be contemplating it with his military advisers, implicitly holding 
out hope that such a U.S. move might at some point be possible.237  That dangling 
promise from the president, seemingly always just out of reach, left Cardona and 
other exiles veering back and forth between rage and despair. 
Infighting and restlessness among Cuban exile groups posed problems for 
Operation Mongoose.  Lansdale warned the project leaders about the increasing 
factionalism within the exile community.  He also warned the group about media 
attention the exiles groups attracted.  As of April 1962 several news stories had 
appeared detailing the training activities of Cuban rebels in the United States, 
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including a New York Times report April 19.238  The CIA’s Miami station, under the 
command of Ted Shackley, kept a close watch on the political currents within the 
Cuban exile community.  Cardona was right.  Disillusionment, confusion and anger 
welled among Cuban exiles.  Why had the Kennedy administration taken no action 
against Castro since the Bay of Pigs?  Would Castro just be left alone?  Who could 
lead the exiles?  Cardona had the backing of President Kennedy, but both looked 
weak in the eyes of many exiles.  Cubans yearning for the downfall of Castro sensed 
a divide within the Kennedy administration, a hard line on the one side and a soft line 
on the other.  Officials like Goodwin, in the minds of exiles, represented the soft line, 
striking a stance seemingly open to compromise and accommodation with Havana.  
RFK clearly stood with the hardliners in the minds of exiles, along with other notable 
administration figures such as Taylor and Vice President Johnson.239  RFK more than 
the president stood as someone sympathetic to the cause of the most militant and 
determined Cuban exiles, and they began to seek him out.  
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V.  Priorities in the Global Struggle  
 
Gaining War Expertise 
Even as Operation Mongoose took shape in the first half of 1962, Attorney General 
Kennedy increasingly contemplated Cold War struggling grounds beyond Cuba and 
Latin America.  In January of that year RFK became a founding member of the 
Special Group on counterinsurgency, or Special Group (CI) as it became known 
within the administration.  Taylor initially chaired the committee, which included 
RFK, McCone, Rusk, Lemnitzer and the heads of the Agency for International 
Development and the U.S. Information Agency.  Answering directly to the president, 
the group was supposed to function as a high-level council dedicated to coordinating 
a government-wide response to the rising threat of communist insurgencies in Third 
World.240  The idea was fairly radical for the time, at least to some within a U.S. 
national security establishment accustomed to thinking about threats in conventional 
or nuclear military terms.  What did a few guerrillas in the jungles of Latin America 
matter when the Soviet war machine menaced Berlin?  But President Kennedy took 
the threat of communist subversion in the Third World seriously and wanted everyone 
in his administration to do so.  The inclusion of Taylor and RFK in the group 
signified the president’s personal interest in the issue.  For RFK, work on 
counterinsurgency enhanced his national security credentials by lengthening the list 
of countries he watched and exposing him to ideas and strategies regarded as cutting-
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edge thinking on foreign affairs by many of the New Frontiersmen.  But Cuba stayed 
at the center of RFK’s work on national security.  No other country posed a bigger 
threat than Castro’s Cuba in the minds of the attorney general and the president even 
as they eyed the rest of the Third World warily.  
The counterinsurgency committee initially listed just three countries on its 
critical list, Thailand, Laos and Vietnam.241  Soon the list expanded to include Burma, 
Cambodia, Cameroon, Iran, Ecuador, Colombia, Guatemala and Venezuela.242  At the 
behest of the counterinsurgency committee the CIA assembled a threat assessment for 
each of these countries.  Most nations on the critical list posed a danger only in a 
distant sense.  In Iran, for example, some ethnic groups and tribes, notably the Kurds, 
appeared restive but unable to mount a significant challenge to the sitting 
government.  Burma had more than 10,000 insurgents active in roughly half a dozen 
different organizations.  But none of them appeared to be linked to Moscow or 
Beijing, and the military government seemed to have the situation mostly under 
control.  Like Burma, Colombia at a glance seemed to be cause for alarm.  The CIA 
estimated that roughly 75 guerrilla bands roamed the country, causing more than 200 
deaths each month.  However, most insurgent groups were simply armed gangs 
without any meaningful political affiliation.  Colombia’s guerrillas were at bottom 
bandits, not communists.  Guatemala, Ecuador and Venezuela raised greater 
concerns, in no small part because they stood within reach of Castro’s influence.  In 
each of those countries organized communist parties formed a regular feature of the 
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political scene, cultivating armed factions and international support as they jockeyed 
for power against governments aligned for the most part with Washington.  Still, the 
governments in question remained solidly anti-communist and seemed strong enough 
to handle armed leftist dissent. 243    
The standout case for the counterinsurgency committee, easily, was South 
Vietnam.  As of mid 1962 Hanoi was making steady gains in its campaign to overrun 
the country and topple Diem.  Viet Cong insurgent ranks had risen from roughly 
8,000 in mid 1960 to as many as 19,000 two years later.  These were just the fighters 
in regular units.  Up to 100,000 part-time supporters backed the main insurgent force.  
Whole swaths of the territory in South Vietnam continued to fall into Viet Cong 
hands.  Communist insurgents held sway in perhaps half the villages in South 
Vietnam.  Increased efforts by the widely resented Diem government to quell the 
insurgency had so far failed to have much visible effect, and the threat of a coup or an 
assassination rose all the time.244  The situation was quickly going from bad to worse 
and represented the most precarious Cold War struggling ground save Cuba and 
Berlin.  No other country on the counterinsurgency critical list even came close in 
terms of needing immediate administration action.  
The attorney general actually visited Saigon in person in February of 1962, 
stopping briefly in South Vietnam during an extensive goodwill trip through East 
Asia.  Conceived and organized by the State Department, RFK’s month-long regional 
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tour aimed to assure people in Asia that the Kennedy administration considered the 
region a top priority, despite all the attention the White House had given to Europe 
and Latin America.  RFK, traveling with his wife Ethel, carried messages and gifts 
from the president as he visited leaders in Japan, Indonesia, Thailand, Hong Kong and 
South Vietnam.245  But security issues in Southeast Asia overshadowed RFK’s charm 
offensive, and the attorney general’s pledges of U.S. support in the struggle against 
communism in Southeast Asia dominated news coverage of his trip.  Speaking to 
reporters in Bangkok, the attorney general promised that President Kennedy would 
help Thailand fight communist threats.  “This must be understood in a neighboring 
country,” RFK said in a clear allusion to China.  “I will take this opportunity to talk 
with the leaders of Thailand to discuss our common problems in order that I may 
report to the president upon my return to Washington.”246  In Vietnam, RFK struck a 
more overtly bellicose tone in public statements, even though the administration had 
hesitated to characterize the struggle in Vietnam as a war.  “This is a new kind of war, 
but war it is in a very new sense of the word,” RFK said.  “It is a war fought not by 
massive divisions but secretly by terror, assassination, ambush and infiltration.”  RFK 
said the United States would “win” in Vietnam and promised U.S. forces would stay 
until victory.  The attorney general, who had visited French Indochina with JFK in the 
fall of 1951, said the “American people understand and fully support this struggle.  
Americans have great affection for the people of Vietnam.  I think the United States 
will do what is necessary to help a country that is trying to repel aggression with its 
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own blood, tears, and sweat.”247  Some of what RFK said in Vietnam was no doubt 
intended to instill confidence within the ranks of Diem’s government, which regularly 
(and rightfully) questioned the administration’s commitment and intentions.  At the 
same time the attorney general’s remarks in both Thailand and Vietnam reflected the 
essence of communist threats in the Third World as the Special Group (CI) saw them.  
A shadow war increasingly enveloped various quarters of the globe, and RFK clearly 
considered himself to be one of the vanguard fighters in this realm alongside the likes 
of Lansdale and Taylor.     
The counterinsurgency committee quickly foundered, despite all the heady 
ambitions the president and its members held when conceiving it.  Most of the 
committee’s activity involved popularizing counterinsurgency strategy within the 
government and the military ranks.  Taylor headed up efforts to add 
counterinsurgency to the curriculum at the National War College, the Foreign Service 
Institute and the CIA Training Center.  That initiative amounted to the most 
substantive work the committee ever did.  The Special Group (CI) lacked the ability 
to do much more than contemplate and plan since it had no significant spending 
authority.  Staff assistants assigned to the committee openly questioned whether it did 
anything substantive at all.  Many meetings amounted to little more than briefings 
about situations already well understood within the national security establishment.248  
Mostly the committee wound up monitoring programs already underway in crisis 
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countries.  As the months wore on the Special Group (CI) grew so inactive that RFK 
and others involved openly contemplated simply disbanding it.249  The committee 
ultimately failed to become a source of influence, power or even deep thinking about 
national security and unconventional warfare, because much of its intended work was 
already being done by the State Department, the Pentagon and the CIA, among other 
government agencies involved in foreign policy.    
The Special Group (CI) held importance for RFK nonetheless.  His presence 
on a senior foreign policy board personally vested by the president furthered RFK’s 
overall authority on national security matters generally.  RFK’s inclusion on the 
counterinsurgency group in effect helped cement his mandate for national security 
policy making.  The president’s brother was not simply taking on foreign policy 
issues as they related to political crises, such as Cuba.  The attorney general was to be 
a policymaker on national security matters whose voice held at least the same weight 
as the likes of Bundy, Taylor and McCone and perhaps more.  This was the implicit 
message RFK’s involvement in the counterinsurgency committee conveyed, and few 
in the administration could fail to understand it.  Indeed administration figures 
involved in national security policy and foreign affairs generally began consulting the 
attorney general on a wide range of issues.  RFK got involved at least peripherally 
with all kinds of foreign policy matters.  For example, the State Department sent the 
attorney general a detailed report about plans for U.S. assistance to Yugoslavia, since 
the president was examining the issue with the National Security Council in January 
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of 1962.250  The State Department also kept the attorney general apprised of U.S. 
diplomacy in West New Guinea, the source of a bitter dispute between Indonesia and 
the Netherlands that the administration sought to ease.251  Dozens of similar reports 
began coming to RFK as a matter of course through 1962 and 1963.  The attorney 
general had the latest government updates on foreign affairs issues ranging from the 
internal tensions of Algeria to the status of Pan-African unity politics.252  Basically 
any and every part of the world drawn into the Cold War fell under the attorney 
general’s gaze, whether he took an active role or not.  The regions where the Cold 
War struggle posed the highest political stakes for the Kennedy White House became 
places where RFK focused his attention.  Cuba came first, but Southeast Asia 
increasingly rose in importance as well.  
RFK had some reason for hope in Southeast Asia, where Laos at least seemed 
to stabilizing after a tense period early in 1962.  The administration remained 
committed to its policy of keeping Laos neutral under a coalition government put 
together with help from international mediators.  A cease-fire in place since May of 
1961 began to fray in the early months of 1962 as the Hmong fighters backed by the 
Kennedy administration through a secret CIA program faced off with the Pathet Lao 
and allied forces from North Vietnam.  Pathet Lao forces moved into the area around 
the town of Nam Tha to counter the buildup of Hmong fighters there.  Phoumi, the 
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Laotian leader and U.S. ally, responded by sending roughly 5,000 troops and artillery 
units to the town in order to prevent it from falling under communist control.  On 
May 6, 1962, four North Vietnamese battalions overran Nam Tha, totally routing the 
Royal Laotian Army forces Phoumi had sent.  The communist forces then began 
moving toward the nearby border of Thailand in a move that raised alarm in 
Washington.253  In a stroke, months of diplomacy unraveled, and Laos appeared on 
the edge of collapse.  The Kennedy administration still had no wish to launch a major 
military intervention in Laos.  All the strategic calculations RFK and others mulled 
the previous year remained unchanged.  At the same time the White House felt the 
need for a show a force in light of events, a military move that would halt communist 
advances in Laos and hopefully restore negotiations.  Within days the president 
decided to send roughly 4,000 troops to Thailand, where they would join another 
1,000 troops already there.  Coordinating with Thai forces, U.S. troops would help 
secure the border and remain poised to launch a joint incursion into Laos if the 
situation deteriorated further.254  The highly publicized U.S. troop deployment had a 
chilling effect on the situation.  The communist halted their advances.  Tensions 
eased, and negotiations resumed.255 
On June 19 Georgi Bolshakov contacted RFK.  Could they meet that day?  
Around 4:00 p.m. Bolshakov appeared in RFK’s office at the Justice Department 
bearing what he said was a message sent personally from Khrushchev.  The message 
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was secret, Bolshakov said, given verbally to him and not shared with others at the 
Soviet embassy in Washington.  The Soviet premier wanted the president to know 
that he was very pleased with the settlement in Laos, evidently referring to the 
pledges both leaders made in Vienna to keep the country neutral.  According to 
Bolshakov, Khrushchev felt that settlement of Laos was a vital step in improving 
relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.  The U.S. troop presence in 
Thailand, however, complicated things, Bolshakov said.  Khrushchev understood, 
Bolshakov stressed, that the White House sent U.S. forces to Thailand in case 
violence in Laos worsened.  Now that the situation was stable, though, Khrushchev 
wondered if perhaps U.S. forces might leave Thailand.  Bolshakov asked the attorney 
general what he thought of the message, emphasizing again that it came directly from 
Khrushchev.  RFK said he had no comment but would pass the message along to the 
president, which he did.256  President Kennedy seized the opportunity to further de-
escalate the situation, and U.S. forces began a publicized withdrawal from Thailand 
in July.257  Far bigger issues than the fate of Laos loomed on the horizon when RFK 
and Bolshakov talked that time, however.  In the months ahead the destiny of Laos 
would seem almost trivial in light of larger developments.  Still, RFK’s intimate 
involvement in the gamesmanship of the Cold War crisis of the moment illustrated 
his new overall role.  On that day Laos stood as the most important Cold War dispute, 
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and RFK played the role to which he had become accustomed – a minister without 
portfolio yet thoroughly involved in national security affairs.  
 
Castro’s Menace  
The possibility of the Soviets establishing military bases in Cuba had long troubled 
RFK, and he discussed the prospect with members of the Mongoose team.  He wanted 
firm action plans in case Soviet bases in fact appeared on the island.258  Another 
possibility loomed as well.  What if the Soviets established a conventional military 
base in Cuba, garrisoning troops as a deterrent against U.S. military action?  The 
administration always kept alive the option of a U.S. invasion of Cuba in the right 
circumstances, but that would be much more difficult to do with Soviet troops 
stationed on the island.259  The Mongoose team could offer little in the way of action 
plans in case of a sudden Soviet military presence in Cuba.  Progress reports on 
Operation Mongoose brought no evidence of significant gains on any fronts, despite 
months of efforts.  CIA operatives who had infiltrated Cuba made little headway in 
launching activities given the heavy presence of security forces.260  Castro’s police 
state showed no cracks.  McCone increasingly shared RFK’s evident sense of 
frustration with the project as the months unfolded. The CIA director wondered 
whether a more aggressive approach was needed.  Perhaps the administration should 
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search for some reason to undertake a swift military intervention in the near future.  
McCone, Taylor and other project leaders discussed whether the announcement of a 
mass execution of prisoners from the Bay of Pigs could perhaps offer a pretext for 
U.S. military action.  In any case all agreed to think further about how to concoct 
reasons for launching an outright war on Cuba.261    
In April, a CIA assessment of the prospects for an outright military invasion 
reached the attorney general.  Its conclusions fell largely in line with thinking among 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the matter.  A U.S. invasion would likely defeat Castro’s 
forces in a matter of days, according to CIA estimates, but a prolonged struggle for 
the fate of the country would certainly then ensue.  Castro and his fighters were well 
aware that the odds of holding key cities against an American military onslaught were 
low, so they were likely to mount a guerrilla campaign from the country’s interior 
after mustering initial resistance.  The CIA figured Castro’s guerrillas would find 
enough support to sustain themselves in rural areas, where the regime had already 
stashed weapons in anticipation of going to ground.  An underground resistance 
network would thrive in the countryside, infiltrate the major cities and make effective 
governance exceedingly difficult for either a U.S. occupation force or a new regime 
installed by Washington.262  In short, the assessment said that direct U.S. military 
intervention in Cuba could topple Castro but would also set loose a whole range of 
new and virtually unending problems.  For the moment the administration lacked a 
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politically viable reason to consider such move in any case.  By the spring of 1962 
McCone felt that intelligence suggesting Castro was engaged in subversive activities 
in Latin America was overblown.  He had looked into a number of such reports and 
found they had no basis. 263  Still, Castro had to go one way or another.  This 
remained the unwavering administration policy, set forth by the president explicitly.  
Pursuing Castro’s downfall had little visible hope for success, but this was true of 
other Cold War efforts underway in the administration too.  The odds of holding 
communists at bay in Southeast Asia never looked especially good, yet the Kennedy 
administration persisted.  Prospects for nuclear arms reduction seemed dim, yet the 
administration pressed ahead there as well.  Reforming Latin America through the 
Alliance for Progress was perhaps the most fanciful administration mission, and yet 
they continued with the effort.  In many ways Cuba was no different than the many 
other intractable foreign policy problems troubling the Kennedy administration.  
Castro’s Cuba represented a Cold War problem that needed constant working even if 
solutions were not readily available.   
With military intervention simply unrealistic, Lansdale’s White House bosses 
ordered him to come up with more options in line with the plan that called for a broad 
U.S. campaign against Castro using everything short of invasion and occupation.  
Lansdale responded by circulating a lengthy policy paper that had a very clear 
recommendation as its bottom line:  Unleash the CIA, which since the Bay of Pigs 
been prohibited from large-scale paramilitary activities against Cuba.  Harvey put 
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forward some possible actions the CIA could undertake if the Special Group 
Augmented loosened the reins.  The White House should authorize the creation of up 
to 15 commando teams numbering about a dozen men each, Harvey suggested.  The 
teams would primarily be Cuban rebels trained and armed by the CIA but would 
include non-Cuban CIA contractors as well, paramilitary experts who could help lead 
missions.  The teams would launch hit-and-run sabotage attacks inside Cuba and 
stash weapons to be used by oppositionists heading a call for revolt when the right 
moment arose.  The CIA could cultivate oppositionists, Harvey said, by creating 
resistance cells in key areas around Cuba.  CIA operatives working in small teams 
could sneak into Cuba and begin forming an underground resistance network.  
Harvey suggested 12 to 15 such teams given an expected loss rate of 25 percent.  
Harvey also advocated the creation of 20 small guerrilla bands who would operate in 
rural areas of Cuba conducting sabotage missions.  Unlike the commando teams, 
these fighters would be in Cuba full-time, resupplied periodically with U.S. airdrops.  
He predicted a 50 percent survival rate for men in these teams.264  
What Harvey proposed, essentially, was a renewal of the mayhem the CIA 
spread across Cuba during the run-up to the Bay of Pigs invasion.  The only real 
difference between the CIA’s old Cuba plan and its new Cuba plan was the absence 
of an invasion force.  As a substitute the CIA suggested a diplomatic pressure 
campaign orchestrated by the State Department and a propaganda offensive that 
consisted mainly of airdropping leaflets and pumping misinformation into the Cuban 
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airwaves.  This was supposed to stoke a revolution in a country whose ruling regime 
rivaled East Germany in its effectiveness at repression.  For his part Taylor balked at 
the CIA’s proposed expansion and urged President Kennedy to adopt a more 
restrained approach going forward in advice he shared with RFK and the other key 
players on Mongoose.  Phase two of the operation, Taylor said, should essentially 
seek to contain Cuba since Castro did not look to be going anywhere.  Economic 
pressure should be maintained.  Some sabotage should go forward.  But in Taylor’s 
eyes Operation Mongoose should be little more than a holding exercise.  As of early 
August the president agreed with Taylor and ordered Operation Mongoose to keep to 
a modest agenda.265  But pressure for something more was building.    
Harvey’s initial plan for Mongoose’s second phase, if approved, would have 
drawn in the Pentagon and raised visibility of U.S. action, something the president 
made clear he did not want.  The CIA wanted to use U.S. military bases for training 
exiles, despite the president’s explicit stance against doing so.  Harvey insinuated that 
the White House lacked guts.  He insisted that the CIA could and would do much 
more if “higher authority” expanded their mandate.  Generally the CIA agreed with 
Lansdale’s assessment that a revolt inside Cuba was possible if the administration 
were willing to demonstrate that it would not let the uprising fail.  Castro’s security 
forces remained strong enough to effectively squelch any internal dissent that might 
lead to revolt.  But an uprising could be launched with U.S. support, the CIA argued.  
The CIA believed that if the administration kept up robust covert operations and 
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propaganda activities that a widespread revolt could materialize inside Cuba by late 
1963.  However, such a rebellion would likely only survive a few days without direct 
military intervention to support it.  Otherwise Castro’s security forces would simply 
snuff it out.  Therefore, Harvey argued, the administration needed to make a firm 
commitment to intervene militarily to save a Cuban uprising when it appeared.  
Without such a commitment, the operation was essentially pointless, in Harvey’s 
view.266   
By mid August the Special Group Augmented settled on an outline for the 
second phase of Mongoose.  Lansdale sketched the plans in a memo.  The goals for 
the most part were modest and in line with activities from the first phase.  The 
operation in these months aimed to discredit the regime through propaganda, sow 
division in the upper rungs of Castro’s government, disrupt the economy, assist 
Cuban exile groups and Latin American countries in efforts to take action against 
Cuba and ready for the moment when an uprising appeared.  The plan for phase two 
included a number of steps to be taken in the diplomatic and political realm to isolate 
and undermine Cuba.  The State Department was supposed to continue efforts to get 
Cuba ejected from political blocs in the hemisphere.  Propagandistic radio broadcasts, 
already filling airwaves hour after hour any given day inside Cuba, would continue.  
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Print propaganda such as cartoons and leaflets were to arrive in Cuba via balloon 
drops.267 
But, importantly, phase two also called for major sabotage operations.  The 
CIA was to orchestrate attacks targeting key infrastructure such as electrical plants, 
refineries, microwave stations and the like.  Additionally, the CIA planned to renew 
destruction of Cuban agricultural products such as sugar, meaning more arson attacks 
on farms.  They would also move to poison fuel supplies in Cuba by slipping in 
destructive additives.   The CIA would either use saboteurs already in Cuba or 
commando teams that would land secretly, conduct a mission and then flee.  The risk 
level would increase.  The agents involved in the attacks might lose their lives.  The 
conspicuousness of the attacks might cost the administration the plausible deniability 
it craved.268  The Special Group Augmented nonetheless approved the plan for phase 
two and notified the president.269  Action could not come soon enough as far as the 
president was concerned.  He personally pressed Taylor to speed up actions planned 
for the second phase of Mongoose owing to recent intelligence suggesting that the 
Soviet Union might be contemplating the introduction of advanced missiles in 
Cuba.270  What restraint JFK felt clearly faded as the prospect of missiles in Cuba 
loomed ever larger in the picture. 
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Bundy applied pressure too, sending a memo to RFK, Taylor, Rusk, 
McNamara and others saying that the appearance of any Soviet missiles in Cuba, 
regardless of whether or not they included nuclear warheads, would dramatically 
change the military and political calculation for the region.271  In the summer of 1962, 
as the missile crisis approached, RFK became one of the administration officials who 
literally watched Cuba, receiving regular CIA photographic evaluation reports.  The 
briefs described dozens and dozens of aerial photographs taken of Cuba through the 
summer months of 1962.  U.S. spy planes overflew the island snapping pictures of 
military areas in the hope of finding suspicious activity.  They found plenty of 
activity, but nothing definitive emerged to confirm the fears RFK and others harbored 
about Soviet bases.  Cuban soldiers busily dug trenches, filled arms depots and 
positioned anti-aircraft weapons.  Airmen practiced bombing and strafing.272  On the 
whole Cuba looked like a country girding for war, an entirely appropriate preparation 
given that the administration was actively seeking ways to provoke one.  Castro’s 
spies had likely gotten wind of at least some of the administration’s plans.  McCone 
for one believed Cuban agents had thoroughly infiltrated the exile community in 
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Florida.  Castro seemed to anticipate most any CIA move.273  The CIA, on the other 
hand, had little inkling of what Castro was actually planning.     
 
Action by the Exiles and the CIA 
In Havana one evening late in August, shortly before midnight, a series of explosions 
rocked the city.  Two gunboats carrying young militant exiles from Florida had 
quietly moved close to the city and unleashed a barrage of shellfire toward a hotel 
used by Soviet advisors to Cuba.  The attackers then slipped away in the darkness and 
headed back toward Florida.  Within days they were speaking openly in Miami to 
reporters about the strike, which battered the hotel and surrounding buildings but 
caused no deaths or serious injuries.  The attackers were from the Student 
Revolutionary Directorate, a relatively new group known in the exile community by 
its Spanish acronym, DRE.  They said they acted to further the cause of Cuban 
freedom, that they could not stand idly while Soviets pulled Cuba into the communist 
bloc.274  The attack marked the most forceful strike against Cuba since the Bay of 
Pigs.  Castro immediately pointed a finger at Washington, but the administration 
could take neither credit nor blame. The DRE, like many other Cuban exile groups, 
were acting on their own against Castro.    
By mid 1962, hundreds of Cuban exile outfits had appeared.  The FBI and the 
CIA struggled of keep track of them all.  The CIA drew up a roster of the various 
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groups, and McCone gave the list to RFK and other members of the Mongoose 
team.275  The Liberation Army of Cuba, known also by its Spanish acronym ELC, 
was similar to the DRE, and both were typical of the militant exile outfits coming to 
life around this time.  Made up mostly of former soldiers who fought in the revolution 
with Castro, ELC leaders began working together in the fall of 1961.  They aimed to 
launch amphibious guerrilla attacks against targets in Cuba and, eventually, 
overthrow Castro and establish a democratically elected government.  They set to 
fundraising among the exile community.  By June 1962, according to U.S. 
intelligence, the ELC had finalized a lease of a small key of the coast of Florida to 
serve as a base of operations.  In July the group registered itself with the Justice 
Department, a move clearly intended to earn the group the law enforcement pass 
given to exile outfits engaged in illegal activity within the United States.276 
On September 24, 1962, the attorney general phoned the CIA deputy director 
and asked the agency to send an officer to see him and discuss a sabotage operation 
RFK heard that some Cuban exiles were planning.  Ford went that day to the Justice 
Department and met the attorney general alone in his office.  RFK explained that the 
ELC was about to stage a major attack inside Cuba and hoped to launch a general 
uprising before the end of the month.  The attorney general heard all this through 
contacts of his own, he explained to Ford.  Some months back a senior ELC figure, 
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Ernesto Betancourt, met personally with RFK and revealed their overall aims.  RFK 
warned Betancourt about moving too quickly, pointing to the failed Hungarian 
uprising of 1956, when Soviet forces brutally suppressed a dissident movement.  
Betancourt, for his part, told the attorney general that the ELC wanted U.S. backing 
but not through the CIA.  Like many exile groups, the ELC distrusted the agency 
deeply because of the Bay of Pigs.  Now the ELC was going forward with attack 
plans.  Betancourt had informed RFK through an intermediary.  RFK was unsure 
what to make of it.  He wanted to know whether Betancourt was a serious player and 
if ELC’s attack plan had any chance of success.  If the ELC could deal blows against 
Castro, then the White House had use for them.  RFK told Ford to contact Betancourt 
and gave him a phone number.  He told Ford to reveal himself as neither a CIA agent 
nor a messenger for the attorney general.277  Ford was to remain vague about his 
affiliation when contacting the Cubans, who most likely could not have been fooled. 
The following day Ford was at his desk in the bullpen when the phone rang.  
It was the attorney general, who told him to seek out Betancourt immediately because 
he and some of the key men from the ELC were in Washington but leaving for 
Florida shortly.  Ford found Betancourt, who took Ford to a house on the outskirts of 
Washington where several other ELC operatives had gathered.  They explained their 
plan, which sounded implausible to Ford.  The exiles said they were orchestrating an 
uprising involving as many 15,000 people, who would take to the streets in just five 
days.  They wanted U.S. help in the form of arms and ammunition but said the 
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uprising would go forward with or without it.  If the Americans wanted to get 
involved, the exiles told Ford, then they needed to provide the ELC with a 
representative who could authorize all requested arms transfers within two days.  
Ford told the exiles that their timetable was likely too tight even if higher-ups were 
inclined to get involved but said he would pass the information along nonetheless.  
Ford found Harvey and related what he heard from the exiles.  Harvey and the rest of 
the CIA team thought the ELC plan was doomed to fail.  The group did not seem 
capable of conjuring thousands of counterrevolutionaries inside Castro’s police state.  
Even if they did, Castro’s forces would surely destroy them in a stroke.  The CIA 
wanted nothing to do with the plot.  Harvey told Ford to report back to RFK.  The 
attorney general listened intently to Ford’s briefing and agreed with Harvey’s 
decision.  Jumping into such a plot at this stage would be pointless.  He wondered 
whether Betancourt and the other ELC men were being “taken in,” evidently 
suggesting that perhaps the group had fallen victim to plots by Castro’s agents.  Still, 
if the uprising did indeed take shape, RFK said, the administration would move to 
support it.  Nothing significant ever came of the ELC scheming.  Regardless, RFK 
told Ford to keep in touch with Betancourt and the group.  The administration wanted 
to help groups like the ELC, RFK said.278  That was U.S. policy.   
RFK and others working on Operation Mongoose remained alert for the off 
chance that some exile group would successfully attempt to launch an uprising inside 
Cuba.  Intelligence suggested that October 1962 was the soonest a new uprising might 
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be able to commence, should one be afoot. 279  But no real cause for hope ever 
materialized.  The rumors were just that, and the Mongoose team concentrated mainly 
on its own plans.  At the end of the summer of 1962, however, little had happened on 
any front.  And by early October RFK and the other Mongoose overseers forcefully 
demanded more action from Harvey and Lansdale. 280  The president made clear that 
he too personally wanted to see some strikes against Cuba. 281   Bundy pushed as well, 
calling Lansdale personally and asking about the best way to get a Cuban rebel group 
going.282  Lansdale blamed the CIA for lack of initiative and vowed to break what he 
described as a deadlock.  “When the president asks for something, he should get it,” 
Lansdale wrote to RFK.  “He has asked for action…  I believe you will have to hit the 
CIA over the head personally.  I can then follow through, to get the action desired.”283  
Lansdale urged RFK to lash out at Helms personally for lack of CIA initiatives on 
Cuba.284  In fact the CIA had many options for covert activities ready to go if 
approved by the White House.   
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Looking for sabotage targets, the CIA had identified 23 Cuban vessels that 
came and went from Europe.285  Harvey asked RFK and the other operation overseers 
for a free hand to attack them.  He wanted to field Cuban operatives in seaports 
around the world, where they would monitor harbors for Cuban vessels and place 
timed explosives on ones they could reach.  Harvey said that the ships marked for 
attack would essentially be fleeting targets of opportunity, precluding specific 
approval from RFK and the Mongoose team in Washington.  No conclusive evidence 
of U.S. involvement would likely emerge from the attacks, Harvey said.  They would 
be made to look like Cuban dissident actions.  Yet the operations would nonetheless 
stir accusations against Washington from Havana.286  Here was the essence of the 
problem that plagued Operation Mongoose.  More had to be done, as RFK had 
repeatedly stressed.  The CIA stood ready to ramp up operations, but doing so 
brought extremely high political risks.  RFK wanted a viable clandestine campaign 
against Castro that would bring results.  But he wanted sabotage operations against 
Castro without a visible U.S. hand and no overt threat U.S. military intervention, per 
the president’s guidance.287 
In early October, finally, the finger pointing and foot dragging that generated 
so many complaints from RFK seemed to be giving way to genuine momentum.  The 
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CIA generated a task list of sabotage operations and submitted it for formal approval 
from the Special Group Augmented and the president.  McCone and Harvey planned 
to unleash what amounted to a wave of terrorist attacks.  An eight-man demolition 
team was going to destroy a key railroad bridge.  Two Cuban frogmen were going to 
bomb a ship at anchor in a Cuban harbor.  Another Cuban agent was going to toss a 
grenade into the garden of the Chinese embassy in Havana from an adjacent rooftop.  
Oil drum mines were to be scattered in one or more Cuban harbors.  Saboteurs would 
attack a power plant, a nickel mine, a sulfur stockpile and two Texaco oil refineries.  
Meanwhile, attackers in speedboats would shoot up oil tankers offshore in the hope 
setting them afire.288  Bundy personally took the CIA plan to the president, who nixed 
the proposal for oil drum mines but approved everything else.  In fact he ordered the 
CIA to go further, widening the proposed attacks on shipping to include Cuban 
vessels coming and going from any port in communist bloc countries, not just 
Cuba.289  The fact that the president himself approved, among other things, a singular 
grenade attack on civilians underscored the personal involvement of both the 
Kennedy brothers in Operation Mongoose.  The CIA was not running amok in Cuba 
under Kennedy’s watch.  In fact the president inserted himself heavily into the details 
of operations, using RFK as his proxy. 
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RFK and the Missile Crisis 
The Cuban Missile Crisis has generated an enormous amount of scholarship, which 
does not need repeating in full here.  The most important writings on the crisis for this 
dissertation are the invaluable transcripts of White House recordings made during the 
crisis and the newest books on the subject, which tackle key questions about RFK’s 
role.  In his memoir of the crisis, Thirteen Days, RFK portrayed himself as a voice for 
peace and compromise during tense days of discussions by the Executive Committee 
of the National Security Council, a.k.a. ExComm.  In the years afterward, Schlesinger 
and other Kennedy loyalists furthered the myth of RFK as a dove among hawks 
during the crisis.290  But the White House recordings and the newest scholarship 
reveal that RFK consistently joined those advocating military action.     
RFK had reason to deepen his longstanding concerns about the presence of 
missiles in Cuba by the first week of October 1962.  Bolshakov reached out to the 
attorney general October 5 with a new message from Khrushchev.  The two 
intermediaries had maintained their rapport despite some difficulties and had even 
grown fond of one another.291  Bolshakov had visited with RFK at Hickory Hill in 
addition to the Justice Department, and RFK at one point even considered a trip to the 
Caucasus with the Soviet military intelligence officer.  During one of their exchanges 
early in 1962 RFK talked about the tense relationship between the White House and 
the military, questioning Bolshakov on whether a similar dynamic existed in the 
Kremlin.  The attorney general was blunt with the Soviet envoy, saying factions 
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within the Pentagon were eager for a clash with the Soviet Union and believed the 
United States could prevail.292  Now Bolshakov delivered what RFK clearly 
considered troubling news.  Khrushchev wanted the Kennedys to know, Bolshakov 
said, that the Kremlin was placing defensive weapons in Cuba.  The Soviet envoy 
remained in the dark about the true nature of the buildup in Cuba, though RFK 
obviously harbored suspicions.  Intelligence reports had for months noted increased 
shipping to Cuba and secretive happenings on Cuban docks.  RFK was visibly tense 
when Bolshakov delivered the latest message.  There was none of the usual small talk 
the two had come to share.  RFK’s normally casual manner with Bolshakov gave way 
to a palpable formality as the attorney general took notes and promised to pass the 
word to the president.293  RFK presumably did in fact transmit the message to the 
president, as he reliably had done in the past with similar messages.  But no 
documentary evidence available specifically notes RFK passing such a message to the 
president.   
In any event, ten days later the CIA finally produced proof of what RFK, 
McCone and others had long suspected, works for a Soviet missile base in Cuba.  Ray 
Cline, CIA deputy director for research and analysis and head of the photo 
interpretation center, identified the telling reconnaissance photos, sent them to Bundy 
and the Kennedys and briefed all of them.  McCone was away from Washington, so 
Cline told Bundy about the pictures late in the day of October 15.  Early the next 
morning Cline arrived at the White House with the photographs in hand so he could 
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formally brief Bundy.  Cline found RFK with Bundy, who had alerted the attorney 
general after getting the initial word from Cline.  RFK had come to see the evidence 
himself, before the president was formally informed.  Bundy, known for his relaxed 
demeanor, took the news calmly as Cline and another CIA man went over the images.  
But RFK grew visibly irate and talked of settling scores.  He quoted his father Joseph 
Kennedy, who had told his boys ‘don’t get mad, get even.’294  The crisis meetings 
began immediately but did not initially involve the president at the White House.  The 
national security team instead gathered in Rusk’s office at the State Department.  
RFK effectively chaired the sessions in the president’s absence, his ownership of 
Cuba policy at this point unquestioned.  After only two sessions at the State 
Department the meetings moved to the White House, where the coming and going of 
senior officials would appear less conspicuous.295   
The situation was much more dire than RFK and the others in the 
administration knew.  The missiles seen in the reconnaissance photographs were only 
part of the military measures the Soviets undertook secretly in Cuba.  The Kremlin 
had managed to send more than 42,000 Red Army troops to Cuba to help repel an 
invasion.  Additionally Moscow had shipped battlefield tactical nuclear warheads to 
Cuba and authorized on-site commanders to use them at their discretion if fighting 
erupted.  If the United States attacked, the Soviets were ready to launch nuclear 
                                                        
294 Ray S. Cline, in recorded interview, March 28-30, 1993, session #1, Ray S. Cline miscellaneous 
papers, collection number 94026, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, CA. 
295 Ray Cline, in recorded interview, March 28-30, 1993, session #2, Ray S. Cline miscellaneous 
papers, collection number 94026, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, CA. 
  
 
156
weapons against the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo, a scenario that would almost 
certainly have escalated to a general nuclear exchange.296 
On the first day of the ExComm White House meetings, Tuesday, October 16, 
the group quickly established that the missile sites were still under construction, with 
the whereabouts of the warheads unknown.  The president contemplated a number of 
options in formulating a possible response.  RFK was quick to argue that the logical 
progression of any response by the administration was an outright invasion of Cuba.  
The White House recording system captured this exchange between the president and 
the attorney general during ExComm debate October 16:   
 
PRESIDENT KENNEDY:  Well this is really talking about are two or 
three different potential operations.  One is to strike just on these three 
bases.  The second is the broader one that Secretary McNamara was 
talking about, which is on the airfields and on the SAM sites and on 
anything connected with these missiles.  Third is doing both of those 
things and also at the same time launching a blockade, which requires, 
really, the third and which is a larger step.  And then, as I take it, the 
fourth question is the degree of consultation.  I don’t know how much 
use consulting with the British… I expect they’ll just object.  Just have 
to decide to do it.  Probably ought to tell them, though, the night 
before.  
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ROBERT KENNEDY: Mr. President? 
PRESIDENT KENNEDY: Yes? 
ROBERT KENNEDY: We have the fifth one, really, which is the 
invasion.  I would say that you’re dropping bombs all over Cuba if you 
do the second, air and the airport, knocking out their planes, dropping 
it on all their missiles.  You’re covering most of Cuba.  You’re going 
to kill an awful lot of people, and we’re going to take an awful lot of 
heat on it.  And then--  you know the heat.  Because you’re going to 
announce the reason that you’re doing it is because they’re sending in 
these kind of missiles.  Well, I would think it’s almost incumbent upon 
the Russians then, to say, “Well, we’re going to send them in again.  
And if you do it again, we’re going to do the same thing to Turkey.  
And we’re going to do the same thing to Iran.”297 
 
 With that interjection, RFK focused the president and the other ExComm 
members on the question of invasion.  After that a series of exchanges among the 
president, Taylor, McNamara, Rusk and RFK revolved around the minimum time 
needed to invade Cuba after airstrikes.  McNamara said a U.S. invasion force could 
land in Cuba seven days after airstrikes.  RFK pressed him and the president to do it 
in five.  RFK said:  “If you could get in, get it started so that there wasn’t any turning 
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back…”298  The ExComm members continued to debate the situation, eventually 
veering from considerations of outright invasion to questions of the readiness of the 
Soviet missiles in Cuba and other related matters.  Three central questions dominated 
the crisis talks that unfolded in the days that followed.  What exactly were the Soviets 
and the Cubans planning to do with the missiles?  How threatening in fact were the 
missiles?  And what should the administration do to respond?  The answers shifted 
over time for most ExComm members as the crisis intensified before eventually 
heading toward resolution.  But RFK’s views as reflected in the transcripts of the 
ExComm deliberations remained largely static, rooted in a willingness to use direct 
U.S. military intervention despite obvious risks of escalation. 
As the initial crisis talks stretched into the evening of October 16 the president 
edged toward approving airstrikes but remained openly wary of a ground invasion.  
RFK pressed the case nonetheless:  “Hell if it’s war that’s gonna come on this thing, 
he [Khrushchev] sticks those kinds of missiles in after the warning, then he’s gonna 
get into a war over six months from now, or a year from now on something.”299  In 
the same ExComm session RFK once again raised the idea of staging a fake attack on 
the base at Guantanamo to give the administration cause for a military takeover of the 
island.  “You know, sink the Maine again or something,” RFK said.300  During further 
ExComm discussions October 18 RFK argued against a naval blockade, the option 
the president increasingly favored.  RFK said:   
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The argument against the blockade is that it’s a very slow death.  And 
it builds up, and it goes over a period of months, and during that period 
of time you’ve got all these people yelling and screaming about it, 
you’ve got examination of Russian ships and the shooting down the 
Russian planes that try to land there.  You have to do all those 
things.301 
 
As the ExComm meetings progressed RFK softened his stance somewhat.  He 
evidently began to fully appreciate the real risk of an all-out nuclear exchange, 
perhaps through private conversations with the president.  And the attorney general 
grew increasingly uneasy with the idea of a sneak attack, comparing such a move to 
Pearl Harbor.  Still, RFK never fully abandoned the idea of an invasion as a course of 
action and remained skeptical of the blockade, openly disagreeing with the president 
even after JFK made his final decision on the matter October 19.  That day RFK 
voiced his displeasure with the decision in a meeting at the State Department.  The 
attorney general said:  “It would be better for our children and grandchildren if we 
decided to face the Soviet threat, stand up to it and eliminate it, now.  The 
circumstances for doing so at some future time were bound to be more unfavorable, 
the risks would be greater, the chances of success less good.”302  President Kennedy 
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announced the blockade October 22.  Late in the evening of October 23 RFK went 
personally to the Soviet embassy and met with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin.  
Once alone in the ambassador’s office RFK exploded in rage.  He berated Dobrynin 
about Soviet deception and what he regarded as a breach of trust in the carefully 
cultivated communications between the White House and Kremlin.  Dobrynin had 
little to say, and RFK left grimly stressing that the administration intended to enforce 
the blockade.303  
Meanwhile, covert operations authorized by RFK and the Mongoose team 
before the crisis began were moving forward.  The CIA kept plans for the raids in 
motion even as the crisis developed in the absence of an order by the Special Group 
(Augmented) leadership to halt operations.  And, with a U.S. military attack on Cuba 
appearing somewhat likely, Harvey figured having commandos on the island would 
be useful for pre-invasion intelligence.304  So on October 26, with tensions mounting 
by the hour, the CIA launched three commando infiltration teams of about five men 
each in small boats toward Cuba for fresh sabotage operations.  Two such teams had 
already previously landed on the island, and six others were readying to go the next 
day via Navy submarines.  Another 10 squads were set to go the same way soon after.  
Meanwhile, the CIA had slipped operatives onto a number of Cuban vessels with 
orders to cripple them either in port or at sea.305  RFK and the Mongoose team 
gathered together to discuss whether the raids should go forward and quickly decided 
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to recall the commandos to avert further inflaming the situation.  All other infiltration 
and sabotage missions would be on hold as well.  McNamara said that, for the time 
being, any Mongoose activities should be aimed at either getting the missiles out of 
Cuba or preparing for a U.S. invasion.  That meant the Cuba project should undertake 
no effort to stoke a general uprising against Castro with the missiles present, a course 
of action the Mongoose team considered even as the president struggled to find a 
solution short of war.306  The Mongoose team managed to avoid having its activities 
complicate the crisis, but RFK remained furious about the CIA’s lack of human 
intelligence about the missiles.  At one point RFK erupted in anger during the day’s 
meetings, focusing his rage on Harvey.  The berating was so severe that McCone 
decided immediately afterward that it would be best if Harvey left Washington for a 
while.307  Soon he was gone from the Cuba project altogether. 
Like the president, RFK had early on realized that U.S. missiles in Turkey 
would likely have to be bargained away in order to resolve the crisis peacefully, even 
though at bottom he loathed the idea.  Any such arrangement would have to be kept 
secret, RFK felt.308  The attorney general floated the idea of a swap discreetly with 
Bolshakov immediately after the president’s quarantine speech, dispatching trusted 
journalist friends Charlie Bartlett and Frank Holeman to air the proposal through his 
Kremlin backchannel.309  Then on October 27, after Soviet fire downed a U-2 and 
                                                        
306 Meeting minutes of the Special Group Augmented on Operation Mongoose, Oct. 26, 1962, Box 
211, Attorney General Papers, Confidential File, John F. Kennedy Library. 
307 Memo from FBI liaison to CIA on high-level meeting, Oct. 30, 1962, JFK Assassination Records, 
FBI Files, NARA Record No. 124-90092-10010.    
308 Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble,” p. 237. 
309 Ibid., pp. 249-252. 
  
 
162
killed the pilot, RFK urgently requested another meeting with Dobrynin, who quickly 
appeared in the attorney general’s office.  RFK warned Dobrynin that controlling 
escalation was becoming increasingly difficult.  In addition to the U-2 incident Soviet 
fire had struck another low-level U.S. reconnaissance plane.  A solution had to be 
found before things got out of hand.  Adhering to orders, RFK opened an offer to 
Dobrynin by saying the president was ready to end the blockade and issue a public 
pledge not to invade Cuba if the Soviets withdrew their missiles, in effect embracing 
an initial offer Khrushchev sent privately to the White House.  Dobrynin pressed the 
attorney general about the U.S. missiles in Turkey, in step with the Kremlin’s 
subsequent public demands.  RFK assured the ambassador that those could be 
removed, quietly, in four to five months.  RFK said that removal of the missiles in 
Turkey could not publically be part of the deal given opposition to such a move 
within NATO.310  Also RFK stressed that public knowledge of missiles in Turkey 
becoming part of the arrangement would hurt his own political career.311  Thus the 
immediate crisis began to ease.  What relief RFK felt was fleeting.  In the end the 
entire episode only deepened his resolve to topple Castro.        
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VI.  Escalations in Vietnam and Cuba 
 
The Coming of a Coup in Saigon 
Vietnam and Cuba dominated the national security agenda for the Kennedy 
administration in its final year, and RFK thrust himself to the center of debate on both 
issues at the White House.  The missile crisis had given virtually everyone in the 
administration reason for pause and seemingly presented a choice going forward in 
the Cold War.  The United States could continue to press ahead in its confrontation 
with Moscow, tangling with communist forces in various corners of the world.  Or, 
Washington could adopt a measure of restraint and seek paths of de-escalation and 
accommodation.  These conflicting impulses tugged at the president and others in the 
administration as they contemplated Cuba and Vietnam, countries that in the eyes of 
the White House needed immediate U.S. attention in 1963.  RFK remained hawkish 
on intervention in both countries.  On Cuba, RFK simply wanted Castro gone, 
perhaps more than ever, and the attorney general was willing to undertake extreme 
measures toward that end.  On Vietnam, RFK stayed supportive of U.S. intervention 
on the whole, never fundamentally questioning the U.S. military effort as it steadily 
escalated.  However, RFK grew to have conflicting views about the course of the U.S. 
mission, as did a number of other administration officials.  RFK and others were 
unsure whether or not Diem was part of the solution in South Vietnam or part of the 
problem. 
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RFK’s episodic dealings on Laos plus his work on the counterinsurgency 
committee kept him involved generally in discussions of the situation in Southeast 
Asia.  The Special Group CI reviewed weekly progress reports on Vietnam at each 
meeting in fact.  The group considered itself responsible for crafting policy actions 
aimed at enhancing counterinsurgency operations in the country.  They brainstormed 
ways to improve the military command structure, enhance interrogation of prisoners, 
strengthen the border and improve the security of South Vietnam.312  The group’s 
deliberations never had any meaningful impact on Vietnam policy, however.  RFK’s 
involvement in the Special Group CI nonetheless allowed him to join the policy 
debate on Vietnam during a critical time late in President Kennedy’s tenure.  He 
could claim policy expertise as well as the president’s confidence, and he made his 
voice heard as talk of what to do in Vietnam consumed the national security team. 
In September of 1962, just before administration absorbed itself for months 
with Cuba, RFK received a lengthy status report on Southeast Asia by the State 
Department.  Vietnam presented worrisome signs then.  Insurgent attacks averaged 
more than a hundred a week throughout 1962, despite months of efforts by Diem’s 
government to enact the counterinsurgency strategy the administration advocated.  
The body count in the report’s tally offered a foreboding sense of what was to come.  
Some 387 Vietcong fighters died waging war that year, according to the report RFK 
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received, while Diem’s forces lost about 88.313  However, The New York Times 
reported in October that North Vietnamese losses passed 5,000.  South Vietnamese 
causalities, meanwhile, reportedly numbered more than 2,000.314  Regardless of 
which figures were more accurate, the overall trend in the fighting was the same and 
cause for concern.  South Vietnamese forces were supposedly inflicting causalities at 
a rate about three times higher than the insurgents, and yet the Vietcong appeared 
only to be getting stronger.  The report RFK got in September was similar to many 
others that increasingly filled RFK’s files in the latter part of 1962 and the early 
months of 1963.315  Even amid all the troubles in Cuba, Vietnam was becoming a 
bigger and bigger strategic problem and political issue and thus increasingly drawing 
the attention of the attorney general. 
The overarching political picture in Vietnam was worsening dramatically by 
the summer of 1963 as the security situation deteriorated at the same time.  Diem had 
long stood accused of oppression by the Buddhist majority of Vietnam, and in May 
tensions erupted into violence.  The Vietnamese city of Hue became a flashpoint.  
Hundreds of Buddhists gathered there May 8 to mark the 2,527th birthday of the 
Buddha.  Diem’s local enforcers banned the flying of traditional Buddhist flags.  
When the Buddhists staged street demonstrations in protest, Diem’s security forces 
opened fire, killing nearly a dozen people, including women and children.  In the days 
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and weeks that followed, Buddhists undertook a nationwide campaign against Diem, 
staging rallies and hunger strikes and issuing foreign appeals.  Diem’s government 
appeared largely unconcerned about the movement through June 11, when a Buddhist 
monk named Thich Quang Duc set himself ablaze in public.  Pictures of the grisly 
suicide went around the world, and a set of them landed on President Kennedy’s desk 
in the Oval Office.316  Now there was open talk at the White House of whether Diem 
could or should remain in power.  At first RFK felt Diem should go.  In an oral 
history interview in 1964, when RFK still believed the war could be won, he said:   
 
Diem – wouldn’t make even the slightest concessions.  He was 
difficult to reason with.  And then it was built up tremendously in an 
adverse fashion here in the United States, and that was played back in 
Vietnam.  I think the people themselves became concerned about it.  
The situation began to deteriorate in the spring of 1963…  Our 
problem was that the important thing was to try to get somebody who 
could replace [Diem], somebody who could continue the war and keep 
the country united.  And that was far more difficult.  That was of great 
concern to all of us during this period of time.  Nobody liked Diem, 
particularly.  But how to get rid of him and get somebody who would 
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continue the war, not split the country in two and, therefore, lose not 
only the war but the country: That was the great problem.317   
 
In Saigon, meanwhile, South Vietnamese soldiers were plotting to overthrow 
Diem by the summer of 1963.  Longtime CIA operative Lucien Conein had first 
learned of an emerging coup plot against Diem on July 4, when he met in Saigon with 
senior Vietnamese military figures who revealed that they were forming a plan.318  In 
the weeks that followed, coup plotting intensified.  At the same time ongoing efforts 
by the U.S. embassy team to persuade Diem to take political actions that could allay 
some of the popular anger foundered.  Diem refused to remove his brother Nhu, the 
public face of the regime’s crackdown against Buddhist protestors.  Any gesture short 
of that would have likely done little to quell rising unrest.  But Diem offered no sign 
of willingness to ease Nhu aside as of late August. 
A new U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge, arrived in 
Saigon August 22.  Demonstrations in Saigon against Diem were drawing 
increasingly more people, and the South Vietnamese government was filling jails 
with arrested protesters.  Neither Lodge nor senior officials at the State 
Department in Washington could see a way forward for Diem given the 
increasing pace of political deterioration, and a change in U.S. policy was sought, 
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immediately.  An August 24 cable that went from Washington to Saigon was 
effectively a throwing down of the gauntlet by a faction of the State Department 
who came to feel that Diem’s government was on a suicidal trajectory despite all 
the U.S. backing over the years.  Egregious acts of government violence traceable 
directly to Nhu through that summer left Washington with little choice but to 
demand Nhu’s immediate removal, the cable said.  If Diem would not rid himself 
of Nhu, then Diem himself would have to go.  Drafted chiefly by Roger Hilsman in 
Washington on a Saturday, the cable went to President Kennedy, who approved 
it for release from his home in Hyannis Port.319 
The cable was the source of heated arguments among top Kennedy 
administration advisers in the following days, including RFK.  The document 
seemed to mark a major policy shift whereby Diem would no longer enjoy U.S. 
support yet left unclear what the U.S. country team in Saigon should do about the 
obvious question of who could replace Diem.  Also, the cable had undergone an 
unorthodox approval process since it arose on a weekend when Rusk, 
McNamara and McCone were away from Washington in addition to the 
president.  In an interview RFK recalled the deliberations surrounding the cable: 
 
The president was up at the Cape and they gave him a telegram.  
He thought it had been approved by McNamara and Maxwell 
Taylor and everybody else.  It had not.  It went out on a Monday.  I 
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became much more intimately involved in it then, because I saw 
the telegram and raised a question about what direction they were 
going to go:  Who was going to take over, and who was going to 
run the coup, and how many soldiers they had on either side.  We 
had a meeting on Wednesday, I think, and all these questions were 
put on the table, mostly by McNamara.  Nobody had the answers to 
them.  The fact that Maxwell Taylor and McNamara and John 
McCone hadn’t been brought in on this created a great fuss.  The 
government split in two.  It was the only time, really, in three years 
that the government was broken in two in a very disturbing 
way.320 
 
On August 29, the White House sent another cable to Saigon seeking to 
clarify the administration’s policy for Lodge and the South Vietnam country 
team.  With normal approval procedures in place, President Kennedy signed off 
on new policy guidance, which was not fundamentally different from the policy 
outlined in the August 24 cable.  It said in essence that the White House would 
indeed welcome a coup if it had good odds of succeeding.  The U.S. mission in 
Saigon should not be involved in planning such a coup but should stay abreast of 
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moves by the generals, who should be informed that the United States would 
provide no material support to them in their effort against Diem.321 
The policy clarification sent to Saigon did little to quiet arguments in 
Washington about what to do, however.  Disagreements among senior officials 
about what the policy was and what it should be continued.  Some in the 
Kennedy administration believed that Diem could be brought around, despite 
increasing signs that he had grown unresponsive to U.S. coaxing and cajoling.  
Others were eager to see Diem fall, a prospect that seemed increasingly close 
since coup plotting had continued apace among the Vietnamese generals.  On 
September 6, RFK joined a discussion about Vietnam at the White House attended by 
Bundy, Taylor, Rusk, Helms and McNamara, among others.  Talk ranged from 
Diem’s standing at the United Nations to ground developments from South Vietnam.  
RFK, however, seized on what was then the central issue, pressing it with the group.  
Could the United States win in Vietnam with Diem or not?  The attorney general 
asked this of the group multiple times.  If the answer was yes, RFK reasoned, then the 
administration needed to become much tougher with Diem in order to get some new 
results.  If the answer was no, RFK said, then it was time to face that reality.  None of 
the other men offered an answer to RFK.  They talked of getting further 
assessments.322   
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Several days later, during another Vietnam meeting held at the State 
Department, RFK expressed impatience with all the waffling from the president’s 
most senior advisors.  It was clear that prospects for success would improve without 
Nhu and Diem, RFK said.  The question was how steep the price for a change would 
be.  The time for discussing generalities about the situation and airing differences of 
views was over, the attorney general argued.  As far as RFK was concerned the time 
had come to discuss specific actions based on the conclusion that Diem and Nhu 
should go.323  RFK tried to push the rest of the White House advisors to action, 
sensing a rough consensus forming around the idea of ousting Diem.  He exerted 
what influence he held but failed to steer the thinking or decisions.  The group 
remained divided about what to do, however.  Debate continued, and the general 
policy drift RFK clearly hoped to halt nonetheless persisted.  
Meanwhile, the coup plotters in Saigon, led by General Duong Van Minh, 
a.k.a. Big Minh, evidently sensed the lingering division and indecisiveness among 
officials in Washington and the U.S. mission in Saigon.  Big Minh wanted clarity 
regarding the U.S. position as the coup plot was moving into its final phases.  So on 
October 5, Conein met with Minh, at the general’s request.  Minh asked flatly 
whether the United States would move to stop the developing coup.  Minh stressed 
that the coup did not need U.S. support, just U.S. acquiescence and willingness to 
continue backing a new government once it came to power.  In line with guidance 
from Washington, Conein told Minh that he could not at that time offer assurances 
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that the United States would remain idle in the face of a coup.  Minh urged Conein to 
seek clarification on the U.S. position and said he would be in touch to get further 
word.  In this same conversation Minh revealed that the coup plot was fairly well 
developed and indicated a willingness to leave Diem in power so long as Nhu and 
another reviled brother, Ngo Dinh Can, were eliminated.324   
Conein passed Minh’s message to Washington.  On October 6, the U.S. 
embassy in Saigon received a cable from Washington saying the matter had been 
discussed with President Kennedy.  JFK did not want the coup plotters to be under the 
impression that the United States would stand in their way or refuse to support a new 
regime once in power so long as the new government committed itself to carrying out 
the war effectively.  But the White House wanted to know more about the plot and 
urged the embassy to have Conein press Minh for details, saying assurances were 
needed from the generals in order for Washington to render an official decision.325   
It was a difficult, perhaps impossible, balancing act for Conein.  Basically the 
White House wanted Conein to get more information about the coup from Minh 
without revealing that Washington was in support of a coup.  Yet at the same time 
Conein should let on that the United States was not going to stand in the way.  Conein 
remembers getting at least the latter point across to Minh in late September or early 
October.326  The carefully nuanced proviso stemming from lack of consensus among 
Kennedy administration policymakers was clearly lost on Minh.   Thus, by default, 
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the White House had settled on a policy of regime change as far as Big Minh and the 
generals were concerned, and they went ahead with their plans accordingly.   
The coup’s odds of success were foremost on President Kennedy’s mind on 
October 29, when senior officials from the CIA and the Pentagon gathered at the 
White House.  The meeting began at 4:20 p.m.  Those attending included Vice 
President Johnson, McNamara, Rusk, RFK, McCone, Helms, Taylor, Bundy, CIA Far 
East Division Chief William Colby and a few other aides.  The president wanted to 
know how many forces would come to Diem’s aid in the event of a coup.  President 
Kennedy feared that the coup might fail in its early stages, with Diem uncovering the 
plot against him in a way that exposed American involvement.  The president also 
worried that the coup might lead to a prolonged crisis in Saigon.  Unless the rebels 
were especially swift, Diem would have time to entrench himself and summon 
loyalists to strike his attackers, leading to fighting in Saigon.  This had occurred in 
1960, when Diem fought off a previous coup attempt.  Kennedy did not want a repeat.  
Colby, who opened the meeting with a briefing on the situation, could offer no 
assurances to Kennedy that the coup would be quick enough to avoid an outbreak of 
fighting in Saigon.  The prevailing CIA analysis was that Diem had about 9,000 
loyalists in the Vietnamese security forces, with roughly the same number ready to 
side with the would-be junta in a coup.  Colby concluded his briefing this way:  
“There’s enough, in other words, to have a good fight.  On both sides.”  Kennedy 
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chuckled, saying, “Thank you for your decisive…”  Others in the room laughed as 
well before launching into a disorganized discussion about the coming coup.327   
The recording JFK secretly made of the session reveals loud debate swerving 
in several different directions from there, with multiple people speaking over each 
other making related yet divergent points.  Bundy suggested putting Colby’s analysis 
to the team in Saigon so that they could either concur or dissent based on their own 
assessment.  RFK noted that Diem probably had gotten wind of a coup and suggested 
that Diem may have infiltrated coup plots with his own operatives.  Rusk raised the 
prospect of civil war erupting if the coup spiraled out of control and said the coup 
plotters should be warned that any move against Diem must involve very quick 
success.  The discussion then meandered a bit before turning to what should be said in 
the next cables from Washington to Saigon.   
RFK suddenly interrupted with a comment that in essence crystalized the 
central issue, which had gotten lost amid the various distractions.  The attorney 
general asked simply whether the United States should be pursuing Diem’s overthrow 
at all.  A key exchange in the transcript involving Robert Kennedy, Rusk, Taylor, 
McCone and the president highlighted the attorney general’s thinking.  RFK, in a 
reversal of his earlier opinions on the issue, argued against overthrowing Diem given 
the uncertainties surrounding such a move.  At first blush, RFK’s change of heart 
might seem to flow from a waxing sense of doubt about the U.S. intervention in 
Vietnam.  But close inspection of the logic RFK articulated reveals that his reversal is 
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rooted in hawkishness.  During the Kennedy administration RFK never questioned 
the U.S. mission in Vietnam.  He only ever sought to ensure its success.  For this 
reason he voiced doubt about the unfolding coup:      
 
ROBERT KENNEDY: I may be a minority, but I just don’t see that 
this makes any sense on the face of it.  I mean, it’s different from a 
coup in the Iraq or [a] South American country.  We are so intimately 
involved in this…  We’re putting the whole future of the country and, 
really, Southeast Asia, in the hands of somebody that we don’t know 
very well…  Maybe it’s gonna be successful, but I don’t think there’s 
anybody, any reports that I’ve seen, [indicating] that anybody has a 
plan to show where this is going… 
 
TAYLOR:  I must say that I agree with the attorney general at 
present…  I would be willing to step farther...  first because you’ll 
have a completely inexperienced government, and secondly because 
the provincial chiefs, who are so essential to the conduct of the field, 
will all be changed, and it’s taken us over a year now to develop any 
truly effective work in that area…  In the long terms, it might be good.  
In the short terms, then it’s bad. 
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MCCONE:  I think our opinion is somewhat the same as General 
Taylor expressed…  A successful coup, in our opinion—I feel very 
definitely that’s right—would create a period of political confusion, 
interregnum, and would seriously affect the war for a period of time 
which is not possible to estimate.  It might be disastrous.   
 
 President Kennedy then spoke up again to say that the parity of loyalists 
versus rebels in Saigon meant that a coup should not be pursued unless the embassy 
team could offer some information showing that the balance of forces would tilt 
toward the junta once the coup began.  McNamara reminded everyone that the clock 
was quickly running out.  “If these people are correct as to when this thing is going to 
happen, we are now at 5 o’clock on the morning of the 30th out there, and it’s gonna 
happen in maybe 24 to 36 hours.”328  McNamara was right.  The mutinous generals in 
Saigon made their move on November 1, with the White House still divided about 
whether a coup should happen at all.  President Kennedy never had a chance to 
embrace RFK’s advice or reject it.  Events in Saigon overtook the president.  By 
November 2 the coup plotters were firmly in control, and Diem and Nhu were dead, 
executed in the back of an armored personnel carrier shortly after being captured by 
the junta.  The CIA sent the attorney general an intelligence brief on the status of the 
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coup November 1, when all appeared successful.  The military had seized power 
smoothly by all accounts.329  This would soon prove to be a delusion.  
 
A Final Push against Castro 
None of the doubts about overthrowing Diem applied to Castro at any point, and the 
Kennedys pursued the Cuban leader’s downfall without pause.  President Kennedy 
never considered covert operations off the table in light of the missile agreement and 
said so explicitly to RFK and the other ExComm men once the most intense moment 
of the crisis had passed.  We can’t give the impression that Castro is home free, JFK 
said.330  Within days of the crisis ending RFK assessed what CIA assets were 
available for use in pressing ahead with covert actions in Cuba.  McCone informed 
the attorney general that 20 trained Cuban commando were ready for infiltration 
operations, with more such teams to become available in the months ahead.331  And 
by December the CIA had renewed resupply missions for operatives inside Cuba in 
order to sustain what assets remained for any future operations.332  The Kennedys 
clearly expressed their intention to resume covert operations against Cuba regardless 
of other ongoing diplomacy.   
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Whatever urge for revenge RFK felt at the beginning of the crisis gave way to 
straightforward strategic thinking about Cuba in the period immediately afterward.  
Cuba, in RFK’s mind, still posed a major security threat, and the attorney general 
remained unquestionably the administration’s chief official handling the issue.  RFK 
feared that the Soviets might try to get more missiles in even while they vowed to 
remove them.  He worried about other conventional arms coming to Cuba and 
possibly being exported to another Latin American country. 333  The administration 
grew increasingly concerned over reports about Soviet missiles supposedly being 
hidden in caves and construction of a Soviet submarine base.334 Meanwhile, public 
anxiety about weapons of all kinds in Cuba ran high, in part because Cuban exiles, 
still hoping for U.S. military action, spoke to the press about alleged military buildups 
on the island.  The picture they painted may or may not have been exaggerated.  
Regardless it caused a further political problem RFK began to address.335  A lingering 
sense of menace emanating from Cuba would pose problems for the upcoming 
election season. 
On November 5, 1962, Dobrynin appeared in the attorney general’s office 
with another letter from Khrushchev.  The Soviet premier was unhappy that the White 
House was pressing for the removal of Soviet IL-28 bombers from Cuba, in addition 
to the missiles.  RFK told Dobrynin that the bombers, like the missiles, were 
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considered offensive weapons and had to go.  The Kremlin did not think that was part 
of the deal.  Moscow held to the view that the agreement involved removal of Soviet 
missiles in exchange for an end to the blockade and U.S. surveillance flights over 
Cuba.  The exchanges between President Kennedy and Khrushchev that formed the 
basis of the deal in October, after all, made no mention of the bombers.336  As the two 
talked the president called.  Word had come, JFK said, that U.S. reconnaissance 
aircraft over Cuba had taken fire.  The attorney general in closing with Dobrynin 
stressed that any arrangements, whatever they involved, were dependent upon no 
incidents in the skies over Cuba.337  For a moment it seemed like as though the entire 
deal was in jeopardy, with another standoff looming. 
Gradually, tensions that filled the air in the aftermath of the crisis faded.  The 
Kremlin relented on the bombers.  Castro, while generally hostile to the dealings 
between Moscow and Washington over his country, nonetheless helped the situation 
by finally releasing the remaining prisoners still held from the Bay of Pigs in 
December, allowing them to be free for Christmas.  Upon release, members of the 
2506 Brigade underwent extensive interrogation by U.S. officials in Miami.  RFK 
requested a report on the questioning and got a lengthy reply from the Army, which 
handled the screening.  On the whole the prisoners expressed relief at being free and 
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an eagerness to continue in efforts to bring down Castro.338  Castro, however, began 
looking for a way out of seemingly endless hostilities with Washington. 
In the opening months of 1963 Castro signaled a desire for rapprochement 
with the administration, as the CIA noted in a report sent to RFK and other senior 
officials.  Castro himself along with multiple senior officials in his government 
repeatedly telegraphed a desire for a thaw in relations between Havana and 
Washington.  The message from Havana to the Kennedy administration was subtle 
but clear, aired through prominent media interviews and midlevel diplomatic 
conversations known by all parties involved to be fodder for intelligence reports.  The 
offer, in essence, said that Castro was willing to talk about improving relations if the 
White House made the first move.339 Castro himself stated this explicitly during a 
lengthy interview in April with ABC correspondent Lisa Howard, who briefed the 
CIA upon returning to the United States.  Castro could not have been clearer about his 
desire for an easing of tensions.  He and Howard even went so far as to discuss who 
the proper intermediary might be and how the talks should unfold if there was 
willingness on the part of the Kennedy administration.  Helms made sure RFK was 
aware of Castro’s desire.340  Castro’s peace feelers failed to impress the attorney 
general, who said any rapprochement should only come if Castro undertook some 
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fundamental steps such as removing Soviet troops from Cuba and ending subversion 
activities in Latin America.341  As far as RFK was concerned Castro still had to go.  
The only question was how. 
Enthusiasm for another round of operations against Castro reached a low point 
in January of 1963.  Lansdale and Harvey fell out of the picture, effectively fired 
from the White House Cuba team after RFK made his displeasure with both 
abundantly clear.342  Bundy, in a memo to the president, said there was virtually 
“universal agreement that Mongoose is at a dead end.”  The president himself tacitly 
agreed in calling for a fresh approach to Cuba policy, ordering his advisors to come 
up with a plan for a new arrangement going forward.343  The president and his 
advisors ultimately had the State Department create a new position for coordinating 
all Cuban affairs, including covert operations.344  The arrangement was more 
cosmetic than substantive and ultimately changed virtually nothing about how Cuba 
was handled at the White House, however.  In practice RFK and the other senior 
White House officials who had worked on Mongoose still held authority to conceive 
and launch covert actions in Cuba and direct overall policy as members of the Special 
Group, the National Security Council, ExComm and the Standing Group, the 
successor board to ExComm.  RFK still figured prominently in all policy discussions 
about Cuba, wherever they occurred.  No bureaucratic flow or arrangement of 
                                                        
341 Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Special Group, Nov. 5, 1963, FRUS V.XI, 1961-1963, 373. 
342 Evan Thomas, Robert Kennedy, p. 235. 
343 Memorandum for the president from Bundy, Further organization of the Government for 
dealing with Cuba, Jan. 4, 1963, DNSA No. CC02824. 
344 National Security Action Memorandum No. 213, Jan. 8, 1963, Box 231, Attorney General 
Papers, Confidential File, John F. Kennedy Library. 
  
 
182
committees had any real effect on RFK’s central role in Cuba policy while President 
Kennedy remained in office. 
By the spring of 1963 a new status quo on Cuba had taken shape.  Publically 
President Kennedy offered assurances that no offensive weapons remained on the 
island even while remaining worried and uncertain privately.  The Soviet troop 
presence still in Cuba, the president said, posed no immediate threat to the United 
States.  But, since Castro would not allow inspections of the island, U.S. aerial 
surveillance would continue to keep a close watch.345  U.S. insistence on surveillance 
flights brought protests from both Havana and Moscow, as did the increasing hit-and-
run attacks staged by militant Cuban exiles.  Proliferating militant exile groups 
operating loosely under the banner of the Cuban Revolutionary Council had grown 
more capable and audacious in their periodic strikes against the Castro regime by 
early 1963.  By March senior Cuban officials had renewed public complaints and 
condemnations of U.S. subversion activities to the United Nations.346  In fact, during 
the months immediately following the missile crisis, the administration had largely 
refrained from sabotage operations in Cuba. 347  But exile outfits acting on their own, 
sometimes with support or encouragement from the CIA, kept up raids. 
Throughout 1963 the CIA tried to keep tabs on the exile raids, which took 
place more and more as the increasingly splintered community grew restless and 
despairing.  The agency sometimes offered help for raids they deemed worthwhile.  
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Other times the CIA obstructed the exile attack plans, setting domestic law 
enforcement on groups hatching plots the CIA disliked for whatever reason.  
Frequently the attorney general was notified about these activities by the FBI, which 
under Hoover’s watch kept a close eye on the CIA’s dealings with Cuban exiles in the 
United States.348  For its part, the FBI regarded RFK as the authority allowing or 
disallowing the activities of various exile groups, regardless of whether such groups 
received direct support from the CIA.  Ostensibly all Cuban exile groups arming 
themselves and conducting raids against Cuba were in violation of U.S. neutrality 
laws.  As a matter of course the FBI undertook efforts to uncover all such activity.  If 
an exile group the FBI monitored appeared in violation of U.S. domestic law, the 
bureau contacted the CIA.  If the CIA said the group’s activities were part of a 
national security effort, then the FBI did not disrupt them.  But the attorney general’s 
prominent role in Cuba policy, combined with his domestic law enforcement 
authority, allowed him also to vouch for exile groups, as was the case with a militant 
Cuban exile outfit known as Alpha-66.  That group engaged in number of actions not 
involving the CIA, but the attorney general instructed the FBI to leave them alone 
anyway.349  What this amounted to in practice overall was clear enough to the FBI, 
the CIA and the Cuban exiles themselves: RFK personally held the power to bless or 
halt rebel attacks on Cuba.  The attorney general’s acquiescence toward exile activity, 
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then, was a green light and a signal all involved that the White House either condoned 
or actively supported Cuban rebel attacks.   
RFK and the president might have continued this general encouragement of 
rebel activity if larger Cold War issues had not intruded.  The exiles struck Soviet 
military assets in addition to Cuban targets, creating a serious dilemma for the 
administration’s dealings with Moscow in 1963.  On March 29, the president gathered 
the ExComm to discuss the exile raids.  The question was whether the administration 
should actively try to stop them or urge the exiles to attack strictly Cuban targets and 
avoid tangling with Soviet forces.  The group was divided about what to do.  The 
raids were useful in terms of discrediting Castro, some felt, but they risked provoking 
the Soviets to increase their military support of the regime.  For his part RFK 
acknowledged that keeping up the charade of noninvolvement with the exile raids 
was untenable.  Everyone at the meeting felt that the raids would only increase in the 
months ahead.  And as such international pressure would mount for the 
administration to do something to stop the attacks.  Disavowing the attacks but simply 
allowing them to continue, RFK felt, was unworkable.  If the policy was to stop the 
raids, the attorney general said, that could be done.  The president leaned toward 
trying to coax the exiles into cooperating more with the CIA to ensure they were 
attacking only targets that the administration wanted hit.  But if the exiles would not 
respond to guidance then they would have to be stopped, perhaps by prosecuting 
some for violation of U.S. laws.  No firm decisions were taken at the meeting.  The 
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president ordered RFK, McCone and some others to come up with a formal plan for 
dealing with the problem.350 
A few days after that White House meeting Khrushchev passed a message to 
President Kennedy through RFK and Dobrynin, who hand delivered it to the attorney 
general at the Justice Department.  The Soviet premier bitterly complained about 
raids in Cuba by exiles and placed blame squarely on the administration.  Khrushchev 
also denounced the administration’s efforts to ruin Cuba’s economy.  Furthermore, 
Khrushchev said, U.S. actions to pressure Moscow into withdrawing Soviet troops 
from Cuba would go nowhere.  He vowed to keep anti-aircraft missile batteries in 
Cuba and threatened to shoot down reconnaissance planes.  RFK was somewhat taken 
aback, regarding the message as uncharacteristically bellicose in comparison to the 
other missives he and Dobrynin had passed back and forth on behalf of their bosses.  
RFK said so to Dobrynin, who agreed.  RFK told the Soviet ambassador that any 
further such messages should simply be passed through the State Department.  Their 
informal channel, he implied was not a place for bluster and threats.351  RFK 
evidently viewed the message as a rant by Khrushchev.  In reality Khrushchev’s 
anger reflected mounting tensions between Washington and Moscow, with Cuba as 
the main cause. 
At a White House meeting within a day of Khrushchev’s message the 
president and the attorney general together told Helms and others working on Cuba in 
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no uncertain terms that they wanted new sabotage operations.  The president 
expressed general approval for the ongoing raids by exiles done on their own volition 
so long as they did real damage on Cuban targets, avoided Soviet ships and did not 
feature showy press conferences by the saboteurs afterward.  Regarding U.S. actions, 
the president ordered the CIA to come up with a plan for what might be accomplished 
with sabotage operations in the next six months.  RFK suggested using attack teams 
as large as 100 to 500 men.  Perhaps commando teams of such a size could infiltrate 
Cuba, the attorney general said, conduct attacks and then evacuate.  The CIA 
regarded this as impossible, since Castro’s forces would certainly destroy any such 
force that suddenly appeared in Cuba.  But RFK’s suggestion revealed how the 
Kennedys harbored ambitions for action in Cuba that went well beyond what the CIA 
or the Special Group contemplated as doable or wise.352  Midlevel officials generally 
felt that sabotage operations undermined intelligence capabilities and had an overall 
negative impact on the political situation.  Bundy and others stressed this to the 
president and the attorney general, but the Kennedys did not want to hear it.353  As 
before they demanded action.  RFK felt that something had to be done, even if it had 
no real hope of bringing Castro down.354 
There were reasons for the Kennedys to pursue covert attacks on Cuba beyond 
blindly swinging at a foe the brothers clearly loathed.  The CIA, in coming up with a 
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covert action campaign as the president directed, emphasized the risk of allowing 
Castro to remain unchallenged.  Castro would only be more difficult to remove in 
later years if allowed a free hand to consolidate his control of the island and perhaps 
widen his influence in Latin America.  Regular attacks, staged dramatically to ensure 
public notice, undermined Castro’s claim to authority and kept alive overthrow 
dreams among the exiles.  The net effect, according to CIA analysis, would be a slight 
destabilization of Castro generally that would pave the way for regime change in the 
future when an opportune moment arose.355  The attacks then essentially comprised 
on some level the middle phase of what the Kennedys saw as a long game.  Keep 
Castro unsteady, the thinking went, and be prepared to knock him over at the right 
moment. 
 
The Exiles and the Endgame 
Throughout 1963 RFK maintained his personal contacts with exile leaders, chiefly 
Artime and Cardona.  Mostly RFK spoke in person with various Cuban exiles at his 
home or at the Justice Department, holding discreet meetings in the same way he did 
with Bolshakov and Dobrynin.  RFK evinced a heartfelt sympathy for the brigade 
members especially.  He wanted to see them treated fairly now that they were in the 
United States.  Those who wanted to continue to take part in U.S. actions against 
Castro should be allowed to do so, he felt.  Others who wanted to move on should be 
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supported.356  RFK met with Cardona personally in early April at Hickory Hill, at the 
invitation of RFK.  Dr. Ernesto Aragon, a senior figure in the CRC, also came, as did 
a senior officer from the CIA.  The meeting was tense.  Cardona told RFK that the 
exile community no longer had faith in the administration since it was clear the policy 
had changed.  The Kennedys no longer seemed serious about overthrowing Castro, 
Cardona said to RFK.  The attorney general tried to convince Cardona that he was 
wrong, that the White House remained intent on bringing Castro down.  At the same 
time RFK complained about rogue exile raids, saying the administration had to take 
steps to curb them.  He told Cardona to disclose any plans for future raids.  Talk then 
turned to the possibility of a U.S. invasion of Cuba.  As far as Cardona was concerned 
the president and the attorney general personally had assured him in April of 1962 
that the exiles could count on a U.S. military invasion at some point.  Prior to the 
missile crisis the CIA had sent further signals, according to Cardona, suggesting that 
an invasion plan was afoot.  Yet nothing concrete ever materialized, leaving Cardona 
feeling deceived.  RFK argued that no such promises were ever made.  The two could 
not agree, and Cardona left Hickory Hill angry.  In following days Cardona fumed 
about what he regarded as U.S. deception and abandonment, and in short order he 
announced his resignation as head of the CRC.357  
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The organization effectively disbanded once Cardona walked away.358  The 
already fragmented exile community lost its central figure.  RFK was right in telling 
Cardona that U.S. policy had not changed.  Indeed, the administration had 
consistently contemplated a military overthrow of Cuba, to be done at a time 
expedient for the administration, not the exiles.  And yet Cardona and other exiles had 
clearly believed that the administration would work in concert with their cause, 
standing ready to move militarily when the moment presented itself.  The exiles 
believed they would have a hand in making that moment.  The president, the attorney 
general and the CIA fanned these beliefs through 1961 and 1962.  Only in 1963 was it 
becoming clear to Cardona and others in the exile community that the administration 
held to its own agenda with regard to Cuba, and the exile community really had no 
say on matters.  The Kennedys and the White House generally regarded the exiles as 
instruments of U.S. policy, to be used when needed and discarded when not.  
Cardona’s falling out with the administration represented a harsh disillusionment long 
in the making for him and the exiles generally. 
The collapse of the CRC coincided with a review of overall Cuba policy by 
RFK and others at the White House.  The remnants of the Mongoose team tried to 
formulate a fresh strategy.  No one seemed to have any new ideas.  McNamara clearly 
had grown impatient with the situation.  If the policy is to get rid of Castro, he asked 
during a key meeting, then there ought to be a plan to do so.  At present there was 
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none. 359  The CIA had continued its murderous plotting against Castro, coming up 
with assassination schemes that involved an exploding conch shell and a wetsuit 
dusted with poison.  As ever it came to nothing.360    RFK proposed three studies.  
One would outline measures the administration could take in the event of Castro’s 
death or the downing of another U-2.  Another study would look at the feasibility of 
overthrowing Castro within eighteen months.  And a third study would examine ways 
to make as much trouble as possible within Cuba over the next eighteen months.361  
The studies RFK suggested were redundant, however.  By early April the president 
and the attorney general were together pressing the CIA to step up covert action, a 
new campaign that would in effect form the center of U.S. policy toward Cuba.362   
From RFK’s perspective, the logic demanding action against Castro 
continually prevailed as the attorney general regularly assessed Latin America for 
signs of communist insurgency.  RFK seemed to adopt the CIA’s generally alarmist 
assessment of communist threats to the region.  In August, the CIA aired a warning 
about pro-Castro guerrillas operating in Nicaragua.  The fighters had entered 
Nicaragua from Honduras in July and had remained active, traveling by boat along 
river ways and buying supplies from locals in the rural areas.  Meanwhile, in Costa 
Rica, backers of the Nicaraguan guerrillas were gathering arms and supplies for them, 
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saying there was a plan to open a new revolutionary front on the Caribbean coast.  
RFK received a copy of the agency’s intelligence report along with a map showing 
probable areas of guerrilla activity.363  The CIA report was one of many similar such 
bulletins RFK got from the CIA, memos of two and three pages bulleted with items of 
interest from various Latin American countries.   
Through these RFK was privy to intelligence snippets that often meant little 
on their own -- the supposed confession of an arrested rebel suspect in Bolivia, 
reports of guerrilla training camps springing up in remote jungles in Central America 
and the like.364  The broader picture these reports drew, however, was a Latin 
America crawling with communist insurgents.  Countries big and small in the region 
seemed threatened by Castro’s revolutionaries as far as the Kennedys were 
concerned.  President Kennedy personally pressed the CIA to give him hard figures 
on the number of Castro’s subversives at work in Venezuela specifically and Latin 
America generally in concerns shared with RFK.365  In response the agency 
assembled an intelligence estimate that put the number of subversives from various 
Latin American countries who had trained in Cuba recently as high as 1,500.  And the 
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guerrillas Castro embraced had been busy afterward, setting up further training camps 
of their own in Costa Rica, Honduras and Panama.366   
In the eyes of the Kennedys, Castro stood at the center of a web of communist 
subversives that stretched across all of Latin America.  The CIA considerably 
overstated the threat.  Castro could offer training and inspiration to would-be 
communist revolutionaries in Latin America but little else.  To be sure Castro yearned 
to see revolutions like the one he led flourish throughout the region, but the realities 
of Cuba’s poverty and international isolation limited his ability to turn such visions 
into reality.  Moreover, Khrushchev explicitly told Castro in May of 1963 that the 
Soviet Union would not support armed insurrection in Latin America and that Castro 
should abandon efforts to orchestrate communist movements in the region.  The 
Kremlin had in the past made only small efforts at spreading communism in Latin 
America, and missile crisis lessened Moscow’s already low appetite for such pursuits.  
Both Moscow and Havana kept up the rhetoric of communist revolution during 1963 
but in practice backed away from the cause.367  RFK and the Kennedy administration 
nonetheless allowed themselves to believe the direst warnings about the threat Castro 
posed.  For RFK, the same logic that drove him to see instability in the Dominican 
Republic as a mortal threat to regional security evidently kept him worried about 
Castro and the small bands of guerrilla fighters in the region with connections to 
Cuba.  Even the fall of a small remote country to communism could upend the U.S. 
position in the region, or so the thinking of the domino theory went. 
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In the wake of the missile crises the Kennedys wanted attacks against Castro, 
by the CIA and by willing exiles.  That would be the new Cuba plan.  Disorganization 
in the exile community did not stop the administration from seeing them as a useful, 
even vital, element of its emerging anti-Castro program.  As of June 1963 the CIA 
moved to support various militant outfits intent on striking Cuba as part of the 
administration’s overall covert campaign, which the president had ordered.  There 
was to be a mix of sabotage operations.  The CIA would stage some raids itself 
through its own resources, while selected Cuban exiles would unleash attacks of their 
own with support and encouragement from the CIA.   In the past the CIA had 
endeavored, if unsuccessfully, to ensure that it controlled all raids carried out by 
exiles against Cuba.368  The program that shaped up in mid 1963 in response the 
Kennedys’ request for more covert action essentially allowed designated exile groups 
to take CIA support and conduct operations at their own discretion.  Facing 
complaints from Moscow and Havana, the administration did take some pro forma 
steps toward curbing exile raids and made a very public display of placing travel 
restrictions on certain exiles in the Miami area.369  But the move amounted to little 
more than a smokescreen for the underlying policy of support for militant exile 
activity.  In the end the administration made no meaningful effort to stop the exile 
raids, because such attacks were integral to the revamped covert campaign against 
Cuba. 
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As the summer of 1963 wore on, the despair that had clouded the hopes of 
much of the exile community earlier in the year gave way to a sense of optimism and 
excitement.  New plans for a move against Castro were afoot, this time instigated by 
the Nicaraguan President Luis Somoza.  President Somoza had traveled to the Miami 
area in July and met with various exile leaders, opening the possibility of hosting a 
rebel base in Nicaragua or another country in Central America.  In August several 
Cuban exile leaders traveled to Nicaragua for talks with Somoza, including Artime, a 
figure widely regarded within the exile community as on the CIA payroll.  The fact 
that Somoza was moving so openly to court Cuban exiles suggested to many that 
Nicaragua and perhaps other countries in Central America were at work on a new 
effort against Castro.  No such activity could go on, many felt, without tacit approval 
from the United States.  Moreover, Artime was rumored to be RFK’s favored Cuban 
exile leader.  Some in the exile community believed that RFK had personally urged 
Somoza to unite rebel groups behind Artime.370  The rumors held truth.  By July of 
1963 the CIA had moved to support Artime, among other militant exiles, and his 
operations outside the United States, with approval from the attorney general and 
other top administration officials.371 
The CIA scheduled a number of its own covert operations to continue through 
the summer and fall of 1963, and the president continued to approve them personally 
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as late as mid November. 372  From the CIA’s perspective the attacks accomplished 
little.  Raid after raid failed as before, with Castro’s forces often capturing the 
infiltrators as they reached Cuban shores.373  Doubts about the wisdom of the covert 
program, evident from the beginning despite the Kennedys’ insistence, deepened 
within the administration in the latter part of 1963 as well.  In the months 
immediately after the Cuban missile crisis some in the White house had simply 
wondered whether such attacks were helpful to the overall goal of deposing Castro.  
Now Rusk for one was arguing that the raids actually worsened matters by 
complicating relations with the Moscow and increasing the likelihood of Soviet 
troops staying in Cuba in large numbers for the long term.374   
Nevertheless, JFK kept okaying CIA operations and did little to stop 
independent exile actions, evidently sharing RFK’s view that something should be 
done even if odds of actually harming Castro in a meaningful way were low.  The 
Kennedys’ standing order to attack Castro remained in place, and the CIA acted on it.  
The raids were not the only method.  The CIA also launched a new assassination plot 
against Castro involving a senior Cuban official, Rolando Cubela Secades.  Seeking a 
potential defector from inside the regime, the CIA successfully recruited Cubela in 
August of 1963.  Disillusioned with Castro, Cubela told the CIA he would eliminate 
Castro if the administration backed a coup.  In October, Cubela, whose CIA 
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codename was AMLASH, met with his CIA handler in Paris.  Cubela demanded an 
audience with RFK as show of the administration’s seriousness in backing the 
emerging plans, which at that date amounted to little more than an agreement to go 
forward with a plot.  RFK did not meet with Cubela but likely knew about him.  
Desmond FitzGerald, who did meet with Cubela, replaced Harvey as chief of 
operations for Cuba and regularly kept the attorney general apprised of covert 
operations.375  Definitive proof of RFK’s knowledge of AMLASH or any of the 
CIA’s plots against Castro in 1963 remains elusive.  But the fact that RFK and other 
senior White House officials regularly discussed the sudden death of Castro when 
mulling options in Cuba suggests at the very least that the CIA’s efforts to kill Castro 
were generally known at the most senior levels in the administration. 
On November 12, the president, the attorney general, McCone and McNamara 
took stock of Cuba operations.  Bundy and Rusk joined the discussion, as did a 
number of CIA men involved, including Helms, Cheever and Fitzgerald.  McCone 
opened the meeting with the usual overview.  He mentioned Hurricane Flora, which 
slammed Cuba early in October.  Initially the CIA said the storm had a devastating 
effect on the Cuban economy, but now the damage appeared to be lower than 
originally estimated.  The Soviets, meanwhile, continued to withdraw some military 
personnel, but new troops continued to arrive at the same time.  McCone said that the 
Soviets seemed to be establishing military assistance mission in Cuba similar to the 
one the United States had in Vietnam.  The Soviets appeared to be training Cubans 
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for all kinds of military activity, including handling of missiles.  As many as 50 new 
Soviet tanks had arrived as well.  The CIA continued to maintain a small network of 
intelligence operatives, who mostly kept watch on the Havana area.  But their work 
was perilous.  Castro’s internal security forces were as effective as ever, and the CIA 
estimated that about 25 U.S. spies had been killed or captured in the past year.376 
The CIA reported some newfound hope, however, in efforts to stir dissent in 
Castro’s officer corps.  The agency had identified 54 Cuba military leaders who might 
be interested in overthrowing Castro.  The CIA had three contacts in Cuba who 
moved in military circles, and the plan going forward was to have these CIA 
operatives connect the would-be military conspirators against Castro with one another 
to get them thinking and talking about a possible move against the regime.  More 
visibly, the CIA had recently staged four sabotage operations, hitting a power plant, a 
sawmill, oil storage facilities and a floating crane in one of Cuba’s harbors.  The CIA 
was also still moving forward in support of Artime’s group, which was in the process 
of establishing bases in Costa Rica and Nicaragua.  The exile outfit headed by 
Manolo Ray was also in the process of establishing a base outside the United States, 
possibly in Costa Rica.  Once these groups had operational facilities, Fitzgerald said, 
then they would become much more effective instruments against Castro for the 
administration to use.  Fitzgerald went on, offering an overview of some upcoming 
operations that needed high-level approval.  The CIA wanted to stage further attacks 
targeting a large oil refinery and storage facilities, a large electrical plant, sugar 
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refineries, railroad bridges, docks and ships.  The group discussed whether airstrikes 
might be used against some of those targets and left off saying the CIA should 
proceed with planning along those lines with action likely coming in January.377   The 
other big play in the works on Cuba, a potential game changer, was the 
administration’s long-running effort to catch Castro sending arms to insurgents 
somewhere in Latin America.  The idea was that if Castro were caught in the act, then 
a military operation to remove him could go forward under the banner of the 
Organization of American States.  The president and his advisors ordered the CIA and 
the Navy to step up surveillance of Cuban shipping in the hope of catching a Cuban 
arms shipment within the next 90 days.378 
None of the administration’s efforts seemed to have any effect on Castro.  The 
regime appeared unshaken by anything the administration hurled at it.  And all the 
administration’s actions went largely unappreciated by the exile community.  On 
November 18, the president made public appearances in Tampa and Miami.  The 
president received a tepid reception from the Cuban exile community.  Indeed, the 
CIA Miami station worked hard to prevent sizable demonstrations that numerous 
exile groups were planning to protest U.S. policies.  The ill will among the exiles, 
never regarded as an especially content group, had reached a level that drew the 
concern of Helms, who informed McCone, Bundy and RFK about the happenings in 
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Miami surrounding the president’s visit.379  In short, Castro’s Cuba remained a source 
of frustration all around during the final days of the Kennedy administration.  The 
only way the administration saw to break the unhappy status quo was outright 
military action or perhaps the remote possibility of a surprise coup in Havana, but 
neither scenario appeared likely in the days before President Kennedy’s death. 
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Conclusion 
 
RFK’s involvement in national security policy came to an abrupt end with President 
Kennedy’s assassination November 22, 1963.  Cuba and Vietnam remained the 
foremost national security issues for President Johnson once he assumed office, and 
his earliest meetings with McCone, Bundy and others mostly revolved around those 
two issues.  RFK was not included in the talks.  McCone in fact urged Johnson not to 
see the attorney general until after the first of the year.  Bundy assured Johnson that 
RFK had been told not to expect the same openness from the Oval Office.  Bundy 
also told Johnson that it would be up to the president to decide how much 
involvement RFK would have going forward in intelligence and national security 
issues.  Johnson expressed no interest seeing RFK take part in national security issues 
any more.  In fact, Johnson made it very clear from the start of his time as president 
that he did not want RFK in the administration at all.380   
At times after President Kennedy’s death RFK’s friends among the national 
security team in the Johnson administration kept him apprised of developments on 
certain issues, but the attorney general never again had any significant say on such 
policy matters.  RFK remained squarely on the sidelines until eventually leaving the 
administration in September of 1964 amid an increasingly venomous political feud 
with President Johnson.  After that RFK began remaking himself as a possible White 
House contender focused primarily on domestic issues.  But what mark, if any, did 
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RFK leave on foreign policy under President Kennedy?  RFK certainly treaded 
heavily everywhere he went in the national security establishment.  The attorney 
general treated the CIA director like an employee, challenged the Pentagon brass in 
Cabinet meetings, dressed down ranking diplomats at the State Department and 
ordered White House foreign policy experts like Schlesinger to shut up when he felt 
the need -- to mention but a few of the ways RFK exercised his dubious authority on 
national security matters.  Brash and assertive, RFK seemed to play a major role in 
every weighty national security issue after the Bay of Pigs as he functioned as a 
minister without portfolio enjoying the president’s personal approval.  But assessing 
RFK’s actual impact accurately requires dividing his activities into three roles:  RFK 
as foreign policy advisor, RFK as high-level envoy and RFK as executive. 
As an advisor RFK held little influence.  Most of the time the national 
security establishment treated RFK with deference as he expressed thoughts on 
matters ranging from the internal security of Iran to damn construction in West 
Africa.  But generally the senior national security team, including the president, 
steered away from RFK’s policy proposals.  This was the case during the Dominican 
Republic crisis of 1961, when RFK was heard but roundly ignored as he called for 
drastic military action.  The Berlin crisis of 1961 serves as another example of RFK’s 
usual inability to shape major national security decisions.  RFK wanted to put 
America publically on a war footing, effectively escalating an already dangerous 
confrontation.  His ideas were mostly disregarded.  Attorney General Kennedy’s calls 
for military action during the Cuban Missile Crisis went unheeded.  And RFK 
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struggled likewise later in multiple debates about Vietnam to hold real sway over 
decisions.  Again and again the views RFK voiced during the making of national 
security policy decisions failed to shape outcomes in a meaningful way, most 
dramatically so during the prelude to the 1963 Saigon coup. 
As a messenger RFK effectively relayed critical communications in vital 
moments between the White House and the Kremlin.  A certain air of drama 
sometimes surrounded the delivery of those messages, especially in moments when 
RFK lost his temper.  But this role should not be overstated in terms of its 
significance.  RFK in these moments served simply as a conduit.  The attorney 
general never negotiated with Bolshakov or Dobrynin.  He simply presented policies 
that had already been crafted through deliberations at the White House to his Soviet 
interlocutors and relayed what messages he received from them.  RFK was not even 
the only backchannel President Kennedy used.  White House Press Secretary Pierre 
Salinger also worked with Bolshakov in handling discreet messages between the 
White House and the Kremlin.381  RFK’s lack of meaningful impact in this role is 
perhaps best illustrated in his exchanges with Dobrynin during the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, when RFK faithfully carried a message outlining the White House’s proposal 
for a resolution even though RFK openly opposed the president’s plan. 
RFK’s demonstrated inability to have a major impact on foreign policy as an 
advisor or a trusted messenger holds significance by presenting a finding that 
challenges the widespread understanding of how the Kennedy administration made 
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major foreign policy decisions.  Throughout the historiography the dominant 
narrative of the Kennedy administration’s foreign policy process shows President 
Kennedy increasingly relying on a tight inner circle of advisers for major foreign 
policy decisions in the wake of the Bay of Pigs.  RFK was integral to that tight inner 
circle yet unable to affect decisions significantly.  RFK’s lack of impact, despite all 
his assiduous efforts, suggests that forces other than the individual influences of 
policy makers were more important to outcomes.  The fact that RFK often found 
himself unable to influence foreign policy decisions forces consideration of new 
historical analyses of the Kennedy administration emphasizing structuralism in 
national security decision making rather than the individual actions of key 
players.   What becomes clear when examining RFK’s experience in dealing with 
national security issues is that shared assumptions about the Cold War among 
senior administration officials formed a paradigm virtually impervious to logic, 
as RFK’s efforts to argue against the 1963 coup in Saigon demonstrated.  
President Kennedy personally instilled one of the most important and erroneous 
assumptions at the base of the paradigm by insisting early on that the Soviet 
Union was pursuing a campaign of communist revolution in the Third World 
even when no evidence supported the Kremlin’s bombastic claim.  Faith in the 
effectiveness of counterinsurgency strategy as a method to confront this 
perceived threat formed another structural feature of the Kennedy 
administration groupthink on the Cold War, as did the flawed assumption of 
Soviet military strength on the ground in Europe.  Historians looking to 
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illuminate the Kennedy administration’s foreign policy processes in the future 
can no longer rely on the standard narrative as a basis for exploration in light of 
RFK’s demonstrated inability to operate outside the paradigm.  Most often RFK’s 
could not even extend his thinking beyond the working national security 
assumptions that formed the paradigm.  In the one instance late in 1963 when 
RFK did challenge administration groupthink based on dubious assumptions he 
failed to alter the course of action.  In short, individual influence counted for 
little on national security policy for one of the most influential individuals.  Thus 
a more sophisticated analytical approach rooted in structuralism is most likely 
needed to explain the actions of the Kennedy administration in the realm of 
foreign policy going forward. 
To be sure, RFK did indeed have an impact in his role as the executive tasked 
with overseeing the administration’s campaign against Castro after the Bay of Pigs, 
but a nuanced distinction between policymaking and policy implementation is needed 
to understand this properly.  RFK did not make a difference in formulating policy on 
Cuba.  He and the president were in effect of one mind on that from the beginning 
and remained so through the end of the Kennedy administration, both embracing the 
Eisenhower administration’s overthrow policy as a major objective within the 
constructs of the Cold War.  No evidence suggests that the Kennedy brothers ever 
diverged significantly in their thinking about plans and actions for Cuba.  They 
worked in concert on the issue from the Bay of Pigs onward.  But RFK made a major 
difference in implementation of the Kennedy administration’s policy.  Without RFK 
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the CIA would not likely have been nearly as responsive to the president’s desire to 
keep up efforts against Castro, since the CIA felt so badly burned in the Bay of Pigs.  
Few in the CIA really wanted to go aggressively after Castro again, and the doubters 
about the wisdom of such an effort ranged from McCone to Harvey.  But RFK’s 
relentless pressure on the agency ensured they worked hard at it and thus directly 
contributed to an increase in the tempo and destructiveness of U.S. attacks on Cuba.  
Evidence of this impact becomes visible in part by charting the pace of U.S. 
covert operations from the Eisenhower administration to the Johnson administration.  
The Eisenhower administration undertook 170 major covert operations in eight years.  
The Kennedy administration launched 163 major covert operations in roughly three 
years.  And the Johnson administration staged 142 major covert operations through 
February of 1967.382  If broken down into annual activity, the figures mean that the 
Kennedy administration undertook more than double the amount of covert operations 
per year than Eisenhower administration did.  And covert operations dropped by 
roughly half while President Johnson was in office.  The Cuba project, in all its 
iterations, undoubtedly accounted for the bulk of these covert actions during the 
Kennedy administration since it was the CIA’s largest program anywhere in the world 
at the time.  Thus the correlation between the steep rise in covert operations and 
RFK’s involvement with the CIA offers one measure of his impact as an implementer 
of foreign policy. 
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Another measure of RFK’s impact as an implementer comes in the impression 
all this work by the attorney general made on Castro, a man who understandably 
made it his business to identify U.S. machinations against him.  Castro believed that 
RFK, not the president, drove the U.S. plots to overthrow him during the Kennedy 
administration.383  RFK’s reputation as a zealot among Cuban exiles alone was 
enough to foster such suspicions in Castro, who might have also ventured this opinion 
on the basis of intelligence information his government gathered.  RFK engaged in 
nothing short of micromanagement of CIA anti-Castro operations.  And at the same 
time RFK launched what could be considered a parallel operation of his own, running 
a CIA operative personally and keeping up his own personal ties with Cuban 
militants.  RFK forcefully instilled energy and urgency in U.S. plots against Castro 
during the Kennedy administration, but RFK cannot be considered effective 
ultimately in his implementation of this policy given the simple fact that Castro 
stayed in power.  RFK’s biggest management project, leading the largest CIA 
program in the world at the height of the Cold War, was an unqualified failure with a 
legacy that literally still lives today.   
The image of RFK angrily waging a secret war against Castro involving 
murder plots and collusion with organized crime stands in stark contrast to the image 
RFK conjures today in historical memory.  Even historians eager to believe RFK 
underwent a profound internal transformation struggle to explain the disparity.  Evan 
Thomas argues, convincingly, that RFK only began to shift his political attitudes in 
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the winter of 1966.  Up to then RFK had remained ambivalent about the U.S. effort in 
Vietnam and tepid toward the idea of domestic reform rooted in the ideals of social 
justice, situating himself as identifiably conservative on the two most prominent 
issues of the time.384  RFK’s political evolution from there over the next two years 
appears cautious and halting, seemingly reflecting more the tactics of a seasoned 
politician aiming for high office than the zealotry of a convert soulfully embracing a 
new ideology.  And yet by the time of his death RFK stood as the torchbearer of 
postwar American liberalism and, most importantly, the voice of reason on Vietnam 
to those who wished to see an end to the U.S. intervention.   
There is little evidence to suggest that RFK fully abandoned major elements 
of his political thinking in just two years.  RFK’s hawkishness on foreign policy, 
rooted in a Cold War conservatism defined by the likes of Hoover and McCarthy, 
exemplified a dominant trait of his worldview.  During the Kennedy administration 
RFK was in a position to take action on these beliefs, and those actions, despite their 
overall ineffectiveness, revealed a depth of personal animus and myopia in RFK 
difficult to square the liberal image his celebrity persona emanated in 1968 and in 
decades afterward up to the present time.  The enduring image of RFK the iconic 
liberal is more a product of shifting perceptions than a reflection of a changed 
man.  The image of RFK crystalized in 1968 is best seen as an illusion that arose 
in the minds of liberals desperate for a political leader amid the rising tide of 
conservatism and the splintering of the political left in the 1960s.  To many, RFK 
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before he died became a symbol of liberalism’s hope for surviving as a viable 
political force in American politics in the face of the Silent Majority and the New 
Left.  RFK appeared to embrace this label chiefly as a matter of political 
expedience as he pursued the presidency, though some genuine political 
sentiments undoubtedly reinforced his new stance.  In this way a kind of myth 
about RFK flourished during his final years, and the illusion fit seamlessly into 
the larger mythology of Camelot after RFK died.385  A truer understanding of RFK 
and his place in history will flow from the kind of revisionist inquiry presented 
here.  New evidence certain to emerge in coming years through declassification 
must be examined with a fresh lens, one eschewing the deeply flawed narratives 
that currently form historical memory on the subject.        
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